but a being determined from without, would, therefore, be nature, and not spontaneity. But formal freedom has no other destination than to pass over into real freedom. The former is only means to the latter as end. Formal freedom is the starting point, real freedom is the goal.

Formal freedom contains in itself the possibility of sin, but only the possibility. How very far this is from a disposition to sin, appears from the fact that there is also in formal freedom a possibility of choosing the good. The Pelagian idea of freedom is liable to the charge of inconsistency, in representing the same faculty as a root both of good and of evil. Doth a fountain at the same place pour forth sweet water and bitter? And it may seem that formal freedom, as implying the possibility of good and evil, is equally indifferent to both. So it would be, if freedom were already fully determined as formal, but in connection with formal freedom, there is the idea of duty to God, by realizing which, the will is to come into possession of real freedom. Moral evil, therefore, arises from formal freedom by no means in the same manner as moral good, for it arises not in the course for which the freedom was originally designed, and which is pointed out by the accompanying consciousness of duty, but by a fall from this destination.

It is not a mere abstraction, but it expresses a real distinction, when we regard freedom not as something which is necessarily involved in the idea of will, but as something which the will can be destitute of without ceasing on that account to be will. Scripture, church, ex

1

By will is meant conscious self-determination. In considering the subject of moral agency, it is necessary to beware of sundering the will from its living union with the other activities of the spirit's life, and of regarding it in an external relation to them. Rather as the soul makes use of the body as her instrument, and subjects all its members, muscles and nerves to her unity, and is present through them all with determining power; so the feelings, inclinations, interests, convictions, principles, which make up the sum of our spiritual life, together make up, as it were, a body for the will; the will is their forming and moving principle, their proper soul. With a correct view of this relation, the old phraseology, that the will is determined by motives, that these bring forth the decision and the act through the will as their instrument, will give no more embarrassment. Truly a strange psychology, which regarded the conceptions as the properly operative agencies in the soul, and on the contrary, gave to the will a merely receptive, or, to speak more correctly, passive place. No less false is it, to represent motives and will as two powers in the inner life which mutually exclude each other, so that, when the motives do not suffice to bring forth a definite decision, the will turns the scale. If the freedom of a volition is in inverse ratio to the degree in which it is determined by motives, the necessitarian always has the advantage; for it will be easy for him to show, that such determining motives are present even when in the moment of volition they escape the notice of consciousness. But even supposing that, on such an hypothesis, it were possible to maintain the freedom of the will, yet the result would be, that man is only then free, when opposing motives have thrown

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Can we bring to mind our first Sin?

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perience teach of an enslaved will, servum arbitrium. The will, which cannot withdraw itself from the ruling power of sin, or resist temptation, is destitute not only of real freedom, but also of formal freedom. Is there in such a man still a desire which resists that ruling power of sin, but only a velleitas, a desire which cannot carry itself into execution, as in the state described, Rom. 7: 14-24, then he will feel the want of freedom as a heavy burden, as the sick man feels his pain so long as his constitution reäcts against the power of sickness. But has that resisting desire vanished, and is the will wholly given up to selfishness, then the bondage of sin is no more felt by such a one, but is yet, notwithstanding the assent of his will to it, so much the more completely present. The voluntarium remains, the liberum is lost. Has man in this life formal freedom?

If there were, at the commencement of our conscious existence, such an individual act as the stepping forth of the will out of a state of indecision into a sinful purpose, it would remain as a dark background in the memory. But who is able to say definitely when and how he for the first time acted in contradiction to his moral consciousness? Certainly our recollection, if our attention is directed sufficiently early to this point, goes back further than is generally supposed, and many a one will be able to say, when, for example, the first feelings of hatred and of revenge were enkindled within him, and what a tumult they produced in the soul of the child. But if we descend deeper into the shaft of self-recollection, we discover behind these earliest moments of sin, still others by which they were prepared, and which accordingly must have been of the same sinful character, and, if we seek to fix these, yet other similar emotions loom up in our memory, and these again, if we seek to hold them fast, lose themselves in an uncertain twilight. To a pure beginning, to an original determining act it is impossible in this way to attain. The earliest sinful act, which presents itself to our consciousness, does not appear as the incoming of an altogether new element into the youthful life, but rather as the development and manifestation of a hidden agency, the awakening of a power slumbering in the deep. Sin does not then for the first time exist in us, but only steps forth into light. However imhim in some doubt before his decision is made, and, that he manifests his freedom the most essentially, when he decides without motives, or even against them. But every one regards it as something unworthy, to decide in any important matter without or against motives; and no one feels it as a want of freedom, but rather he has then the strongest feeling of freedom, when in any instance he is moved to a definite decision quickly and without at all wavering by the force of powerful, and clearly perceived reasons. A volition, then, not a simple, but a complex exercise of the spirit.

portant the epoch of awakening moral consciousness may be, it has a past behind it, which is not without co-determining influence upon conduct of the child in that crisis.

the

And is it probable that a decision on which depends the future moral character of an immortal soul, would be entrusted to the weak hand of a child? Go back as far as we may, we do not find formal freedom in this life. From the earliest period of his existence in this world, the moral character of man is already determined. On the ground of a practical empiricism, i. e. a mode of thinking which seeks for the circumstances and conditions of the moral actions of men only in what comes under our observation during this earthly life, the doctrine of necessity cannot be refuted.

To originate one's own character is an essential condition of personality, and since from the beginning of this life man's character is already determined, we are obliged to step over the bounds of time to find the source of his freedom of will, to discover that act of free-will by which he determined himself to a course of sin. Is the moral condition in which, irrespective of redemption, we find man to be, one of guilt, and a consequence of his own act; is there truth in the testimony of conscience which imputes to us our sins; is there truth in the voice of religion that God is not the author of sin, then the freedom of man must have its beginning in a domain out of time. In this domain is that power of original choice to be sought for, which precedes and preconditions all sinful decisions in time.

In contemplations of this kind the unfathomable depth of our depravity and guilt is opened to us, and we find a solution to the riddle of that inextinguishable melancholy and sorrow which forms the hidden ground of all human consciousness, until relieved by the light of redemption. The irrational animal is joyous and contented, if its natural wants are supplied, and if it is undisturbed and unendangered from without; in the human consciousness the dark background of sinful choice casts its shadow even upon the brightest scenes of life, and amid the sounds of hearty joy is mingled the tone of secret complaint. Here we may find a cause of that spirit of sadness which breathes in the arts and mythology of ancient times, and in the popular poetry and music of the moderns. Moreover, that anxiety and sorrow which modern philosophers have regarded as the pervading and constant character of animal life, is scarcely anything else than the coloring of that gloom which the sorrow of the human self-consciousness throws upon the animal world; only personal beings have in themselves this original source of pain and discomfort, and only they can have it, because they alone have the beginning of their existence without the domain of time.

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Sin is innate in the Race.

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§ 4. The Universality of Sin.

Sin is not merely to be found here and there among the children of men, but it is a universal characteristic of the race. With but one exception, no human life is free from it. It is sufficient to say of any person that he belongs to the family of man, and at once to settle the point that he is a sinner. The natural condition of man presents itself as a supremacy of selfishness over moral and religious impulses, and in connection therewith, as a partial and often almost total perversion and obscuration of the knowledge of God and of duty. Consistent with this is the acknowledgment, that even in heathenism and generally in the entire extent of unrenewed life, there are found elements of a nobler striving which betoken a reverence for moral law; for, in human nature in its present condition, there is a discordant action; there is the idea of God and the sense of duty, there is also a propensity to selfishness, but the latter is the dominant one. Consistent also is the acknowledgment of a relative innocence in early childhood in comparison with the period of riper years, and by reason of which it is set before us as a pattern for imitation, Matt. 18: 3. 19: 14. 1 Cor. 14: 20; for this innocence rests upon the fact that the germs of sin are still undeveloped, but that the germs are already present in the child, is evident from the fact, that as soon as moral consciousness is awakened by the moral law, sin appears.

The Holy Scriptures declare the universal presence of sin in the human race, not merely by individual texts which expressly teach it, Rom. 3:9, 20, 23. 5: 12. Gal. 3: 22. Eph. 2: 3. 1 John 1: 8. 1 Kings 8: 46. Ps. 143: 2. Prov. 20: 9. Eccles. 7: 20, but still more decisively by the facts, that the New Testament everywhere refers redemption to the whole world, and thereby describes the whole world as needing redemption, therefore sinful, John 3: 16. 6: 51. 12: 47; that it knows of no other salvation than in Christ, John 1: 12. 14: 6. Acts 4: 12. Mark 16: 16; that Christ announces as an indispensable condition of a share in this salvation to all without distinction, repentance and regeneration, Matt. 4: 17. Mark 1: 15. 6: 12. Luke 24: 47. John 3: 3, 5, and even designates as evil those who had already allied themselves to him, Luke 11: 13.

There are many facts of common life which serve for confirmation of the doctrine that in every man there is a deeply rooted, an inborn tendency to sin. On what other ground are we to comprehend the certainty with which, whenever a human form meets us, we know we have to do, not with a holy, but with a sinful being? Whoever presumes to have a little knowledge of men, compassionates him as a

good natured fool, who would work upon them or with them in the various relations of life without taking into the account their moral weakness, and the consequences that may result therefrom. We would not, indeed, deny that that view of human nature which teaches us to expect only evil of others, is itself of evil. We must rather acknowledge it as duty to meet every one with confidence in the honesty of his disposition, till we have proof of the contrary; but will any one, on that account, call in question the general conviction above referred to? On the contrary, the certainty of it is so great, that if any one should profess to be absolutely sinless, the conclusion would be, that his share in human sinfulness was doubled by his arrogance and conceit. So universal is sin, that it is precisely the morally earnest man, the man who means to do right, that least ventures to declare himself to be free from it; and only then would we acknowledge an exception to the doctrine, when the entire moral appearance of a man who announced himself as holy, was altogether another and a higher than that of other men, even of those who were prominent among their fellows for their virtue.

If we consider the general course of the moral development of man, it is one of the most known and acknowledged facts, that in order to progress in good, constant exertion, toil and conflict are necessary; while, on the other hand, progress in wickedness is easy, and can be made without difficulty. The seed of sin grows and ripens in the human heart of itself, without any special care; one needs only hold no restraint upon himself, and he is at once deep in sin. But that any man can, only through new and repeated conquests over himself, make progress in good, has no meaning, if there is not something in the natural condition of man, which must be resisted as striving against the good, and which consequently is a propensity to sin.

Another fact which shows us how deeply rooted sin is in our nature, meets us in the observation, that virtues are usually so intwined with faults, that often the latter present themselves as the reversed side of the former. Serious earnestness imperceptibly glides into a censorious hardness, and mildness into softness; a ready activity for the welfare of others goes over into an imprudent intermeddling, and quiet moderation into a lazy ease; firm decision, which would make one's own conviction avail, becomes intolerant narrowness, and a regard for the rights of the individuality and convictions of others becomes an idle and crippling indifferentism; a lively, vigorous confidence degenerates into haughtiness and presumption, and wise caution into pusillanimity and wavering fear. Upon every human virtue easily creeps its degeneracy, and this exchange is wont to take place by such slight transitions,