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time abroad, it was held that he could still file his petition in the district of his domicile, if his original domicile had not been given up, and he had returned before filing his petition, with the intention of making his home at that point.16 Under the power to transfer from one district to another given by section 32 of the act, an involuntary petition had been filed in Georgia, and the debtor had filed his voluntary petition in New York. He had lived in Georgia. The great bulk of his debts had been contracted there, and he was an employé of a corporation which was located in Georgia, and had succeeded to the business of his former firm. It was held in this case that Georgia was the proper and most convenient district, and that the right to transfer applied not simply to involuntary cases, but to an involuntary proceeding in one district, and a voluntary in another.17 But if a petition is filed where the debtor had not resided or been domiciled, a creditor who wishes to object must do so promptly. He cannot come into the proceeding, prove his claim, and then urge this lack of jurisdiction in opposition to the bankrupt's discharge; for by coming into the proceeding he has waived any objections to jurisdiction; the question being merely one of personal jurisdiction, and not of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.18

principal place of business of a corporation is a question of fact, not necessarily controlled by its charter. Burdick v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 737, 75 C. C. A. 603; In re Matthews Consolidated Slate Co. (D. C.) 144 Fed. 724; In re Pennsylvania Consolidated Coal Co. (D. C.) 163 Fed. 579; In re Perry Aldrich Co. (D. C.) 165 Fed. 249. The fact that it has ceased operations where it had been conducting its principal business, and is engaged in liquidating its affairs, does not prevent proceedings against it in such district. Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed Milk Co. (D. C.) 141 Fed. 444; Robertson v. Union Potteries Co. (D. C.) 177 Fed. 279. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (KeyNo.) § 16; Cent. Dig. § 20.

16 In re Williams (D. C.) 99 Fed. 544. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 14; Cent. Dig. § 20.

17 In re Waxelbaum (D. C.) 98 Fed. 589. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 18; Cent. Dig. § 22.

18 In re Worsham, 142 Fed. 121, 73 C. C. A. 665; In re Walrath

PARTIES-VOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

37. Any person who owes debts, except certain corporations, may avail himself of the benefits of the act as a voluntary bankrupt. This, however, does not apply to any one non compos mentis, nor to one under legal disability.

This applies to a resident alien.10 Notwithstanding its broad language, however, there are some parties who cannot avail of the act. An infant cannot file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, nor can an involuntary petition be filed against him; for an infant needs no discharge against the great mass of his debts. Hence, where an involuntary proceeding had been instituted against a partnership which had an infant member, the proceeding was dismissed as to him, though it was retained as to the other partners.20 On similar principles, a lunatic cannot file a voluntary petition, nor can an involuntary petition be filed against him for debts incurred while non compos mentis, as a lunatic could not commit an act of bankruptcy. If, however, the act of bankruptcy was committed while sane, his supervening lunacy would not prevent a procedure against him.21 Nor can a married woman file a voluntary petition, or be proceeded against, except in states where her common-law

(D. C.) 175 Fed. 243. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 21; Cent. Dig. § 24.

19 In re Boynton (D. C.) 10 Fed. 277. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 13; Cent. Dig. §§ 13-16.

20 In re Duguid (D. C.) 100 Fed. 274; In re Stein, 127 Fed. 547, 62 C. C. A. 272; Jennings v. Stannus, 191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 91. See "Bankruptcy," Dcc. Dig. (Key-No.) § 13; Cent. Dig. §§ 13–16.

21 In re Marvin, Fed. Cas. No. 9,178; In re Pratt, Fed. Cas. No. 11,371; In re Weitzel, Fed. Cas. No. 17,365; In re Kehler, 153 Fed. 235; Id., 159 Fed. 55, 86 C. C. A. 245. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 13; Cent. Dig. §§ 13–16.

disabilities have been removed, and she has power to contract.22

The eighth section of the present bankrupt law provides, also, that the death or insanity of the bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings. This alludes to death or insanity supervening after the filing of the petition. The original act excluded corporations from the class entitled to file voluntary petitions. But the amendment of June 25, 1910,23 changed this so as to deny the privilege only to "municipal, railroad, insurance or banking corporations."

SAME-INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

38. Under the fourth section of the bankrupt act, as amended February 5, 1903, and June 25, 1910, any natural person, except a wage earner, or a person engaged chiefly in farming or tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any moneyed, business or commercial corporation, except a municipal, railroad, insurance or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thousand dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. This is inapplicable to persons under legal disabilities, on the same principle as the exception above stated in the case of voluntary bankruptcy.

For reasons already given, infants, lunatics, and married women cannot be proceeded against under the qualifications stated, so that they are excepted as much as if they had been expressly named. All other natural persons, ex

22 In re Kinkead, Fed. Cas. No. 7,824; In re Goodman, Fed. Cas. No. 5,540; McDonald v. Tefft-Weller Co., 128 Fed. 381, 63 C. C. A. 123, 65 L. R. A. 106. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 13; Cent. Dig. §§ 13-16.

23 36 Stat. 838 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1493).

cept those named in the act, may be proceeded against. e better opinion is that the status of the party at the

The

time

Of the act of bankruptcy governs.

Wage Earners and Farmers

24

The exception of wage earners from the list of involuntary bankrupts introduces a large field for construction by the courts. The twenty-seventh of the preliminary definitions in the act defines it as meaning an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding $1,500 per year. But for this definition, it would probably have been held to include those who work for wages, as distinguished from those who work for salaries, or compensation measured by the work rather than the period. The word "wages" usually implies the compensation of persons of small means.25 Counsel fees are considered as above the grade of wages, and could hardly be included.20 Under similar statutes, like lien acts, a contractor is not usually counted as an employé, nor his compensation as wages. 27 Another section of the act (section 64) names among the preferred debts wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants. It is not entirely safe to consider the decisions construing this section as in point in reference to the meaning of "wage earner," for the use of different language by Congress is indicative of different intent; and, besides, a clause changing the ordinary rule of equality would be more strictly construed than the first. Under this latter section, however, it has been held that

re Leland (D. C.) 185 Fed. 830. Compare In re Wakefield (D. C.) 182 Fed. 247. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 67;

24 In

Cent. Dig. §§ 17-18, 86, 87.

25 Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. Div. 45. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

26 Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U, S. 501, 11 Sup. Ct. 405, 34 L. Ed. 1023. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §

68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

27 Riley v. Warden, 2 Exch. 59; Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220, 10 Sup. Ct. 60, 33 L. Ed. 310. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

HUGHES FED.Pr.(2D ED.)—7

a traveling salesman who is paid a salary of five thousand dollars does not secure any priority on account of "wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants." 28 Nor does the clause apply to the general manager of a mercantile corporation, who is paid a salary of twelve hundred dollars per annum, or to the president of a business corporation who is paid a salary of seven hundred dollars per annum.29 As to tillers of the soil, reference may be made to the cases cited below.00

Decedents

31

There is no such thing as a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy against a decedent's estate. The reason is that the ordinary laws for the administration of estates give ample remedies for securing its just distribution among creditors; and, as far as the debtor is concerned, he can hardly be considered as interested in securing a discharge.

Corporations

As to the corporations against whom involuntary proceedings may be taken, the policy of the law in its original form was very different from that of the act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 517, c. 176). That act allowed the proceeding against all moneyed, business, and commercial corpo

28 In re Scanlan (D. C.) 97 Fed. 26; In re Greenewald (D. C.) 99 Fed. 705. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

29 In re Grubbs-Wiley Grocery Co. (D. C.) 96 Fed. 183; In re Carolina Cooperage Co. (D. C.) 96 Fed. 950. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

30 In re Thompson (D. C.) 102 Fed. 287; In re Luckhardt (D. C.) 101 Fed. 807; In re Wakefield (D. C.) 182 Fed. 347; In re Dwyer (C. C. A.) 184 Fed. 880; American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Brinkley, 194 Fed. 411, 114 C. C. A. 373. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 68; Cent. Dig. §§ 18, 86, 87.

31 Adams v. Terrell (C. C.) 4 Fed. 796. But the proceedings do not abate. In re Hicks, 107 Fed. 910; In re Spalding, 139 Fed. 244, 71 C. C. A. 370. See "Bankruptcy," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 25, 67; Cent. Dig. §§ 53, 134.

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