Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite SubjectivityCombining Minds is about the idea of minds built up out of other minds, whether this is possible, and what it would mean if it were. Roelofs surveys many areas of philosophy and psychology, analysing and evaluating denials and affirmations of mental combination that have been made in regard to everything from brain structure, to psychological conflict, to social cooperation. In each case, he carefully distinguishes different senses in which subjectivity might be composite, and different arguments for and against them, concluding that composite subjectivity, in various forms, may be much more common than we think. Combining Minds is also the first book-length defence of constitutive panpsychism against all aspects of the 'combination problem'. Constitutive panpsychism is an increasingly prominent theory, holding that consciousness is naturally inherent in matter, with human consciousness built up out of this basic consciousness the same way human bodies are built up out of physical matter. Such a view requires that many very simple conscious minds can compose a single very complex one, and a major objection made against constitutive panpsychism is that they cannot - that minds simply do not combine. This is the combination problem, which Roelofs scrutinizes, dissects, and refutes. It reflects not only contemporary debates but a long philosophical tradition of contrasting the apparently indivisible unity of the mind with the deep and pervasive divisibility of the material world. Combining Minds draws together the threads of this problem and develops a powerful and flexible response to it. |
Contents
| 1978 | |
| 1984 | |
Conscious Subjects Conscious Unity and Five Arguments for Anti | |
Composite Subjectivity and Microsubjects | |
The Problems of Structural Discrepancy | |
Composite Subjectivity and Intelligent Subjects | |
Composite Subjectivity in Organisms Organs and Organizations | |
Composite Subjectivity and Psychological Subjects | |
What It Is Like for Two to Become | |
Concluding Remarks | |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | |
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Common terms and phrases
access-conscious action aggregate anti-combination basic behavior blending boundedness causal interdependence Chalmers chapter cognitive combinationists complex component personas component subjects composite experience composite subject connected conscious structure conscious subject conscious unity consider corpus callosum deny dissociative identity disorder distinct distinguish division-relative entities exist experiencing experiential properties explain fact feel functionalist combinationism Goff human brain idea identity individual inner conflict instance instantiate intelligent functioning intelligent subjects interact introspective intuitive involves mental combination metaphysical microexperiences microsubjects mind Monism Nation-Brain neurons object other’s Oxford University Press panpsychism panpsychist combinationism participants particles particular person phenomenal binding phenomenal consciousness phenomenal field phenomenal unity Phenomenology Philosophical Philosophy of Mind physical properties premise principle problem psychological combinationism Qualia qualities radical confusion representational unity representationally seems sense share simply single sort split-brain stream of consciousness structure-specific wholes structured consciousness substrates supervenience theory things thought thought experiment true undergo visual
