Page images
PDF
EPUB

account number as an identifying mechanism.

The SSA has

been somewhat helpless in trying to stop or reverse this process. In the arrangements worked out between INS and SSA to implement the provisions of the 1972 amendments, the procedures called for persons applying for a card, who had foreign birth, to prove their status with regard to the immigration and nationality laws. If they needed a card but were not authorized to work, their account number was annotated to that effect. If earnings were reported to the account, SSA referred the information to INS.

During the initial months of the new SSA application procedure, an average of 500 applications a day were referred to INS for checking; in all, a total of about 40,000 applications were referred in the period March 1974 to February

1975.

1974

17/

Following the implementation of the Privacy Act of

[ocr errors]

these referrals fell off sharply; today they average about 10 - 20 a week. At present, whenever an applicant is hesitant or reluctant to provide proof of citizenship or legal alien status he is informed that the information could be referred to INS for an illegal alien check. If the individual withdraws the application, all

17 / The Privacy Act does not cover "illegal aliens, so there are no restrictions regarding exchange of information between various agencies concerning such individuals. such individuals. However, the SSA does not know whether they are dealing with a legal resident or not. Since the Privacy Act covers legal resident aliens, the SSA is carefully revising its regulations to cover exchanges of information with INS.

data already submitted by the alien are returned and no
referral is made to the INS. Only after complying with
the provisions of the Privacy Act and the individual's
expressed desire to pursue the application are doubtful
cases referred to INS and even then the SSA will wait just
one week before processing the application.

Following the March 1974 implementation of regulations and before the Privacy Act became effective, the data on all SS applications abandoned following a request for proof of status was routinely passed to INS. There were some 39,000 applications abandoned under these conditions in the period March 1974 to February 1975. The SSA control system cannot detect the use of someone else's valid SS number by an illegal alien or anyone else for that matter. SSA records are essentially confidential pursuant to the Privacy Act. While illegal aliens are not covered by the Privacy Act, a prudent bureaucrat would be careful not to make a mistake involving a U.S. citizen or a legal alien resident. Concern over the requirements of this legislation has essentially brought the cooperative effort to a standstill. While SSA continues to screen applicants and does annotate accounts, very little information is being sent to the INS. The one salutary aspect of this program may be in the area of abandoned applications which are thought to be indicative of deterred ineligible aliens. However, this may not be true

in light of the fact that a number of abandoned applications

turned out to be those of resident legal aliens or citizens as a subsequent check with INS revealed. It was this development which prompted the SSA to stop making referrals to INS, unless the person's permission was received to pursue the application in such a manner.

During the period of March 1974 to February 1975, the SSA issued 23,000 cards for which the account was annotated "work prohibited". One thousand five hundred cases of

reported earnings were referred to INS for that period. This program has had an uneven history. The following problems exist in the current procedures:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Those persons under 18 claiming native birth
are not required to show any documentation.
The SSA did conduct a study to validate this
experiment.

For those over 18 who claim citizenship, a
check with INS that only allows seven days for
turn-around before issuance of a card is not
realistic given the volume of work involved in
such processing.

The application form for an SS number only
requires a date and place of birth -- it does
not require a statement of citizenship or alien
status. As the system works now, there is an
inherent bias which favors the false claimant.
Although the card carries a warning regarding
those who willfully furnish false information,
the SSA does not prosecute illegal aliens offering
false information to obtain a number. They are
prepared to prosecute those who intend to defraud
the system of benefits; however, they doubt that
U.S. Attorneys would be willing to prosecute just
fraudulent applicants.

There is a minimum time delay of six months before earnings to an annotated account will be reported

to INS. The INS places these investigations
in a low priority due to the time delay involved.

Until such time as new regulations are written and

promulgated by SSA, the impact of this cooperative effort will be minimal. However, the following possibilities

should be considered to improve the quality and usefulness

of information exchange:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The SSA has collected its information on abandoned
applications centrally. The SSA should conduct a
study of this information. One area to analyze
is the particular districts which have the largest
number of abandoned applications as compared with
those areas that are perceived to be the locales
of large numbers of illegal aliens.

INS must give greater attention to working leads
on annotated accounts with reported earnings. Once

a test of these leads' workability has been completed,
a judgment can be made about their worthiness for
future efforts.

INS could supply information to SSA on prospective
overstays, and SSA would compare this data with
its data on annotated accounts with reported
earnings.

The SSA could, within its own system, compare data on employers with reporting problems with its data on annotated accounts with reported earnings, and make referrals to INS.

INS could refer to SSA the names of employers who
are thought to be hiring illegal aliens. SSA, in
turn, could compare this information with either
its data on annotated accounts with reported
earnings or its data on employers with reporting
problems.

All of these possibilities would have to be tested. Their success would depend upon the relative costs involved in carrying on such efforts on a large scale. However, they offer the possibility for improved information exchange in the context of these agencies' current capabilities.

The experience with the SSA/INS cooperative efforts is instructive in a number of respects. First and foremost, future policymakers should be extremely wary of drawing agencies whose central purpose is not enforcement into arrangements which require them to act in ways contrary to their historical nature. The SSA has always seen itself as a service agency, and thus has been slow to adjust to the requirements inherent in the amendments of 1972. Secondly, when such arrangements are undertaken, proper consideration must be given to the funding implications involved. This is not always a case of additional personnel. Thirdly, the success of these efforts can turn on nothing more than how such agencies collect and organize information. If there is not sufficient compatability and management attention to information gaps and procedural difficulties, such arrangements are probably doomed to failure. finally, all these factors would indicate that it is far more desirable to foster cooperative relationships between agencies whose operations are essentially enforcement or compliance in nature, and thus share a common interest in related problems. In this sense, the operations and legislative mandate of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Wage and Hour Enforcement Division, are more akin to such endeavors.

And

« PreviousContinue »