The branches of jurisdiction heretofore discussed have been of a special or exceptional nature. Until the Judicial Code of 1911, it had been the policy of Congress to confer on the district court cognizance of litigation of this sort, and to make the circuit court the forum for the ordinary controversies between man and man of which the federal courts could take jurisdiction. Therefore the previous discussion has been of those classes which went into the district court before the Judicial Code, either exclusively or concurrently with the circuit court. They were carried into the Judicial Code beginning with paragraph 2 of section 24. Paragraph 1 of that section sets out the general jurisdiction over controversies which heretofore went into the circuit court and which by the Judicial Code have been transferred bodily to the district court. Though substantially constant in its general scheme, it has been changed greatly in detail, but it is an evolution of the previous acts from the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, c. 20) to the present time. It is as follows:

"Sec. 24. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:

"First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law to sue, or between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants from different states; or, where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is between citizens of different states, or (c) is between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. No district court shall have cognizance of any suit (except upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer

and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover upon said note or other chose in action if no assignment had been made: Provided, however, that the foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section." 1

The jurisdiction conferred by this section is far short of that which Congress can validly grant to the federal courts, being limited both as to the character of suit and as to the amount involved. An analysis of the section shows that, in order for federal jurisdiction to vest, the following requisites must concur: first, it must be a suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity; second, it must be either (1) brought by the United States or one of its officers, or (2) be between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants from different states, or (3) exceed three thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs, and (a) arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or (b) be between citizens of different States, or (c) be between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

SAME-SUITS OF A CIVIL NATURE AT COMMON LAW OR IN EQUITY-MEANING OF “SUIT”

93. It is not every procedure which is a suit. The word is used in the sense of a proceeding in a court of common law or equity which culminates in a judgment that conclusively determines a right or obligation of the parties, so that the same matter cannot be further litigated except by writ of error or appeal.2

136 Stat. 1091 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 135).

2 In re Stutsman Co. (C. C.) 88 Fed. 337. See "Action," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 1, 16; Cent. Dig. §§ 1-7, 85-93; "Courts," Dec. Dig.

Matters of mere administration or ex parte proceedings are not suits, in the sense of this statute. For instance, the federal courts have no probate jurisdiction for admitting or refusing the probate of wills, or for administering an estate by virtue thereof."

By this it is meant that the federal courts have no probate jurisdiction as such. If, however, they have jurisdiction by virtue of the citizenship of the parties, and in some proceeding which is undoubtedly a common-law or equity proceeding, the fact that questions under a will are involved does not of itself defeat that jurisdiction.*

A proceeding before a tribunal charged with the special power of revising a tax assessment has also been held not to be a suit, within the sense of the federal statute. A leading case on this subject is Upshur County v. Rich," which considered an appeal to a body called a county court in West Virginia. The court, however, reviewing the state statutes, held that this was not a court, in the proper sense of the term; that its duties were merely administrative, and not judicial; and that therefore the federal courts had no jurisdiction over such a proceeding. On the other hand, in Re Stutsman County District Judge Amidon held

6

(Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

3 UPSHUR COUNTY v. RICH, 135 U. S. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. 651, 34 L. Ed. 196; O'Callaghan v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 25 Sup. Ct. 727, 50 L. Ed. 101. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

4 Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 30 Sup. Ct. 10, 54 L. Ed. 80; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 30 Sup. Ct. 501, 54 L. Ed. 762; American Baptist Home Mission Soc. v. Stewart (C. C.) 192 Fed. 976. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key. No.) 88 472, 475.

5 135 U. S. 467, 10 Sup. Ct. 651, 34 L. Ed. 196. See, also, PACIFIC STEAM WHALING CO. v. U. S., 187 U. S. 447, 23 Sup. Ct. 154, 47 L. Ed. 253. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

6 (C. C.) 88 Fed. 337. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

that as the state statute in that case made the decision of the court conclusive and binding, and settled the obligation of the tax bill without any remedy except by appeal, it was a suit, in the sense of the statute.

Under the same principle, a proceeding for condemnation of lands may or may not be a suit, according to its nature. In so far as the proceeding is merely before a board of inquest, it is not a suit; but if the procedure is in a court, and unites the other requisites of jurisdiction, it may be one of which the federal court could take jurisdiction."

A mandamus proceeding, on the other hand, is not a suit, in this sense, because mandamus in the federal courts is not an original writ, but rather in the nature of a writ of execution.8

On the other hand, a statutory civil action under a state law against a corporation for the forfeiture of its charter, which is the practical equivalent of a quo warranto proceeding, is such a suit."

So, too, a writ of prohibition would come within this term.10

7 Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206; In re Delafield (C. C.) 109 Fed. 577; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U. S. 239, 25 Sup. Ct. 251, 49 L. Ed. 462; Drainage Dist. No. 19, Caldwell County, v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (D. C.) 198 Fed. 253 (a drainage case). It has already appeared that express jurisdiction over federal condemnations is vested in the district court (ante, p. 198). The above cases were state condemnation proceedings, in which the question of the right to remove was involved. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 4, 9; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

8 Davenport v. Dodge County, 105 U. S. 237, 26 L. Ed. 1018; Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 450, 7 Sup. Ct. 633, 30 L. Ed. 743. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; “Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 4 Sup. Ct. 437, 28 L. Ed. 482. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11–20.

10 Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (KeyNo.) 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

A habeas corpus proceeding would also be included within the term.11

SAME-SAME-SUITS AT LAW

94. By a suit at law is not meant simply a suit authorized by the proceedings of the common law as distinguished from statutory proceedings, but it means a suit administering a legal right or title as distinguished from proceedings in equity or in admiralty.12

SAME-SAME-SUITS IN EQUITY

95. A suit in equity means a suit within the jurisdiction of an equitable court, as that jurisdiction existed at the time when the Constitution went into effect. This was practically the jurisdiction of the old high court of chancery in England, and while the principle is well established in the federal courts that equity has no jurisdiction if there is an adequate remedy at law, it is equally well established that state legislation can, in a general sense, neither enlarge nor restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts in equity; and hence the fact that there may be now an adequate remedy at law by virtue of a state statute does not defeat the juris

11 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 614, 10 L. Ed. 579, 618. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; "Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.

12 Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 481, 16 L. Ed. 198; Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 3 Sup. Ct. 327, 27 L. Ed. 1006. See "Courts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 281; “Removal of Causes," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 4; Cent. Dig. §§ 11-20.