diction of the federal equity court if the case is of a character in which it would have had jurisdiction in 1789.13

This principle that a state cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal equity courts is a very important one. It can hardly be considered to go so far as to say that no additional state remedy in equity can be adopted by the federal courts, but it is clear that such additional remedies cannot be adopted if they would violate other provisions of the federal Constitution—notably, the provision that the right of jury trial shall be preserved. An analysis of the cases to be quoted shows that this is the point on which practically all of them turn. A new remedy in equity given by the state court as to cases in which the party would not have been entitled to a jury trial at common law could be adopted by the federal courts.11

15

As an illustration of the principle that a state statute cannot substitute an equitable procedure for one which at common law would have been before a jury, Whitehead v. Shattuck was a case in which the state statute gave a party who was out of possession a statutory right to proceed in equity to settle the title to real estate. The Supreme Court held that the federal court would have no jurisdiction over it. So, too, where a state statute gave a simple-contract creditor the right to file a bill in equity to

13 MCCONIHAY v. WRIGHT, 121 U. S. 201, 7 Sup. Ct. 940, 30 L. Ed. 932; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 9 Sup. Ct. 237, 32 L. Ed. 630; Green v. Turner (C. C.) 98 Fed. 756; Waterman v. CanalLouisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 30 Sup. Ct. 10, 54 L. Ed. 80; ante, p. 10; post, p. 419. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 262, 335; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§

11-20.

14 National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593, 56 C. C. A. 657, 61 L. R. A. 394. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 262; Cent. Dig. 88 797, 798.

15 138 U. S. 146, 11 Sup. Ct. 276, 34 L. Ed. 873. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 335; Cent. Dig. §§ 902-9071⁄2.

set aside a conveyance alleged to be fraudulent, though it gave him a lien from the date of filing his bill, it was held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction, and that it was necessary to proceed to judgment on the claim at common law before such a creditor could file a bill, or at least to have some lien or charge which was enforceable under the general principles of equity jurisprudence.16

As state legislation modifying or rearranging the original jurisdiction of common law or equity as between its own courts cannot operate to enlarge the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts as conferred by the Constitution, so neither can such legislation curtail it.1

SAME-SUITS BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OFFICER THEREOF

96. The district court has cognizance of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity brought by

the United States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law to sue.

This is the first class of suits named in paragraph 1, § 24, of the Judicial Code. The jurisdiction vests regardless of the amount involved, the committee of revision having adopted in this respect the construction placed upon the former acts by the Supreme Court.18

An action of debt for penalties in the name of the United States is sustainable under this paragraph, as well as under

16 SCOTT v. NEELY, 140 U. S. 106, 11 Sup. Ct. 712, 35 L. Ed. 358; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 977, 37 L. Ed. 804; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 259, 335; Cent. Dig. §§ 902-9072.

17 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Trapp, 186 Fed. 114, 108 C. C. A. 226. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 259, 335; Cent. Dig. §§ 795, 796, 902-9072.

18 U. S. v. SAYWARD, 160 U. S. 493, 16 Sup. Ct. 371, 40 L. Ed. 508. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 296, 326; Cent. Dig. § 838.

HUGHES FED.PR.(2D ED.)—15

the ninth.1 So, also, an action on a postmaster's bond.20 So, also, an action of trover by a United States marshal for money held by him in that capacity.21 Suits by receivers of national banks, to realize the assets of the bank and for other purposes, are also sustainable under this section.22 Also suits on contractors' bonds for the benefit of materialmen.2

28

SAME

CONTROVERSIES

BETWEEN CITIZENS

OF THE SAME STATE CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF DIFFERENT STATES

97. The district court has jurisdiction of cases involving controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states.

The reason for conferring most classes of jurisdiction upon the federal courts is to protect those whose rights depend upon federal statutes, or who are nonresidents, from local influences and prejudices. Hence it is as important to confer this jurisdiction where the source of title might create prejudice, as where friends of the local tribunal or juries are opposed to strangers.

19 Jacob v. U. S., Fed. Cas. No. 7,157; Hepner v. U. S., 213 U. S. 103, 29 Sup. Ct. 474, 53 L. Ed. 720, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 739, 16 Ann. Cas. 960. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 296; Cent. Dig. § 838. 20 Postmaster General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136, 6 L. Ed. 577. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 296; Cent. Dig. § 838.

21 Henry v. Sowles (D. C.) 28 Fed. 481. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 296; Cent. Dig. § 838.

22 Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin (D. C.) 12 Fed. 395; Lake Nat. Bank v. Wolfeborough Sav. Bank, 78 Fed. 517, 24 C. C. A. 195; Schofield v. Palmer (C. C.) 134 Fed. 753; Auten v. United States Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 19 Sup. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 296; Cent. Dig. § 838.

23 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 381, 51 L. Ed. 516. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 296; Cent. Dig. § 838.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, conflicting land grants among the several states were quite common. The relative boundaries of the states in relation to each other were not well settled, and when new states were formed there were often difficulties as to whether the grant from the old state or the grant from the new state was a valid one. It was soon decided that the federal courts had jurisdiction in cases of conflicting grants between an old and a new state, although the grant of the old state was made before the new state was formed. This was decided in the case of conflicting grants from New Hampshire and Vermont, where the New Hampshire grant was made at a time when Vermont was still a part of New Hampshire.24 This source of litigation, however, has long since lost its importance.

SAME-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT

98. "The matter in controversy must exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000." The "matter in controversy," in the sense in which it is used as defining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the federal courts, means the claim presented on the record to the consideration of the court, though, as a matter of fact, the claim is not sustained by the proof, or though it is only in part well founded. It is the pecuniary consequences to the party which are dependent on the litigation.25 This means the amount or value directly at issue between the parties in the special suit. The collateral effect

24 Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, 3 L. Ed. 735. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 320; Cent. Dig. § 846.

25 Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198, 14 L. Ed. 660; Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co., 147 U. S. 500, 13 Sup. Ct. 416, 37 L. Ed. 255; WHELESS v. ST. LOUIS, 180 U. S. 379, 21 Sup. Ct. 402, 45 L. Ed. 583. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 328; Cent. Dig. $$ 890-896.

of that suit cannot be considered. For instance, where suit is brought upon coupons detached from bonds whose amounts were less than $2,000, and the issue raised involved not merely the validity of the coupons, but the validity of the bonds themselves, this fact did not give jurisdiction.26

The former statutes as to the jurisdiction of the federal courts prescribed a lesser amount than the present limit of $3,000, and did not exclude interest from the computation. Hence decisions passing upon the amount then required are in point as to the general principle, though this difference between them must be borne in mind.

Prior to the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals, the limit to the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court was for a long time $2,000, and then $5,000. The statutes defining this limit used the same language as the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the lower court as to amount, except that interest was not excluded from the calculation. Hence decisions on the statutes limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are also in point, and many of those referred to under this title relate to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the former law.

The claim asserted by the plaintiff, in order to give jurisdiction, must be actually asserted in good faith, and not colorable merely. If, for instance, coupons or other evidences of indebtedness are transferred to a prospective plaintiff without consideration, and merely for the purpose of collection, the court will not acquire jurisdiction. Not only this, but under another section of the statute it is the duty of the court, of its own motion, even without a plea, to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction on discovering that the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the court,

26 Bruce v. Manchester & K. R. Co., 117 U. S. 514, 6 Sup. Ct. 849, 29 L. Ed. 990. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 328; Cent. Dig. §§ 890-896.