balza," and as Captain Burney observes, "in the Peruvian method of managing it is to be seen the origin of what has been called sliding keels." Sir Richard Hawkins (see his "Observations in his Voyage to the South Seas," in 1593) saw balzas as low down the coast as Valparaiso, and has described them to be "rafts made of masts or trees fastened together;" and in the "Miroir Oost and West Judical," or journal of Jean Cornelius May, companion of Joris Spilbergen in his voyage round the world in 1614, the only description of the balza, independent of an illustration, is that "the natives go in them to fish, and that they sail very near to the wind." Don Antonio de Ulloa, however, in his "Voyage to South America," has given a plate and full description of the balza of Guayaquil as seen by him in 1736. He says that the balzas or jangadas, as they are sometimes called, are of different sizes, some being used in fishing, some for the carriage of goods in the river Guayaquil, and some for navigating the coast as far as to Puyta. They are made of five, seven, or nine poles of a very light wood, which the Indians of Darien call Pucro. Some of these poles or canes are twelve or thirteen fathoms in length, and about two feet or two and a half feet in diameter. The thickest of the poles of which a balza is formed is likewise the longest, and the excess of length is in the after part. Joining to this one is placed one each side, and the same is repeated in succession till the whole is completed, the one in the middle serving as mother to the rest, by which means the number is always odd. They are fastened by strong rope lashings to each other, and to cross pieces at each end, which render them very secure, but it is necessary to examine the lashings from time to time to see they are not worn out, for the neglect of such inspection has occasioned some melancholy accidents. The large balzas have a second platform of canes and a deck-house. Some of them carry from 400 to 500 quintals without being incommoded by the wash of the sea, either

running over or rising up between the spars, by reason that the whole embarkation yields to the motion of the waves." "Thus far," says Ulloa, says Ulloa, "only the construction and use of the balza has been mentioned. There remains to be explained the greatest singularity, which is, that it sails and works when the wind is contrary as well as vessels with keels, and makes good as direct a course. It possesses this advantage by an invention perfectly distinct from that of a rudder, and which experience and necessity have dictated to the Indians, strangers to science, and, in this instance, the contrivances of untutored navigators may be said to have rivalled, or even excelled, the inventions founded on nautical theory. This Peruvian method of steering is by means of some planks three or four yards in length, and half a yard in breadth, called juares, which are disposed vertically both in the fore and after part of the balza, between the principal timbers composing it, and by lowering some in the water and by raising up others they pursue their course, whether with a side wind, in tacking before the wind, or in veering, and preserve the prow in whatever direction required."

Don Jorge Juan, the associate of Don Antonio de Ulloa, who composed a short memoir on the use of the juare, which is inserted in Ulloa's work, shows that a juare being put down near the prow of a vessel under sail will make her luff up (that is, will make her prow point nearer to the wind), and that taking the juare up will make her fall off, or bear away from the wind. And on the contrary, that a juare being put down in the after part will make the vessel bear away; but being drawn up will make her steer nearer to the wind. Sometimes five to six juares are used in a balza at the same time to prevent her making leeway. The balza of Ulloa has two poles erected as sheers to serve the purpose of a mast, and a square sail which hangs from a yard and is fitted with bow-lines; which "fashion of rigging," he adds, “ is

doubtless in part European." The balza mentioned in Spilbergen's voyage, is rigged in a more rude and simple manner, the sails being triangular, and the same spar being made to serve both the purposes of mast and yard.

NOTES

ON THE

HISTORY OF HER MAJESTY'S ELEVENTH

(NORTH DEVON) REGIMENT OF INFANTRY

FROM ITS FORMATION TO THE PRESENT TIME.

(Continued.)

Little importance as had previously been attached to Bethune as a fortress, its capture so soon after the fall of Douay was felt to be humiliating. In France it created quite a national outcry against Villars. It was urged by the easy-chair critics that the French marshal had under his orders an army numerically superior to that of his opponents, and that he should not have permitted either Douay or Bethune to fall without fighting. Villars, however, knew better. He foresaw the obloquy to which he exposed himself by leaving Bethune to its fate; but to that obloquy he, in the interests of France, willingly submitted. Anxious as he was to save Douay and Bethune, he felt that the risks of a general engagement would, under the circumstances, be too great; that failure would be absolute ruin to France; and averse as he was to inaction, he felt that to adopt the defensive, presented the best if not the only chance of ultimate escape from the serious position in which France now found herself. In this view of the case he without hesitation adopted the defensive, a course it is true which resulted in the loss of the two fortresses, but one which saved France from invasion, and possible partition. Great, however, as was the outcry in France against Villars and his measures, Louis XIV.

was not dishearted. Encouraged by the hope that the Court intrigues in England, of which he was fully informed, would result in a change of Ministry, and the overthrow of the war party, he resolved to continue the contest to the bitter end. But whilst he and his marshals made the most of the armies at their disposal, his emissaries plied the secret advisers of Queen Anne with clandestine overtures, in the hope of detaching England from the Grand Alliance, and inducing her to consent to negociations for a separate peace. As will appear hereafter these covert efforts were unfortunately but too successful. It was insidiously suggested by Marlborough's enemies that he was not anxious to terminate the war, that in order to retain the emoluments and patronage accruing from its continuance, he preferred carrying on a contest of sieges and posts, to fighting a conclusive battle in the

open.

There are always people in the world who are willing to believe anything that is said to the disadvantage of a distinguished public man. Those who are interested in believing it are especially willing to do so. The opinion that Marlborough was pursuing the course represented was studiously fostered by many about the Court. If not fostered it was certainly adopted by the Queen, and countenanced by those who professed to possess her confidence and to reflect her opinions. By little and little it gained ground with the general public, a circumstance that emboldened the Duke's enemies to try to hamper his action by the appointment of Lord Halifax as joint Plenipotentiary to the Hague, for the purpose, as was asserted, of accelerating peace negociations. Lord Halifax was an avowed enemy of Marlborough, and this appointment was in consequence most distasteful to the latter. Thus whilst a great General, supported by a veteran army which he had created, was zealously endeavouring to promote the glory and best interests of his country, a disrepuatable clique in England was trying with equal zeal to neutralize his efforts, and the result was that after the fall of Bethune the action,