in the record. I am not asking that we go into that at this time. But I am sure that the chairman will agree that Mr. Barlow's answer should be incorporated in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest to the committee that Mr. Barlow be given the privilege of answering the letter read by Mr. Bates and that his answer be incorporated in the record.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I understand that tomorrow morning we shall meet and that at that time the committee will consider the question whether we shall consider further evidence.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. JACOBSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. JACOBSEN. Mr. Chairman, this is my first experience in attendance at a hearing of the Naval Affairs Committee. I have attended the meetings every day and have heard practically every witness that has appeared before this committee. I believe Mr. Martin has been one of the most important witnesses that has been before us and this country, and we are deeply indebted to him for the valuable information he has given us.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go into executive session tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to file for the record a statement by Maury Boykin, former lieutenant, junior grade, United States Navy Reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the same may be filed for the record.

(The papers referred to are as follows:)

Hon. CARL VINSON,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C., February 24, 1938.

Chairman, Naval Affairs Committee, House of Representatives,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN VINSON: I am in receipt of the enclosed from Mr. F. E. Turin, chairman of the Adequate Coast Defenses Association, and request that the same be made a part of the record in connection with Mr. Turin's appearance as a witness before the Committee on Naval Affairs in re the pending naval expansion bill.

With best regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

NORMAN R. HAMILTON.

BRIEF PRESENting a DiscusSSION OF THE SITUATION CONFronting the United STATES UNDER WAR CONDITIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ESTIMATED TIME REQUIRED FOR THE UNITED STATES FLEET TO REACH THE ATLANTIC COAST AND THERE ASSEMBLE TO REPEL AN ATTACK FROM AN ENEMY FLEET

Submitted to Mr. Francis E. Turin, chairman, Adequate Coast Defenses Association, Norfolk, Va., on February 15, 1938, by Maury Boykin, former lieutenant (jr. gr.) Supply Corps, United States Navy (chairman, technical committee, Adequate Coast Defenses Association)

CAPE HORN VERSUS MAGELLAN, 177 MILES

Many conditions which we cannot now foresee will no doubt appear and com plicate matters after the Navy Department has ordered the ships of the United States Fleet to assemble at some Pacific coast base and stand by for an immediate cruise to the Atlantic coast to engage the enemy fleet in battle.

The exact steaming time required for the fleet to reach its destination cannot therefore be definitely stated. However, the very minimum possible time predi

cated on various speeds is given in one of the three tables attached. This time is based on an assumption that the fleet may steam continuously without stopping to take on fuel oil which is impossible in practice.

The Pacific base where the fleet might assemble is being kept secret no doubt and it is perhaps known only by a small group of high ranking officers such as those officers serving in the War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Atlantic base where the fleet will take on fuel oil and consolidate its position before meeting the enemy is equally unknown. Every situation confronted in this discussion is therefore hypothetical and I am simply trying to make the most of it and come to some plausible solution of the problem of estimating the time required.

The time required for the fleet to reach the Atlantic from the Pacific under emergency conditions depends on the following variables:

(1) Point of origin (unknown).

(2) Point of destination on the Atlantic coast (unknown).

(3) Refueling at foreign ports. The location of these foreign ports is unknown. (4) Sufficiency of oil piers (unknown).

(5) Will ships be refueled at sea from tankers? Accurate information, at this time, of the number of tankers available is difficult to obtain.

These factors control the entire situation.

HYPOTHETICAL CASE

It is reasonable to believe that the fleet might assemble at San Pedro (Los Angeles).

Immediately war becomes imminent it is assumed that the enemy will succeed in sinking a ship loaded with TNT within the Panama Canal locks, thus blocking the Canal. The fleet must therefore proceed under forced draft to the Straits of Magellan and thence to Norfolk, Va., to be fitted out for battle.

A fleet is no faster than its slowest ship. In this case the slowest ships are the oil tankers and supply ships, in other words, the train. Navy and many merchant marine oil tankers have a speed of only 12 knots an hour.

The itinerary of the fleet I am assuming to be as follows: (1) Port of departure— San Pedro, Calif. (Los Angeles). (2) Callao, Peru. (3) Punta Arenas. (4) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (5) Port-of-Spain. (6) Norfolk, Va. The controlling factors determining this decision are: (1) Bunkering capacity. (2) Fuel-oil supply.

Los Angeles is a great port for the export of fuel oil, while it is also the base for the Battle Force of the United States Fleet.

Callao includes the port area where the Peruvian oil produced is exported. Punta Arenas is always a port of call for ships cruising in the southern hemisphere. The Rio de Janeiro area is near the midway point and should meet the requirements for refueling from oil tankers. Port-of-Spain is adjacent to the great Venezuelan oil production area. Norfolk, Va., offers a central location and a sheltered harbor where fuel oil is plentiful.

No port in either North or South America has a sufficient number of oil piers to bunker the fleet as a unit. Therefore the fleet must rely on its own tankers to supply the oil either in port or at sea.

Any enemy who succeeds in blocking the Panama Canal would in all probability send a flotilla of submarines to the Straits of Magellan for the purpose of delaying the passage of the fleet, and furthermore to weaken it by attrition. Even if the enemy submarines were forced to retreat or were sunk, delaying tactics would consume considerable time during the passage through the tortuous Magellan Straits. Caution would prevail in the mind of the commander in chief. The sinking of a battleship, aircraft carrier or even oil tanker would be a considerable loss.

PLAN FOR BUNKERING SHIP

The fleet would take on oil and stores at San Pedro. The slow oil tankers would then be ordered to proceed as fast as possible to a rendezvous on the Peruvian coast within the Callao area. The tankers and cruiser-destroyer escort would be operating under orders to stand by until the fleet arrives (if it is possible for the tankers to arrive before the fleet) and then after the fleet arrives and has already filled its bunkers the tankers would be instructed to refill with Peruvian oil in preparation for the voyage to Punta Arenas.

At Punta Arenas the ships would refuel from oil tankers.

Since a sufficient oil supply may not be available at Punta Arenas, the empty oil tankers would proceed with the fleet to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, or perhaps back to the United States.

In the meantime another division of oil tankers would be steaming down the east coast of South America for a rendezvous with the fleet at Rio de Janeiro.

After bunkering at Rio de Janeiro the fleet would continue the voyage to Port of Spain where a new division of oil tankers would meet the fleet and fill the bunkers again.

As an additional precautionary measure the tankers would take on Venezuelan oil and the fleet would proceed to Norfolk with bunkers full because battle might be expected at any time.

In the final analysis additional time beyond the continuous nonstop steaming time must be allowed for the time spent in refueling at four breaks in the journey viz Callao, Punta Arenas, Rio de Janeiro, and Port-of-Spain.

The distances in nautical miles between these ports of call are as follows:

Expressing 13,570 nautical miles from San Pedro, Calif. through the Straits of Magellan to Norfolk, Va. in terms of days and hours required we have 40 days and 9 hours. It is assumed that the fleet has averaged a steaming time of 14 knots per hour which would no doubt be a remarkable time if made in practice.

Since oil tankers average a speed of approximately only 12 knots per hour, I am presuming that the fleet itself might steam between stretches at 14 knots per hour because, although the fleet will be in the Pacific, many tankers perhaps will be available in the Atlantic and these can be steaming under forced draft along the east coast of South America in the Atlantic to the rendezvous while the fleet is steaming down the west coast of South America in the Pacific or proceeding north along the Atlantic coast after passing through Magellan. Therefore the tankers will have a shorter distance to travel, thus accounting for the difference in speed between tankers and the fleet as the latter could steam at 20 knots per hour under forced draft as long as the fuel oil supply would last. Economy is important in balancing speed with bunker capacity.

Passage of the fleet through the Panama Canal necessitates very little comment other than to invite attention to Admiral William D. Leahy's testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee at which time he stated that the Navy was keeping all information secret regarding past performances of the fleet in passing through the Canal. However it was brought out at the hearing according to the papers that 3 weeks would be required. All capital ships enter the Panama Canal locks in single file while in the case of small ships several can enter the locks at any time.

It was brought out at the hearing that construction of the proposed canal through Nicaragua would save approximately 1 week in the passage of the fleet from one ocean to the other. The distance by air from the Panama Canal to the proposed Nicaragua Canal is about 300 miles. Thus it can be realized that a very long time would be required for the fleet to contact the enemy fleet in case the Panama Canal is rendered useless by sabotage.

Distances between American bases and foreign ports of call along the route in passing from the Pacific coast to Atlantic coast via Strait of Magellan

[Expressed in nautical miles and taken from U. S. Navy table of distances]

Dutch Harbor to Sitka, Alaska..

Sitka, Alaska, to Seattle, Wash..

Seattle, Wash. to San Francisco, Calif

San Francisco to Los Angeles, Calif. (San Pedro).

Magdalena Bay, Lower California, Mexico, to Panama

Panama to Callao, Peru...

Valparaiso, Chile, to Punta Arenas, Chile..

1, 084

809

804

368

93

600

Los Angeles to San Diego, Calif

San Diego, Calif. to Magdalena Bay, Lower California, Mexico..

Callao, Peru to Valparaiso, Chile.

Total..

Punta Arenas is on the Strait of Magellan. This strait connects
the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean.

2,265

1, 346 1,306

1, 438

10, 113

Distances between American bases and foreign ports of call along the route in passing from the Pacific coast to Atlantic coast via Strait of Magellan-Continued

Punta Arenas, Chile to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Rio de Janerio, Brazil, to Post of Spain, Trinidad, West Indies.
Port of Spain, Trinidad, West Indies to Charleston, S. C..

Charleston, S. C. to Norfolk, Va.

Norfolk, Va. to New York, N. Y.
New York, N. Y. to Boston, Mass..

Grand total..

2, 242

3, 188

1, 468

426

292

378

7, 994

18, 107