Page images
PDF
EPUB

Mr. ROBERTSON. I didn't say that, Senator.

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. As far as the qualifications of the people who are nominated to serve on this Board.

Mr. ROBERTSON. What the House agreed to do in the conference was a provision that all the nominations to the NTSB were to be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, and the House conferees were well aware that this committee has the critical role in that function of advice and consent.

Senator STEVENS. The law itself requires that only two members have the particular background that you want all of them to have; isn't that correct?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I'm not saying that I seek to have all of them have that background. I think it might be a good idea. But the law doesn't require that. But under the bill as originally passed by the Senate, there could be no exceptions.

Senator STEVENS. That's not the way it passed, though.

Mr. ROBERTSON. No; that's right.

Senator STEVENS. And you say that this nomination is not in compliance with the law?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I'm not saying that at all, Senator.

Senator STEVENS. But aren't you asking us to impose something stronger than the law requires as far as this particular nominee is concerned?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is exactly right, to impose what the Senate has already passed as its sense of what a nomination to this Board should be people with professional backgrounds in transportation safety.

Senator STEVENS. I suggest to you if we did that, the next time we wouldn't get Senate confirmation of a nominee, because that's precisely what the House thinks we do, that is, exercise judgment beyond the strict requirements of the law as far as advice and consent is concerned.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Well, you have to pass on this nominee in terms of the job that she's to perform, as well as what the statute says about the qualifications to do it.

Senator STEVENS. But you're asking us to write into the law what was in the bill only when it passed the Senate as we give our advice and consent on this nominee. Isn't that right?

Mr. ROBERTSON. Well, with all respect, Senator Stevens, I don't think that I'm saying that. I did not suggest that the Senate should change the law. I'm saying that this Board at this particular time urgently requires people with professional background in transportation safety.

Senator STEVENS. Well, I can understand that, but with all due respect, you did say that before. You asked us to apply the judgment of the Senate to this nominee rather than the strict requirements of the law as determined by the House and Senate in conference. Now I think what

Mr. ROBERTSON. Well, if I did imply the Senate should ignore the law, I apologize, because that's not exactly what I intended to convey. What I'm trying to say is that the Senate has expressed its sense that professional background in transportation safety is a proper qualification for this position, and I think that it's the proper function

and proper role for this committee to apply that standard, even though it's not a statutory standard, in passing upon these early nominations to this important agency.

Senator STEVENS. Well, it's my experience that when we get some bright young women on some of these independent agencies, that their competition makes the men perform a little bit better. So I think you're missing the point.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PEARSON. Mr. Chairman, because of the exchange here and the issue developed, I think that section 303 (b) (1) of the act ought to be put in the record at this time, and the pertinent part of that paragraph reads:

At any given time no less than two members of the Board shall be individuals who have been appointed on the basis of technical qualifications and professional or managerial standing in the field of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, or transportation safety.

Senator CANNON. That, of course, is now a part of the record, and quite correctly so.

But I think, if I understand the witness, he is saying that the Senate has the obligation, in its advice and consent procedure, to determine that the people are properly qualified.

The fact that two people by law are required to have technical qualifications does not mean that the other three people on the board should have no qualifications at all. And that, I think, is the distinction that the witness was making, and he was suggesting at this particular time the Board needs technically qualified people to properly carry out its job, which is a highly technical job.

Is that

Mr. ROBERTSON. That's right, Mr. Chairman. I think we ought to retain your services to present our case because you're much more articulate than I have been this morning.

Senator CANNON. Well, that was the way the presentation came

across to me.

Mr. ROBERTSON. You stated it much better than I did.

Senator STEVENS. Well, Mr. Chairman, with due respect, I remember sitting through the hearing with regard to this Board where we had such an administrative foulup down there that the people weren't getting along with one another, primarily because there was some administrative top aide, you will recall, that wasn't following the directions of the chairman and was convening the other members and a few other things.

It seems to me that this nominee has demonstrated administrative capability as a background in terms of working in the legislature, and certainly ought to understand the relationship between this Board and this committee, and I think we ought to welcome that as far as expertise is concerned also.

We would be in a tough spot if we had all the members of that Board that had absolute top credentials as far as accident investigation, but didn't know how to run the railroad down there. I hope that she is able to do that as vice chairman. It is my understanding that that's to be her position, is it not, vice chairman?

Senator CANNON. That's the statement, for a 2-year term.

Senator STEVENS. So I think we've got a duty to look at it in terms of advice and consent as to the total balancing of the Board, as well as the qualifications as far as accident investigation are concerned.

Senator CANNON. I think the record should also show that at the time we came back to the floor with the conference report, I made it quite clear, if I recall correctly, that this committee would expect to exercise a higher degree of requirement than was imposed by the law with respect to only two of the members, because we wanted to insist and insure that people appointed to these technical jobs were technically qualified.

That, I believe, was what I said, substantially, on the floor of the Senate at the time the conference report was approved.

Thank you very much, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CANNON. The next witness is Capt. John J. O'Donnell, president, Air Line Pilots Association, International.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. JOHN J. O'DONNELL, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. ROGER J. PHANEUF, DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING AND AIR SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Captain O'DONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce Dr. Roger Phaneuf, who is the head of the Engineering and Air Safety Department of the Air Line Pilots Association, on my right.

My name is John J. O'Donnell and I'm president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the 37,000 pilots represented by ALPA to present our views on the confirmation of Ms. Kay Bailey, of Texas, to be a member and Vice Chairman of the NTSB.

Our statement also reflects the views of the Association of Flight Attendants whose 17,000 members are vitally concerned about the efforts of the NTSB in the field of cabin safety.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, that in January of this year, I addressed letters to you and to President Ford expressing ALPA's concern over the quality of several recent NTSB accident reports. "The deficiencies of these reports, in our judgment, are directly related to the lack of professional competence and technical expertise of the members of the Board who endorsed them. I went on to state our intentions to examine the technical qualifications of future nominees for the Board and to oppose those whom we believe are lacking in professional standing in the field of transportation safety.

The basis for our emphasis on the technical qualifications of NTSB members is twofold: First, we firmly believe that the investigative role of the Board requires that the members have a working technical knowledge of the complex facets of high performance aircraft operations and of air traffic control systems and procedures.

NTSB members are active participants in accident investigations, not simply judges of probable cause based on the evidence accumulated and presented by professional staff.

Second, the Congress, by its enactment of the Transportation Safety Act of 1974, has expressed its intent that Board members possess technical qualifications.

A brief review of the legislative history of the Transportation Safety Act of 1974 serves to highlight the intent of Congress, and more particularly the intent of the U.S. Senate, concerning the qualifications of nominees for the NTSB.

Title III of the act consists of the text of a separate bill, S. 2401, entitled the "Independent Safety Board Act," which was the product of extensive oversight hearings by the Senate Aviation Subcommittee in 1973. As reported by the subcommittee, and passed by the Senate on October 7, 1974, title III, section 303 (b), provides that, ". . . The President shall appoint individuals to be members to the Board upon the basis of technical qualification and professional standing in the field of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, or transportation safety."

The House-passed version of the Transportation Safety Act contained no similar provisions concerning the qualifications of NTSB members, which were not unusual since the House of Representatives has no responsibility under the Constitution to advise and consent on presidential nominations. However, during the House-Senate conference on the act, the qualifications section of title III quoted above was amended to read as follows:

At any given time, no less than two members of the Board shall be individuals who have been appointed upon the basis of technical qualification and professional or management standing in the field of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, or transportation safety.

It is absolutely clear that the intent of this subcommittee and the U.S. Senate, which has the constitutional responsibility to consider the qualifications of Presidential nominees, and to confirm or reject their nominations, was and is that all five members of the NTSB should be technically qualified and have professional standing in the field of transportation safety. The appointment of an individual to the Board who has virtually no background in this highly complex field is a flagrant disregard of the intent of Congress and the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.

On May 6, 1976, NTSB Chairman Webster Todd presented to this subcommittee a new policy statement which outlined the direction which the Board must take to meet its responsibilities in the safety area. Chairman Todd stated that.

The Board, therefore, must maintain a standard of professionalism in accident investigation which is above reproach as well as build an analytical capability which allows it to move significantly beyond historical analysis toward the forefront of accident prevention through expanded safety consciousness. The Chairman went on to state that:

Safety in transportation is achieved by a combination of strong leadership and correct decisions at top management levels and the conscious effort of all involved parties to insure that no preventable series of actions culminates in a catastrophic occurrence. The Board, as a catalyst for safety, is dedicated to influencing those who make the decisions and those who carry them out.

Obviously, the Board will be successful in influencing those in the transportation industry who are responsible for safety only to the extent that its members command the respect of industry leaders.

Chairman Todd has established commendable goals for the Board, and we applaud him, but he must have highly qualified professionals in the field of safety to assist him in achieving them.

Effective leadership of accident investigations requires that individual Board members possess the ability to manage a wide range of scientific disciplines to insure meaningful data collection and analysis. All too often, the lack of sufficient professional experience and technical competence has resulted in accident reports that are superficial and incomplete, and fail to identify and analyze the real causal factors.

Several recent airline accident investigations have, in our judgment, demonstrated the Board's inability to probe in depth all the relevant factors involved. ALPA has petitioned the Board to reopen the investigations into two of these accidents based on the failure to consider certain critical data. Attached to my statement are the letters which we have addressed to the Board outlining our reasons for these two petitions.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask your permission to submit for the record, a statement concerning the recent report of the Board on the accident of Continental Airlines flight 426 in Denver last August. I respectfully request that the captain of that flight, Capt. Bob Pries, be permitted to submit a statement for the record at an early date.

Senator CANNON. We will be glad to receive his statement. [The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF CAPT. ROBERT E. PRIES, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

I was the Captain of Continental Airlines Flight 426 which crashed off the end of the runway at Denver, Colorado Stapleton Airport on August 7, 1975. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the crash was caused by an encounter with a severe wind shear just after takeoff. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and some of the passengers received serious injury.

The Board, in its Safety Recommendations A-76-73 through 75 to the Federal Aviation Administration, stated that "the flightcrew's performance during the emergency evaluation did not conform to the desired or expected standards of a well trained flightcrew. Following the accident, the flightcrew evacuated the aircraft through the cockpit windows instead of manning their evacuation duty stations in the passenger cabin." The Board's Safety Recommendations were totally misleading and devoid of the pertinent facts relating to the evacuation. First of all, the Second Officer tried to open the door which leads from the cockpit to the passenger cabin, but found it to be jammed, which would make impossible the "manning their evacuation duty stations in the passenger cabin." The aircraft impacted the ground at about 250 mph and we were violently thrashed about as the aircraft slid to a stop on its belly. The crash forces were so great that part of the seat belt was torn from my seat and that of the First Officer. I received two crushed vertebrae and the Second Officer received a deep laceration over the eye and through the eyelid. All three cockpit crewmembers received bruises and lacerations requiring surgery.

When the aircraft came to a stop, the engines continued to run at full power, however, this was not apparent to us in the cockpit because I had used the normal engine shutdown procedures. Unknown to me, all of the cockpit instruments were dead and the controls in the engines were severed. At least one of the engines was stalling and producing an exploding sound. Large holes in the fuselage made the engine noise much louder than normal which also prevented us from recognizing these sounds. We interpreted the sounds to be the exploding and roar from fire.

Considering that we were in at least some mild form of shock, I'm not at all surprised that the Second Officer, after trying the door and hearing these loud noises, yelled "FIRE! LET'S GET... OUT OF HERE."

« PreviousContinue »