THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS MAKES NO CRITICISM OF OUR FINDING THAT CONEWANGO RECREATION FACILITIES WOULD BE VASTLY SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF KINZUA

The "Analysis" of the Chief Engineer takes no exception to my findings as to recreation, to which a chapter was given in my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers. Outdoor recreation is not unimportant, but is an increasing source of human satisfaction and is big business. The Muskingum Conservancy District of Ohio, with its several reservoirs, of which I was chief engineer until I went to the TVA, was primarily designed for flood control and river regulation. Yet the income from recreation, in the form of rent from cottage sites around the reservoirs, meets the entire operating cost of the project, including taxes on the land taken, operating expense, and administration. I am informed that a study by the University of Tennessee disclosed that, since the development of the TVA lakes, the income of the State from recreation ranks with the income of the TVA from power sold.

Conewango would be greatly superior to Kinzua as to recreation. Kinzua would destroy important present values. The Allegheny River above the Kinzua Dam site in its present condition is an exceptionally attractive recreation area. There are hundreds of cottages along the river, and both hunting and fishing are good.

While Kinzua would completely destroy this resource, as well as part of the Allegheny National Forest, Conewango would preserve this resource and greatly add to its value by completely preventing the present repeated serious flood damage to the hundred of summer homes along the riverbank. Also, it would increase the undesirably low summer flows to about 5 times as much, maintaining the most desirable river stage. Seldom does a riverbank recreation region have such ideal river control.

Conewango would have a very well defined, but nowhere precipitous, shoreline, somewhat better than the present shoreline of Chautauqua Lake. Only at the north end would there be a flat area where a considerable acreage of bottom land would be exposed during the late summer. An inexpensive type of control could hold the water in this area to a uniform desirable level the year round, except for short periods of a few days during rare large floods. This area, if planted to Indian rice, could become a wild fowl nesting place and fish spawning area.

If Kinzua Reservoir should be built, the lakeshore toward the north end would recede more than 10 miles downstream between high and low water, and it would be wholly infeasible, under the conditions of the large spring flow of the Allegheny, to construct works to stablize the water level in shallow areas, as is entirely feasible at the north end of Conewango.

Conewango would create a new recreation region, with a lake having a minimum water surface area of 28 square miles, as compared with minimum area of about 4 square miles for Kinzua. (I do not have the Army data at hand, and may be in error by about 1 square mile as to Kinzua.) The depth of Conewango Lake would be 10 feet to 40 feet, with resulting desirable temperatures for native fish, whereas, according to the Army Engineers report, the deeper Kinzua waters would be too cold and probably would eliminate the native fish.

The annual fluctuation of lake level in Kinzua would be about 80 feet, reaching more than 100 feet once in 10 years. The extreme 10-year fluctuation in Conewango would be less than 20 feet, and the usual annual fluctuation about 10 feet or less.

To reach Kinzua Lake during late summer it would be necessary to go down a very steep slope 60 to 80 feet over mud deposits, or downriver 10 miles or more from where the shoreline was a few months previously. To reach Conewango Lake under similar circumstances it would be necessary to go about 10 feet down a slope that is well defined, but not too steep for an auto to drive on. Kinzua would have almost no approach roads, except the drowned-out ends of those which once crossed the valley. Conewango would have approach roads nearly everywhere. There would be six villages along the margins of Conewango to serve visitors. Kinzua, except at the Dam, could have almost no nearby villages. If any villages should be built to serve visitors, because of the great fluetuation of water level and the rough mountain terrain, they would need to be ser eral miles away to serve late summer and fall visitors. Conewango villages could be within 200 feet to a quarter of a mile from the low water lake shore.

Kinzua would disrupt communication and association of people living on the two sides of the Allegheny Valley. About 10 local highways by which these

people crossed the valley would be destroyed, making it necessary to go to the end of the reservoir to cross, often by a long, round-about route. There is no material interruption of cross-reservoir communication for Conewango.

Altogether, Conewango would supply vastly superior recreation opportunities. The "Analysis" of the Chief of Engineers made no comment on my statements in this regard. The differences are unquestionable.

THE PERSONAL FINDINGS OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

I have indicated some the the findings in my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers to which no exception is taken in the "appraisal" of the Chief of Engineers as presented to the Subcommittee on Public Works of the Appropriations Committee.

The first two pages of the “Analysis" obviously are the comments of the Chief of Engineers personally, whereas the remainder seem to be for the most part a collection of statements furnished to him. I shall next examine his personal 2-page statement.

The Chief of Engineers stated: "TAMS (Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton) made an engineering study and review of the authorized project and of five alternative plans that covered the principal possibilities for storage in the Conewango Valley and for diversion through the Conewango into Lake Erie."

This statement is incorrect. Of the three most promising routes for diversion to Lake Erie, TAMS studied and reported on only one, and that one, as it turns out, was the least desirable of the three. TAMS studied three variations of treatment of one route, but gave no attention whatever to two better routes. The need for further exploration beyond the one route they did study was made plain to them. It was made clear that the studies for the Seneca Nation were as yet in their preliminary stages, so far as discovering the best solution was concerned.

The Tippetts engineers must have been cognizant of my testimony before the House committee a few months before they began their work, because they quoted verbatim in their report (Appendix A P 1071-1073 of Tippetts report to the corps). The following is from my testimony as quoted by Tippetts:

"It should be a fundamental principle of good engineering that no vast project costing many millions of dollars shall be undertaken until all possibilities have been examined and compared, so that the best way may not by chance be overlooked. This is a first principle of responsible engineering. I am convinced that no such adequate comparison has been made in this case, specifically as to the diversion of floodwater to Lake Erie. *

"The project of diverting floodwater to Lake Erie, because of the exceptionally favorable conditions existing, is possible of several variations. It can be planned with or without storage of water on the Conewango marsh, or with or without power generation above Lake Erie, and with or without control of low water in [for] the lower Allegheny, and with possibilities of varying degrees of water control. The cost may vary somewhat, depending on which of these or other alternatives is chosen. Further study probably would disclose varied improvements and economies over the plan presented here."

Then, on November 18, 1957, when the Tippetts engineers were just beginning their studies, I wrote them directly as follows:

"The earlier fieldwork and calculations for this study were largely made by my long-time friend and associate, Barton M. Jones. Upon his sudden death a few weeks ago, I located such of his papers as I could, and have continued the study. He commented frequently that the project has such a variety of promising alternatives that when the possibilities and economies were fully worked out, the plans may have little resemblance to the ones he has prepared. * * * It is hoped that as Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton make their study with more adequate resources, they will not simply determine the feasibility of the elements we propose, but will be alert to see further possibilities and economies, as well as any weak spots in our proposals."

However, TAMS made no general exploration for possibilities, but only looked into the specific suggestions that I was able to make to them at the time they began. As I found what seemed to be better possibilities, which would save millions of dollars, and presented them to the Tippetts engineers, they told me that they did not have time to look into them. The Tippetts engineers made no general study of possibilities, and did not acquaint themselves with potential alternatives I had not suggested.

Explicitly, the Tippetts engineers did not, as implied by the Chief of Engineers, explore fully the matter of alternative plans," and did not "review the principal possibilities for storage in the Conewango Valley and for diversion through the Conewango Valley into Lake Erie.

On page 2 of his personal statement the Chief of Engineers commented: "Mr. Morgan suggested a further variation for additional study (hereafter referred to as plan 6) [This includes the diversion to Cattaraugus. AEM] which he claims to be similar to plan I (then estimated by TAMS to cost $142,338,000, or over $41 million more than the authorized Allegheny Reservoir)."

This statement is inaccurate in that, taking $41 million from $142,338,000 leaves $101,338,000 as the cost of Kinzua. Now, the cost of Kinzua as given by the Army Engineers in 1958 is not $101 million, but $110,780,000. Consequently, Tippetts' estimate of plan I is not $41 million more than Kinzua, but $31,608,000, (We estimate our plan 6, with diversion to Cattaraugus, to cost less than $85 million, whereas the present Army estimate for Kinzua is $113 million. This would leave Conewango costing $28 million less than Kinzua, not counting the proper extra charge against Kinzua of about $25 million for cost or loss from highway changes.)

Again quoting from that paragraph of the Chief of Engineers: “About 6 months after the completion of the engineering firm's report, Dr. Morgan suggested a further variation for further study."

This night imply that I was dilatory in making suggestions. Approximately midway in the Tippetts engineers' 5-month period of work, I was told that no further suggestions could be considered. While the report was nearing completion, they declined to correct an error or oversight I pointed out, even on an important matter where the members of the firm recognized the error which involved several million dollars. When the report was nearing completion I asked to see it, but was refused opportunity. I telephoned from the Tippetts' New York office to the engineer officer in Cincinnati, under whose direction the report was being prepared, asking him to arrange for me to see it, but he declined.

I did not see the Tippetts' report until after it had been received by the corps and until after the corps had announced to the press that the Conewango plan had been dismissed from consideration, and that a recommendation had been transmitted to the Chief of Engineers that Kinzua be built. Thus, I was given no opportunity to discuss the Tippetts' report with the corps until after the public announcement just mentioned. This was early in April 1958. Thus the matter seemed to be beyond any action on my part until the Assistant Secretary of the Army, in July 1958, gave me audience to present my proposals to him and to the Chief of Engineers. At that first opportunity I presented the "further variation" of diversion to Cattaraugus Creek, and other possibilities. Thus the Corps of Engineers did not receive my further suggestions until 31⁄2 months after the Tippetts' report came into my hands. Thereafter, at the request of the Chief of Engineers, I worked very steadily to prepare a detailed statement of the plans I had made to him verbally on July 22. This detailed statement is the memorandum to the Chief of Engineers of October 13, 1958.

CONCERNING FLOOD CONTROL OPERATION-ALLEGHENY

The "Analysis" states: "Mr. Morgan contends that the flood protection to be provided by the Allegheny Reservoir is inadequate primarily because: (a) Reservoir storage is inadequate to protect Warren and Pittsburgh from floods resulting from 'probable maximum rainfall.'”

That statement, constantly repeated by the corps, is inaccurate. That has not been my position. I have often referred to the fact that Conewango would fully and unqualifiedly protect against such a flood as a way of emphasizing its complete adequacy. I hold that the Kinzua Reservoir, the capacity of which cannot be increased because of the location of Salamanca and of main railroad lines, will hold only a minor fraction, perhaps no more than a third, of such a flood, and is inadequate.

The Weather Bureau estimated the maximum probable precipitation, but the Corps of Engineers estimated what part of that precipitation would run off as flood.

The corps' estimate of needed capacity is inadequate for the following

reasons:

(1) It starts with an assumption that it is necessary to protect against only half that estimated maximum. That is a great reduction, and further reduction is not justified.

(2) By estimating a 2-day storm, whereas longer storms do occur. The very storm suggested by the Weather Bureau as typical was of longer duration, and had two peaks. The corps, by eliminating that possibility, reduced the degree of protection from 50 percent to about 43 percent of the probable maximum precipitation.

(3) The corps made no allowance, or at least totally inadequate allowance, for snow on the ground when the storm rain should come.

(4) The corps assumes that only 66 percent of the rain would run off, whereas in somewhat similar cases the runoff has been above 90 percent, with no snow on the ground.

(5) The corps presumes the almost perfect working of an intricate and difficult flood forecasting and management service. We believe that the degree of forecasting skill assumed is far greater than the state of the art insures, especially as what is learned in moderate storms may not be borne out in very large storms. These are large elements of uncertainty which sound engineering judgment will try to provide against by an adequate factor of safety. In this case we hold that an adequate factor of safety would call for at least 600,000 acre-feet more flood storage. Even a quarter of that is impossible with the limited capacity of Kinzua.

All these shortages exist even if we assume that it would be enough to protect against even half the probable maximum flood. In view of the great vulnerability of Pittsburgh to floods, protection against two-thirds of the probable maximum would be wise if it can be had without great cost.

In all, the estimates of the corps of what the savings would have been if Kinzua had existed, it is assumed that the first part of the flood would have been held in the reservoir. That commonly works out because most floods turn out to be moderate. Should a storm occur of the shape of that suggested by the Weather Bureau, and only half as large, that policy of holding the early part of the flood might be very serious, especially if any of these possible exigencies should occur.

In short, with Kinzua, Pittsburgh would be prepared against most moderate floods from the upper Allegheny, but at the risk of having stored those moderate floods when a big flood following would call for the storage space. Every time a flood would occur the corps would have to guess whether or not a big flood would follow. Generally they would be right, because unusual floods are unusual.

The great flood catastrophies commnly follow very unusual storms, which may be thought of as unprecedented. The flood at Dayton and the Miami Valley in 1913 was more than twice as great as anything else for 160 years. The great New England flood, which did $1,500 million damages, was also called "unprecedented." The Corps of Engineers' estimates on Mississippi floods held for several years, and then proved very inadequate. The Chief of Engineers in three succeeding annual reports announced unqualifiedly that the Mississippi River is now secure against serious damage from floods. Then came the "unprecedented" flood of 1927, which went far beyond the standards set by the corps and did vast damage. If protection against very unusual floods can be had at little or no extra cost, it would seem to be a social crime not to get it.

Conewango would protect against a flood far greater than the most extreme that has been estimated. Why not have that complete and unconditioned security against the upper Allegheny?

Conewango would furnish complete, unlimited protection to Warren from both the Allegheny and Conewango Creek. Jamestown also would profit greatly from Conewango. Kinzua is no protection from Conewango.

The Kinzua capacity is tight all around. There is no adequate margin for uncertainties, such as a prudent engineer hopes to secure. The vastly larger flood control capacity of Conewango is of very high value.

Kinzua is definitely a compromise. Conewango is not.

EFFECT OF RELEASES TO EVACUATE FLOOD CONTROL POOL

All floodwaters stored in Kinzua should be released as soon as possible after every flood. This is necessary in order that the reservoir capacity shall be available in case another flood should come. The policy stated in paragraph 8, page 3, of the section of the "Analysis" on flood control operation, of commonly

holding the discharge of flood storage to 3,000 cubic feet per second, indicates a radical change from previously announced policy. It means that there would often be less flood storage available than is counted on.

This entire discussion of the subject in paragraph 8 is so completely inadequate, and so at variance with other statements of the corps, that I shall not undertake to discuss it here. Rather, I refer to pages 68 to 71 of my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, of which the committee has a copy.

This is a very important factor in the situation. In my opinion, the value of removing the unwanted floodwater from the Ohio and Mississippi would be from $60 to $200 million. These estimates result from using various methods of the corps for estimating budgets. One reason for a range of estimates is that almost never is such an opportunity afforded for entirely removing unwanted floodwater from a river, as can be done with Conewango diversion to Lake Erie. As would be the case with Kinzua, it usually can only be temporarily held back, and must be released downstream during the flood season. The value of temporarily delaying floodwater, and then letting it down in flood season is questionable, where to remove it entirely, as can be done by Conewango, is highly valuable.

THE STATEMENT ENTITLED “ADEQUACY OF STORAGE FOR LOW-FLOW REGULATION— ALLEGHENY RESERVOIR" SUPPRESSES A MAJOR OFFICIAL FINDING OF THE COEPS, MISSTATES IMPORTANT FACTS, AND DISCLOSES THE FACT THAT THE CORPS HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY PRESENTING TO CONGRESS A LARGE FALSE ITEM OF BENEFITS IN ITS STATEMENTS TO JUSTIFY THE CONSTRUCTION OF KINZUA DAM

First, as to efforts to discredit Conewango by explicity misrepresenting im portant official findings of the corps and of the U.S. Public Health Service. Members of Congress or any other persons relying upon this, the second of three statements included in the "Analysis," would be explicitly misled and deceived as to the controlling facts concerning the value of increasing the low-water supply in the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers. In my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers and elsewhere I have held that a larger degree of low-water stabilization and increase than could be provided by Kinzua would be desirable and economically justified. Both in the "Analysis" and elsewhere, in opposing Conewango the corps has denied this, and in the process of denying it has misstated and suppressed its own specific and official findings, and has stated a conclusion exactly opposite to its own official findings.

Since this is a very important matter, which of itself might well be decisive for Conewango and against Kinzua, I shall quote statements of the corps in three instances, in each case in arguments opposing Conewango. The statement in the "Analysis," made in opposition to increasing the low-water flow is: "The benefits from low-flow regulation would not increase proportionate to an increase in storage capacity.”

Since the corps is denying the feasibility of increasing the low-water flow be yond what could be achieved by Kinzua, they can only mean that the increase would be less than proportionate. This is made clear by a statement issued by the Pittsburgh office of the corps to Pittsburgh industrialists. I quote from that statement, dated July 3, 1958, and presented by Colonel Sprague, engineer officer, then in charge of the Pittsburgh office of the corps:

"Dr. Morgan in this paragraph takes his next important position regarding the Allegheny Reservoir, which concerns the storage of water for low-flow regulation. The Allegheny Reservoir would have 549,000 acre-feet capacity for summer-fall season low-flow regulation compared with 1,020,000 acre-feet under each of plans and 5 for the Conewango Reservoir. Such a large reservoir with a large amount of low-flow regulation storage would not be economically justified since benefits for low-flow regulation do not increase in the same proportion as the increase in reservoir storage. For example, pollution-abatement benefits credited to the authorized Allegheny Reservoir are based on estimated reductions in the cose of waste treatment, beyond the cost of direct treatment that would be needed in any event, which would be required to provide desirable stream quality standards without any low-flow regulation. Such pollutionabatement benefits are limited by the treatment facilities that can be eliminated and would not be increased by additional flows that could be provided by operation of a large reservoir on Conewango Creek. The additional flow from that reservoir would, however, have some small additional value in improving water supplies."