Wittgenstein on Sensation and Perception

Front Cover
Taylor & Francis, Jan 12, 2017 - Philosophy - 216 pages
0 Reviews

This book offers two novel claims about Wittgenstein’s views and methods on perception as explored in the Philosophical Investigations. The first is an interpretive claim about Wittgenstein: that his views on sensation and perception, including his critique of private language, have their roots in his reflections on sense-datum theories and on what Hymers calls the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space. The second is a major philosophical claim: that Wittgenstein’s critique of the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space is of ongoing relevance to current debates concerning first-person authority and the problem of perception because we are still tempted to draw inferences about the phenomenal that only apply to the physical. Many contemporary discussions of these topics are thus premised on the very confusions Wittgenstein sought to dispel. This book will appeal to Wittgenstein scholars who are interested in the Philosophical Investigations and to philosophers of perception who may think that Wittgenstein’s views are mistaken, irrelevant, or already adequately appreciated.

 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

Introduction
1
1 SenseData and the Misleading Metaphor of Phenomenal Space
6
2 Wittgenstein Phenomenology and SenseData
26
3 Phenomenology Grammar and Private Language
49
4 The Grammar of FirstPerson Authority
74
5 The Contemporary Debate about FirstPerson Authority
97
6 Back to SenseData?
121
7 Sensory Qualia
156
Conclusion
186
References
187
Index
197
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Bibliographic information