but the low and infignificant leaders of a democratic faction men whom nothing short of a revolution could place at the helm of government. In this point of view we cannot but approve this address of John Bull to his brother: though we do not think it equal in energy with that which the former occafion produced. ART. 22. American Candour, in a Tract lately published at Bofton, entitled, An Analysis of the late Correfpondence between our Adminiftration, and Great Britain and France. With an Attempt to jbew what are the real Causes of the Failure of the Negociation. Svo. 106 pp. 33. 6d. Richardfon. 1809.. The partiality fhown to our enemy by the prefent government of the American States, has been, in our opinion, fully proved in feveral able tracts; but in none more perfpicuoufly or forcibly than in the work before us, which first appeared in detached numbers in a Boton newspaper. Our limits will not permit us to detail all the circumstances brought forward by this fpirited writer to fupport the opinion which he maintains, refpecting the American rulers. A few of the leading topics fhall however be given, as fpecimens of a publica tion, which, together with others, that we have had occafion to notice, has, we hope, by this time, opened the eyes of all, but the moft prejudiced perfons, both in that country and our own. The author's first charge againft the court of Washington, as he terms it, is, that, while it profeffed to remove the veil of fe crecy from the negociations of America, with the two great belligerent powers of Europe, its affected frankness was a mere illu fion; for that many important documents, and portions of documents, (by no means of a more fecret nature than those made public) had been fuppreffed. Charges of this nature have often been brought, and, we have no doubt, in many instances unjustly, against minifters. But here fome of the documents themselves are produced by the author, and inferted in an Appendix, with remarks. In our opinion, they clearly prove his allegation that the omiffions are calculated to veil, as much as poffible, the atrocious conduct of France, and to fupprefs every circumftance favourable to Britain. He infers, however, even from the papers produced by that government, that the members of it have a private understanding with the former power, and are determined to refift all the honourable and amnicable proposals of the latter. At first, the author obferves, the American adminiftration affected to confider the Berlin decree as vague and uncertain in its intentions, though America was, in effect, the only neutral power against whom it could operate. They then appeared delighted with the explanations, given by decrees to the minister of Ma. rine; though every man of fenfe perfectly understood their dupli, city. Thefe circumstances are strongly urged as proofs of the in. fincerity fincerity of the American cabinet. Purfuing the fubject further, the author fhows, from a letter of Mr. Madifon (then Secretary of State) to General Armstrong, the American minifter at Paris, that the American government could not believe the interpreta tion then given to the Berlin decree to be fincere, fince this very letter of Mr. M. contains an admiffion that the French cruizers in the Weft-Indies had enforced the decree by depredations on American commerce; and none of thofe captured fhips have been fince reftored. The writer alfo reprobates, we think justly, the admiffion of Mr. M. in a second letter, that the Berlin decree was lawful, as a municipal regulation, if not enforced on the high feas; and fhows it to be a violation of the law of nations, and also a direct breach of the convention between America and France. That it was in any degree juftifiable, as a retaliation on the pre ceding conduct of Great Britain, the author proceeds to difprove; but he premifes, that if it had been true that the decrees of both nations flood, in this refpe&t, in pari deli&o, still the circumftances under which they were refpectively iffued, ought to have excited ten times more indignation against France, than against Great Bri tain: first, because America had a commercial treaty with France, exprefsly forbidding this very injury; whereas fhe had rejected an advantageous treaty with Britain, and done every thing to provoke her government to war: fecondly, because France not only gave no notice of her decrees to the Americans, but actually allured them into her ports, by a falfe pretence, and then feized their perfons and property; but the government of Great Britain gave ample notification, that unlefs the decrees of her enemy were refifted, the muft retaliate; waited a confiderable period for fome movement on the part of America; and at laft gave full time and notice of her orders to neutrals, to prevent their falling within the purview and effects of them. Thirdly, becaufe the decrees of France were unlimited in their extent; but those of Britain opened to the Americans the extenfive colonies of her enemies, and indeed every fource of trade effential to their comfort and profperity. Fourthly, becaufe France disfranchises for ever all American fhips which fhall vifit a British port; whereas Great Britain had made no fuch arbitrary difqualifications. Laftly, because the French had no power of enforcing their blockade, and "were therefore obliged," fays the author, "to refort to cunning to draw the Americans within their fangs ;" but Great Britain had the means of enforcing a ftrict and rigorous blockade; "and the very men," (he obferves)" who brand this blockade as illegal, because nominal, have the fhamelefs inconfiftency of defending the Embargo, because not one of their fhips would have efcaped capture by Great Britain!" "If fuch," (he adds) "be the power of Britain to enforce her orders, to coerce her enemy, to execute her blockade, the perfect juftification of them may be grounded on that that power," even according to the doctrine of the famous armed neutrality, which he cites. He then examines the question, "Whether France was," (as has been alledged) "authorized to make retaliation on Britain, through neutral commerce, as much as Great Britain was autho rized to retaliate on France ?" The three grounds on which it has been attempted to maintain the affirmative of this question, are feparately difcuffed, and fhown to be untenable. Two of them indeed are admitted by the committee of Congrefs (partial as that committee is alledged to have been) to furnish no pretext of complaint, except to America; and France appears to have precluded herfelf from urging the latter objection, (the restrictions on the colonial trade) having invariably on that fubject maintained the principle afferted by Britain. The next fubject of the author's examination is the boafted im partiality of the late offers of the American government to Great Britain and France, in relation to their feveral edicts and decrees, The grofs partiality fhown to France in thefe offers, is here proved by a detail of facts, and a chain of reafoning, which, we think, muft carry conviction to every unprejudiced mind; but which we could not detail within any reafonable limits, or do juftice to them by an abridgment, or partial quotation. So manifeftly unequal, indeed, were the offers to the refpective parties, so advantageous to France, and fo unfair and futile as made to Great Britain, that we are astonished that any advocates for the acceptance of them by our government, could have been found in the British Parliament. The indecent partiality betrayed even in the language held to the two belligerent powers refpectively, is alfo commented upon by this able and fpirited writer; and he particularly examines the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Erskine, on the orders of Great Britain; a letter which, it feems, has been highly eulogized by Mr. Madifon's friends. The author, in the tenth and laft numbers, recapitulates the feveral points eft ablished by him in the preceding part of the work, namely, the favourable interpretation, by the American government, of the Berlin decree, contrary to its explicit terms, and their ready acceptance of an unauthorized and inexplicit explanation of it, on which they themselves placed no ferious reliance. Their making no formal remonitrance against it till November 1807, one day after the British orders of retaliation;-nay, their even apologizing for it, on grounds the most untenable; the inequality in their offers to France and Great Britain, being to the former " an alliance in the war, as a condition of the repeal of her decrees;"--to the latter only the barren repeal of the Embargo, an offer, fays the author, "deftitute of reciprocity, mean, inconfiftent, and hypocritical." These topics are enforced by many excellent obfervations. We need fcarcely add our opinion, that this publication requires only due attention in order to produce the most beneficial effects both in America and Britain. ART. ART. 23. A Political Catechifm, adapted to the present Moments 8vo. 44 PP. Is. 6d. Mawman. 1810. In an age like the prefent, when almost every Briton of the leaft education is familiarly acquainted with the principles of our Conftitution, there is little occafion to multiply political catechifms; and fuch catechifms, when, like the one before us, they are "adapted to the prefent moment," are generally calculated ra ther to ferve the purposes of a party, than to convey useful inftruction. Of fuch a purpofe we cannot acquit the prefent author. His definitions of the terms Whig and Tory, viz. that the latter is one who always fupports the Crown and the perfon, whoever he may be, "whom the King chufes to make his Mi nifter;" and the former one who "always fupports the interefts of the people," are as manifeftly partial and unjuft, as his affertion that the Tories are always in and never out of place," is contradicted, by his fubfequent affertion, that the Whigs when in place cannot accomplish all the ends which they have in view. In point of fact, it is fo notorious, that during the two laft reigns the Whigs were almoft conftantly in power, and the Tories in oppofition, that we know not where an author can have lived, or what books he can have read, if he is really in earnest in such affertions. But what fhall we think of a writer who afcribes the national debt, feptennial parliaments, the interference in German quarrels (as he terms our wars in defence of Hanover), and other notorious meafures of Whig adminiftrations, to the Tories? We can only excufe fuch grofs ignorance, or mifreprefentation, by concluding that, according to this author's notions, all parties when in oppofition, are Whigs, and all minifters Tories. Yet even this doctrine (abfurd as it is) is inconfiftent with his admif fton, that Whigs have fometimes been in place. It is needlefs, after these famples, to give any opinion of the tract before us. It ranks among the lowest and most vulgar effufions of democratic fpleen and party prejudice; if indeed that author can be faid to belong to a party, who appears completely ignorant of the hif tory and measures of the two great parties in this kingdom, and is not aware that, however the name of one of them may be still affumed by certain perfons for interefted purposes, the conftitu. tional diftinctions between them have long fince ceased. ART. 24. The Patriots and the Whigs the most dangerous Enemies of the State. In which is recommended a new and more efficient Mode of Warfare. By Irving Brock. 2d Edition, 8vo. 62 pp. Richardfon. 1810. The object of this writer is to expofe the mischievous defigns, and reprobate the unwarrantable proceedings not only of the democratic faction headed by Sir F. Burdett, but of the higher po litical party in oppofition. With his cenfures of the former we perfectly perfectly coincide. On the latter he is perhaps too generally and indifcriminately fevere. We are not, indeed, among thofe who approved the meafures, or more properly fpeaking, the inactivity of their adminiftration; or who applaud the fpirit which they difplay in oppofing their fucceffors in the government. Yet it is hardly fair to judge of their difpofition and views from the language or the conduct of their most violent democratic adherents, whofe recommendation (to make peace at all hazards) they did not follow, when in office, and in whofe naufeous panegyrics of our enemy the moft refpectable of the party do not coincide. We applaud, however, the public fpirit of this writer, and his zeal in the caufe of his country. The mode of warfare recommended at the conclufion of his work, (namely, by maritime expeditions against the French ftations and garrifons on the coaft of Spain) has alfo our warm approbation. It has indeed, fince the appearance of this tract, been tried, upon a fmall fcale, and attended with diftinguished fuccefs. Very different is our opinion of his propofal to burn the maritime towns, and lay waste the coafts of France; a meafure which would be unneceffarily cruel to individuals, and have little (or perhaps an adverfe) influence on the fortune of the war. Experience has shown with what indifference the tyrant would behold the fufferings of his oppreffed people; and fuch a measure would furnish him with an admirable pretext for diverting the hatred of that people from himself to the British govern ment and nation. With thefe exceptions we can recommend the tract before us as maintaining the beft principles, and enforcing them in a fpirited, though rather a declamatory ftyle and lan guage. ART. 25. A Vindication of the Peer's Right to advise the Crown. To which are prefixed, the Debates which occurred on that Sub. ject in both Houses of Parliament, in December, 1783. 8vo. 55 PP. 25. J. J. Stockdale. 1810. The republication of this fhort tract is faid, in the preface, to have been occafioned by the animadverfions on the conduct of a noble Earl in prefenting privately to his Majefty a narrative of the expedition which he commanded on the Dutch coaft. As the meafure in question has been amply difcuffed, and a decifion taken place in the Houfe of Commons, we fhall not fay more on that fubject than that the proceeding appears to us to have been rather unfair than unconftitutional; unfair perhaps on the noble Lord's colleagues in adminiftration, whom the juftification of the Commander might involve in blame, as deficient in forefight, information, or arrangement: but it was, we think, ftill more objectionable, as obliquely accufing, in a fecret paper, the naval com. mander of the expedition. We are convinced, however, from the character of the noble Lord, that his error (if he erred) pro ceeded |