STATEMENT BY ARTHUR E. MORGAN ON "ANALYSIS OF ALLEGHENY RESERVOIR AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL OF ARTHUR E. MORGAN BY MAJ. GEN. ITSCHNER, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS"

THE OCCASION FOR THIS STATEMENT BY ARTHUR E. MORGAN

On May 5, 1959, I appeared before the Subcommittee on Public Works of the House Appropriations Committee on behalf of the Seneca Nation of Indians, to testify in favor of the Conewango plan for reduction of floods and for increase of low-water supply of the upper Allegheny River. The Corps of Engineers had submitted to the subcommittee its "analysis" of the issue.

By action of the committee I was given a copy of that analysis, with the request that I present a reply to the subcommittee by May 14. On the following day, May 6, I testified before the corresponding subcommittee of the Senate. I had already been committed to a heavy schedule of engagements in New York and Pennsylvania for the period between May 6 and May 14, and was not able to return to Ohio where my office and my engineering files are located. This statement has been prepared while I was traveling. I have had with me a copy of the memorandum I delivered to the Chief of Engineers on October 13, 1958, a copy of the report of the engineering firm of Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthyStratton, which was employed by the Corps of Engineers to study the situation, and a binder of data relating to the matter.

THE TWO PLANS FOR UPPER ALLEGHENY RIVER CONTROL

Two methods have been proposed for the control of the upper Allegheny River.

The Kinzua plan, presented by the Corps of Engineers in 1936 and authorized by Congress, along with more than a hundred other reservoir sites, concerning many of which there had been little study, provides for a dam across the Allegheny River about 8 miles above Warren, Pa. It would store water during floods, and let it out as soon as possible afterward, so as to be ready for the next flood. Also it would store a limited amount of water, claimed by the Army Engineers to be 550,000 acre-feet, for increasing the low-water flow, especially at and near Pittsburgh. The Kinzua Reservoir would flood almost all the habitable portion of the Allegheny Reservation of the Seneca Nation of Indians. The capacity of the Kinzua Reservoir site is inflexibly fixed and limited by the fact that there is only one short stretch of the Allegheny River where it is feasible to build the dam, while the location of the city of Salamanca upstream in the bottom of the Allegheny River Valley sets a definite limit to how high water can be stored in the reservoir. No amount of engineering study can change that hard fact. Commenting on this limitation, Colonel Smyser, in charge of the entire Ohio River district of the corps said, "Kinzua is a compromise."

The Seneca Nation objected to the taking of practically all the habitable part of their homeland, and asked me to look into the situation for them. The result has been the proposal for an alternative Conewango plan, which we believe is far superior to Kinzua for all the interests concerned, and especially for the cities of Pittsburgh and Warren.

The Conewango plan would divert the flow of the Allegheny River through a 6-mile channel into a large glacial depression which has about three times the capacity of Kinzua, where it would be stored for flood control and for increasing the low-water flow. Of this regulated low-water flow a part would pass directly down the Allegheny to maintain good river condition, and the rest through a control dam at Waterboro on the Conewango Creek to the Allegheny River at Warren, Pa. In case of a flood too large to be stored, even in the Conewango Reservoir, the excess would be passed through a channel and control works into Cattaraugus Creek and to Lake Erie. Thus no floodwater would need to be passed down to Pittsburgh and the Ohio River during the flood season, as would be necessary with Kinzua.

The Conewango Reservoir site has about three times as great capacity as the Kinzua site. Moreover, by means of a short channel from the Conewango Reservoir site to Cattaraugus Creek, which flows for much of its distance through an enormous rock gorge 300 feet deep, any excess floodwater which cannot be stored for low-water control can be discharged harmlessly to Lake

THE NATURE OF THE "ANALYSIS" OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

The "analysis" presented to the House subcommittee by the Corps of Engineers consists of a two-page statement by the Chief of Engineers, followed by three memorandums, which have the following headings: "Flood Control Operation-Allegheny Reservoir," "Adequacy of Storage for Low-Flow RegulationAllegheny Reservoir," "Comparison of Estimates-Allegheny Reservoir and Alternatives." From the similarity of the wording and contents of these three statements to previous statements issued from the Pittsburgh office of the corps. I judge that they were prepared in the Pittsburgh office of the corps, which has had immediate supervision and direction of the Kinzua project.

The statement of the Chief of Engineers and the three supporting documents will be discussed in that sequence. However, I shall precede that discussion by a statement of important elements of the situation concerning which the Corps of Engineers takes no exception to my position, as given in my memo randum of October 13, 1958, which I prepared for the Chief of Engineers at his request.

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS HAS HAD AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY MY MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 13, 1958, AND THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS STATES THAT THEY GAVE IT UNUSUALLY THOROUGH STUDY

On October 13, 1958, I personally left with the Chief of Engineers 4 copies of a large memorandum of about 80 pages, with about 60 maps, tables and charts, outlining the proposal of the Seneca Nation for a plan for flood control and low-water augmentation for the upper Allegheny River. This material represented a large amount of work, by six engineers during a year and a half. At that time I went over this memorandum in considerable detail with the Chief of Engineers, discussing the more significant features. He said that my memorandum would have prompt and careful attention. A month later the Chief of Engineers informed me that while the local staff (presumably Pittsburgh and Washington) was opposed to my proposal, he was giving the report to a highly qualified engineer officer at a distance, for him to give entire time to it for 2 or 3 months, and that he would inform me immediately on reaching a conclusion.

On March 26, 1959, the Chief of Engineers informed me of his disapproval of my proposals, and in doing so, wrote: "Members of my staff, and I personally, have carefully reviewed the material you left with me during your visit to my office on October 15, 1958. Also I have had the benefit of the observations of an extremely competent engineer officer who made an independent review of the matter." On March 30, I wrote the Chief of Engineers: "Your decision in this matter must, of course, be based on your opinion that there are specific inaecuracies of large magnitude in the presentation made to you in our memorandum of October 13, 1958. May I have the opportunity to see the data on which this conclusion is reached, especially the report of 'an extremely competent engineer officer who made an independent review of this matter?" "

In his letter of April 3, stating that he could not grant my request, the Chief of Engineers stated: "I consider that proposals for alternative measures have been given exhaustive study by the Corps of Engineers far beyond that normally required to reach a decision."

From this sequence of events and these statements by the Chief of Engineers it is reasonable to conclude that the "Analysis of Allegheny Reservoir and Alternative Proposal by Arthur E. Morgan," which the Chief of Engineers presented to the Subcommittee on Public Works of the House Appropriations Committee, is not a casually or hastily assembled opinion, but is a considered statement. and reasonably covers the ground of my proposals. Inasmuch as the “analysis” of the Chief of Engineers took time and space to comment on numerous relatively minor matters, it is to be assumed that if no exception is taken to relatively major issues it is because the study directed by the Chief of Engineers did not find any exception to take on such matters. Therefore it is important to note what major findings of mine have passed without criticism this "exhaustive study *** far beyond that normally required."

FINDINGS IN MORGAN'S MEMORANDUM TO WHICH THE "ANALYSIS" DOES NOT TAKE

EXCEPTION

The three reasons for rejecting Conewango

The firm of Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, hereafter referred to as Tip petts or TAMS, in the letter submitting their report to the engineer officer in

charge of the Ohio River division of the Corps of Engineers, found that my proposal is feasible, but gave just three reasons for holding Conewango to be inferior to Kinzua. These three points were: (1) That Conewango would cost more; (2) that Conewango would take more land, and; (3) that Conewango would displace more people.

When this engineer officer publicly announced that he had submitted that report to the Chief of Engineers with his recommendation that the Corps of Engineers proceed with the construction of Kinzua Dam, he gave these three reasons, and no others, for his decision against Conewango.

The Chief of Engineers also took explicit notice of this opinion of the Tippetts engineers. He stated in his introduction to the "analysis": "TAMS found the alternate plans to be feasible, but they would cost from 25 to 38 percent more than the authorized projects, would require 51 to 108 percent more land, and would dislocate 150 to 180 percent more people." In my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, I stated that as to land taken, it is not acres which count, but values (a large part of Conewango marsh is unused and useless), and that in value, according to figures of Tippetts and the Corps of Engineers more would be taken by Kinzua than by Conewango. That finding of mine was not questioned.

As to the displacement of people, the six villages of the Kinzua project would be buried deep under water and, as explicitly stated in the report of the Corps of Engineers, must be entirely eliminated, with the inhabitants of necessity scattered to considerable distances. This is because outside the river valley the adjoining mountains are too precipitous for habitation. In the case of Conewango the six villages affected (one of them two or three times as large as any in Kinzua) all are along the margins of the Conewango Reservoir, with moderately rolling terrain. They could be readjusted by moving the buildings below flood line uphill a fraction of a mile, without disrupting the life or business of the community. (The Tippetts engineers had assumed that any village touched by the flood line would be dislocated, and all its people displaced.) I showed in my memorandum that correction of this improper assumption of the Tippetts engineers discloses that, according to the figures of the Tippetts and the corps, many more persons would be displaced by Kinzua than by Conewango, and I concluded that, so far as displacement is concerned, Conewango should be chosen over Kinzua. There was no challenge or criticism of this finding by the staff of the Chief of Engineers.

Thus, of the three points made by the Tippetts engineers and by the Corps of Engineers for dismissing Conewango, only the one of cost, which they did question, remains to be considered, so far as any purported major defect of Conewango is concerned. This matter of cost will be dealt with in detail later.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT QUESTION OUR FINDING THAT THE PURPOSES OF FLOOD CONTROL AND OF LOW WATER INCREASE WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY SERVED BY CONEWAN GO

The Tippetts firm had found that the purposes of the Corps of Engineers for controlling the upper Allegheny for flood control and low water augmentation would be effectively served by use of the Conewango Reservoir and diversion to Lake Erie. The "analysis" by the Chief of Engineers quote that finding, and in no way challenges or critizes it. In fact, since 1957 the Corps of Engineers has admitted this.

THE SENECA NATIONS WOULD COOPERATE

The admission that the purposes of upper Allegheny River flood control and low water increase would be effectively served by the Conewango project has a very important bearing on the problem of the Seneca Nation. The Senecas have announced publicly and repeatedly that if the protection of Pittsburgh should make imperative the taking of their land, they would not oppose that action; but that if a reasonably alernative should be available, then the breaking of the 160-year old treaty and the taking of their homeland should be avoided.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT CRITICIZE OR TAKE ISSUE WITH OUR FINDING THAT CONEWANGO WOULD FULLY PROTECT PITTSBURGH, WARREN, AND OTHER COMMUNITIES FROM A FAR GREATER FLOOD THAN WOULD KINZUA

The U.S. Weather Bureau determined what would be the "probable maximum precipitation," but the estimate of the size of flood which would result from such precipitation was made, not by the Weather Bureau, but by the Corps of Engi

neers. Since the capacity of the Kinzua Reservoir cannot be increased, if Kinzua is to be used, then the estimated flood to be cared for must not be greater than that definite capacity can account for.

The size of flood is affected, not only by the amount of rainfall of a specific storm, but by other factors, such as the proportion of rainfall which will run off, whether melting snow will add to the precipitation of the storm, and whether or not the storm will be quickly followed by a second storm. (The Weather Bureau, in its report to the corps, presented the typical storm as having been preceded by a smaller storm-such a short time before that there would not have been time to empty the reservoir in the time in between them. The Corps of Engineers ignored this prognosis of the Weather Bureau, and did not provide against the possibility of a smaller storm immediately preceding the great one.)

I held that it is wise to have a considerable factor of safety in reservoir capacity to take care of any, and preferably all, of such uncertainties. Conewango would fully do that. Kinzua would not. Considerable additional capacity would help to make a project safe against any such uncertainties.

The Corps of Engineers assumed that it would be satisfactory to protect against a flood which would result from a rain half the size of the "maximum probable rainfall” estimated by the Weather Bureau. However, we held that the corps either ignored entirely, or made inadequate provision against, the various uncertainties mentioned. Considering the lack of a factor of safety against what we consider to be real risks and possibilities, we hold that the rigidly limited capacity of Kinzua would not fully protect against a storm half as great as the "probable maximum precipitation" as estimated by the Weather Bureau, but only against a storm perhaps a third as large. Anything larger could not be fully protected against by Kinzua.

The Corps of Engineers questions the need for more protection than Kinzua would give, but the "analysis" of the corps does not in any way question our finding that Conewango would fully protect against a flood between two and three times as large as would Kinzua.

The Tippetts report also acknowledges that Conewango would fully protect Pittsburgh, Warren, and other downstream cities from an upper Allegheny flood more than twice as large as would Kinzua. There is no question as to that finding from any quarter.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT QUESTON OUR FINDING THAT KINZUA WOULD DESTROY THE BEST WATER LEVEL HIGHWAY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS, AND WOULD REPLACE IT BY AN EXCEEDINGLY BAD HIGHWAY

My memorandum draws attention to the fact that the building of Kinzua would destroy the one water level highway route through the mountains, which as stated in the report of the corps, has excellent highway characteristics, and would replace it with a highway monstrosity along the steep mountain side, with grades of 10 percent and sharp curves. This road would be very dangerous at all times, and almost unusable in winter weather.

According to the standards of appraisal of the American Association of Highway Officials, the cost or loss of values by this undesirable change would be about $25 million on the basis of State highway department estimates, or a loss of $40 million on the basis of Army engineers estimates. Such an item should be added to the proper cost of Kinzua Dam.

This important matter could not have missed the attention of the corps. When on October 13, 1958, I described the condition to the Chief of Engineers he was incredulous, and said that such a mountainside road never could be the work of the corps. Then I told him that the profiles I was showing him were photostat copies of the official profiles of the corps. In the analysis of cost and value of Kinzua, which was placed at the beginning of my memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, this cost or loss is shown as a proper added cost of Kinzua. The corps had no criticism of this important finding.

When this proper item of cost is added to Kinzua, the cost of Kinzua is about the same as the estimate of the Tippetts engineers for Conewango, and is more than $50 million higher than our estimate for Conewango with diversion by way of Cattaraugus Creek. The fact that the Chief of Engineers had explicit per sonal knowledge of this matter, that he had expressed incredulity at what the corps had done in relocating this road, that a detailed financial analysis of the

situation is included in my memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, and that it is stated that this extra cost or loss, due to the very harmful highway change, should be considered as part of the cost of Kinzua, is evidence that this matter could not have been overlooked. Absence of any criticism of this finding is evidence that no effective criticism of it was found. Yet it substantially changes the balance of values against Kinzua, and might of itself turn the balance against Kinzua.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT QUESTION OUR FINDING THAT UP TO 1957 ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CORPS MADE ACCURATE COMPARISON IMPOSSIBLE

From 1928 at least until April 1957 the Corps of Engineers had held (to quote a formal published statement of the corps on April 1, 1957, which was, I am informed, reproduced in the Congressional Record): "A major reservoir on the Allegheny would be required in connection with any plan of diversion for flood control or power generation." Since any such dam would require the removal of the water level line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, which the corps estimates to cost $25 million, and the removal of the water level highway and its branches, which the corps estimates at amount $20 million, in addition to the dam, lands and all other costs, any "major reservoir" would cost not less than $75 million, and probably more than $100 million.

The Tippetts report clearly confirms my finding that no such "major reservoir on the Allegheny" is necessary for a diversion project. The corps takes no exception to our finding, explicitly confirmed by the Tippetts engineers, that such a reservoir is unnecessary.

So long as the Corps of Engineers lived and worked under the gross misapprehension that this extra item of $75 million to $100 million would be essential to any diversion project it would be unable to make any accurate judgment of comparative values of Kinzua and Conewango. Therefore, at least until the past year or two, the corps has not been in a position to judge the relative value of these two projects, even if the corps had been aware of the possibilities for diversion.

No question is raised by the Chief of Engineers concerning my finding that when Kinzua was adopted and until 1957, the corps, carrying this misconception of the need for a "major reservoir on the Allegheny" as a necessary element of any diversion project, was not able to make a competent comparison of Kinzua and Conewango with diversion. (This is only one of several reasons for the judgment that prior to 1957 the corps lacked the facts necessary for making a valid comparison.)

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT QUESTION OUR FINDING THAT THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS ADOPTED KINZUA WITHOUT BEING AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

It has been customary for the corps in its publicity to assert as stated in the language of the corps: "Prior to the Flood Control Acts of June 22, 1936, June 28, 1938, and August 18, 1941, which authorized the Allegheny Reservoir, the Corps of Engineers gave comprehensive consideration to all the reasonable alternative means for achieving the desired objective-flood control and associated water resources development for the upper Ohio River Basin." I have stated that no such "comprehensive consideration to all reasonable alternative means" was ever given. The existence of the most promising alternatives was not known to the Corps of Engineers. There is no evidence of any such consideration, and the very inaccurate statements in the publicity of the corps concerning the terrain and other physical conditions involved shows a lack of knowledge of the existence of these possibilities or of their characteristics. The choice of the Kinzua site and project was made in complete ignorance of the existence or characteristics of the best alternatives. To come to a conclusion concerning a great project without knowing what the significant alternatives are, or what their characteristics are, is not a sound basis for public policy, and calls for a reappraisal, with consideration of these alternatives.

I stated this important conclusion and gave my reasons for it. Especially I indicated why the study of 1928, which is frequently referred to by the corps, did not in any degree constitute such "comprehensive consideration." No evidence whatever is given in the "Analysis" to contest the accuracy of my position, and there is no mention of the subject in the "Analysis" of the Chief of Engineers.