No. 281.] Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward. UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, Shanghai, April 24, 1868. (Received June 24, 1868.) SIR Mr. Frederick Jenkins, a citizen of the United States, formerly interpreter to this office, gives me the following information: There are now in Shanghai four Coreans and a bishop for Corea, of the Romish Church. These persons have been sent here by the Corean government. The purpose is to make inquiries concerning the state of feeling existing toward Corea in regard to the alleged murder of French priests and of the crew of the American schooner General Sherman, with a view to determine whether it will be wise for the Corean government to send an embassy to America and Europe to explain those occurrences, and to make desired treaties of amity and commerce. Mr. Jenkins expects to sail with these persons for the Corea in a few days, and believes that the result of the report of the commissioners and of his visit will be the sending of an embassy, as proposed. He expects to return to Shanghai in about a month, and that ambassadors, as indicated, will come with him. Mr. Jenkins further informs me he is told the priests were executed in punishment for schemes of theirs at the court. The General Sherman trouble is explained as follows: That vessel had reached a point in the interior on a river, of which he does not know the name. Several of the crew went ashore and became embroiled in a row growing out of the wrongful treatment of some women, and were arrested. A force was then sent from the Sherman, which rescued the men and took them on board, together with two native officers, who, it is supposed, the master intended to hold as hostages. This excited the people, and they attacked the vessel, killing eight persons and capturing the others, who are still held. Mr. Jenkins says that this information is known only to the ambassadors and himself, to a Jewish merchant who has visited the Corea several times, and by whom the commissioners were brought to him, and to one other person who has necessarily been spoken to in order to arrange for the charter of a steamer to proceed to Corea. He assigns as reasons why he has been approached, the belief of the Corean government that the proposed embassy would be more favorably received in America than elsewhere, and should be sent there first; and the fact that he is familiar with the Chinese language, which is the written language of Corea. He is unable to explain how it happens that the Corean government is now employing confidentially the Romish bishop, one of a class they have so severely treated. He expects to bring back with him those of the crew of the General Sherman who are still living. The Shenandoah has lately sailed from Cheefoo for the Corea to make inquiry regarding the crew of the General Sherman, information having been previously received which indicated that some of the number are living. It is difficult to say whether anything will be accomplished by her commander. Mr. Jenkins says that the Coreans now here declare that the visit will be useless. GEO. F. SEWARD. No. 282.] Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward. UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, Shanghai, April 24, 1868. (Received June 24, 1868.) SIR: My dispatch No. 281, herewith, offers information touching the General Sherman case, which has heretofore engaged your attention. It is a subject for congratulation that it is likely to be satisfactorily explained and any necessity for hostile action averted. It is also satisfactory, if true, that the Corean government is anxious to enter into treaties with the western powers. The empire is independent, although it sends complimentary tribute to Pekin. The population is said to be about six millions, or one-third that of Japan. The climate is mild for the latitude. The people are described as peaceful and industrious. In my opinion there is no sufficient object attainable to render it advisable to use force, or even the show of force, to procure a commercial treaty with the Coreans. It may be considered, however, that the interests of our shipping require that at least a treaty providing for the kind treatment of shipwrecked people should be entered into. But if the Coreans are prepared to go to the extent of opening up their country to our merchants, this opportunity is not one that should be lost. I respectfully propose, therefore, in case the proposed embassy be not concluded on, and it shall still seem desirable, on the receipt of your instructions, that authority be given me to request of Admiral Rowan the use of two vessels of war, (one like the Shenandoah or Iroquois, the other smaller,) to employ one or more interpreters, and to proceed to the Corea in order to ask an official explanation of the Sherman affair, and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and of commerce similar to those now existing with China and Japan, or such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and attainable without the exercise or show of force. If unsuccessful-and I am inclined to believe that the exercise of a degree of discretion and patience would insure a more or less complete success-the undertaking could do us no harm. GEO. F. SEWARD. No. 292.] Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward. Shanghai, May 25, 1868. (Received July 13, 1868.) SIR: I have the honor to advise you that the United States steamer Shenandoah, which left this port for Corea on the 18th of March last, has returned to Cheefoo. The commander had intercourse with officers at different points on the coast, but learned nothing to corroborate the reports which have been prevalent here that some of the crew of the General Sherman are still living, and that the government is disposed to send an embassy to western states. Mr. Jenkins has also returned. He had frequent communication with the Corean officers, and virtually confirms the information brought by the Shenandoah. Whatever causes may be at work in Corea, I am now led to believe that no negotiations, not supported by a considerable show of force, would be likely to be successful. GEO. F. SEWARD. No. 294.] Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward. UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL, Shanghai, July 3, 1868. (Received September 8, 1868.) SIR: On the 24th April I had the honor to advise you, in my dispatch No. 281, that I had received information from Mr. F. Jenkins which indicated that some of the crew of the schooner General Sherman were still living and held in custody in Corea, and that the Corean government was anxious to enter into negotiations for treaties of amity and commerce with the several western powers; and on the 25th May I had again the honor to inform you, in my dispatch No. 292, of the visit of the Shenandoah to Corea, and of the return of Mr. Jenkins, and that their further information indicated that there was no reason to believe that any of the crew of the Sherman were still surviving, or that the Coreans were desirous of entering into relations with western states as alleged. At the date of writing the latter dispatch I had become aware that the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded to Corea had been engaged in an attempt to take from their tombs the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country for the purpose, it would seem, of holding them for ransom. I therefore entered upon an investigation of the facts with a view to determine the nature of Mr. Jenkins's connection with the expedition, and whether I ought to prosecute him. I regret to inform you that the information gathered by me has convinced me that it is my duty to do so." The indictment which I have caused to be prepared I inclose herewith. The trial will proceed in a few days, and I shall transmit to you a full copy of the minutes. The consuls of other powers concerned await the result of my action before determining whether to proceed against their nationals. GEO. F. SEWARD. Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward. No. 317.] SHANGHAI, October 14, 1868. (Received December 7, 1868.) SIR: I wrote to you on the 28th ultimo, giving a general statement of my impressions touching the Corean question. Having now had the benefit of consultations with Messrs. Browne and Van Valkenburgh and with Admiral Rowan, I propose to offer some brief remarks bearing on the propriety of our sending a mission to Corea, and its form. They will doubtless touch considerations which you have already duly weighed, but perhaps something may be added which will prove of interest to you. The first object of a mission would be to procure information of the loss or destruction of the American schooner General Sherman, and in case the reports of the wrongful treatment of the crew prove correct, indemnity or satisfaction therefor. I shall not dwell on this point further than to say, that it cannot be well to let pass uninvestigated a matter which there is reason to believe may have been a very grave outrage on a vessel and persons sailing under our flag; that all our efforts to procure information have hitherto resulted not altogether satisfactorily, and that there seems no way to procure perfect information except by direct communication with the Corean government. On the other hand, there is something due from us to the Coreans. We should assure them of our appreciation of their kindness to the wrecked crew of the Surprise in 1866, and disposed as we are not only to assert our dignity, but as well our intent to deal justly, we cannot be indifferent to the propriety of offering to Corea an explanation of our views and conduct in regard to the recent expedition of an armed force for the purpose of exhuming and holding for ransom the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country, in which one of our citizens has been charged as a leader. It is satisfactory to know that we have only to ask from Corea proof that she has dealt as honorably with us in the Sherman case as we have with her in the latter matter. The second object is to obtain a treaty. I have hesitated to say that there is one adequate object to render it perfectly desirable to procure a general commercial treaty. Commercial intercourse with states where we take on ourselves the responsibility of protecting and altogether controlling our nationals, and where the result of intercourse is the introduction of ideas and forces calculated to work changes that may not be gradual and benign, but may upturn in a revolutionary way the existing order of gov ernment and even of society, is not to be inconsiderately sought. But all my reflection leads me to believe that it will be well for us to make the attempt. We have three ports of China in the Gulf Pechili much frequented by our vessels. There are three of Japan on the west coast similarly available to us. Right down between these juts the Corean peninsula. The steamers of the northern branch of the Pacific mail line run for a distance almost within sight of the coast of the peninsula. To the north of Corea stretch away possessions of Russia, having the river Amoor as a natural channel and guide of their commerce to the Pacific. Here are regions of China, Japan, and Siberia, which have already a considerable trade. Within a year or two coal will be extensively worked in each, and it will soon be no longer necessary to bring this indispensable article in the navigation of the present day around the Cape of Good Hope. Thereupon will follow a development of trade here, which will, I think, surprise the most sanguine. Centrally situated, midway in the long stretch of the eastern Asiatic coast, with foreign vessels already skirting her shores in very considerable numbers, Corea cannot hope to exclude foreigners much longer, nor can it be possible that, with a mild climate and a large and industrious population, commerce would not, under favorable auspices, flourish in her cities. France has been unfortunate in Corea. Great Britain has hardly a greater interest at stake than we, and no grievances to redress. North Germany, with her increasing commerce and great fleet of coasting crafts, has yet no determined policy in the East. We are favorably known, and all the circumstances indicate that an attempt to open the country may best be made by us. But whether a general treaty is desirable or not there can, in my opinion, be no question of the need of one that shall provide for the safety of seamen and others wrecked or driven on the Corean coast. Indeed we can hardly consent that it shall remain peculiarly dangerous to our navigation. I remarked in the dispatch referred to in the outset, that the settlement of the Sherman matter, and a treaty of the latter sort, may, it seems to me, be obtained without great difficulty, but that a considerable show of force would probably be needed to secure a general treaty. If the Coreans were excited by grossly wrong conduct on the part of the Sherman crew to engage in a struggle with them, we may perhaps be saved great trouble in this branch of the negotiation, and there is enough in the general conduct of the Coreans to indicate that they would not be greatly averse to giving us formal guarantees to care for persons wrecked, and to arrange measures by which they could be speedily returned to some hospitable district. Touching the broader negotiations it may be assumed, generally, that eastern states have a settled policy toward western powers which is dictated by fear that intercourse will result disastrously; they find occasion for this fear in the harsh lessons of the past, and in the actual condition of a considerable portion of their continent. And, indeed, China is only just emerging from an internal struggle which has threatened most severely the controlling power of the empire, while Japan is, at this moment, in the throes of revolution-troubles which it would not be difficult to connect with the introduction of foreigners. There are arguments which may be advanced to show the Coreans that a juster consideration of eastern states is prevailing in the west; that China would not have encountered the rebellion had the government been at all a wise one, while from the stranger constitution of Japan the result of war was almost inevitable; that foreign intercourse is in many ways desirable, and that it is surely becoming unavoidable. It is indeed doubtful, however, whether there can be found in Corea men able to weigh justly the position of the state, and to bring about, in face of all preconceptions and of conflicting interests, the radical changes contemplated. But it is to be said that these eastern peoples are not unalterably wedded to old practices and institutions. Japan accepted Cómodore Perry's peaceful but formidable mission without great opposition, and of late all parties in that state have vied among themselves in availing of foreign knowledge and material. China, naturally less mobile by reason of her continental position, vast territory and population, has been more consistent in all her history than Japan; but she has not failed to acknowledge, from time to time, the force of new ideas and circumstances, and, even with her, sweeping reforms have been effected by peaceful means working from within. It may not be altogether visionary, therefore, to hope that such a condition of affairs may be found in Corea as will render it possible to attain success without the exercise of force. But, as intimated, I am disposed to think it desirable, if a mission is to be sent to Corea, that it should be provided with a number of vessels. Reasons are so obvious that I will not dwell to review them. But of course I contemplate only the display of force, not its use, and not even intimations that it may be used. I know well there should be no irregular action; and that it will be time enough for the United States to determine on the exercise of force when peaceful efforts shall have been exhausted, and all the circumstances broadly considered. A mission, then, such as the one I have indicated, will require a cordial coöperation with the navy. Fortunately this is perfectly within reach. Admiral Rowan has himself. proposed to me that authority and instructions in our joint names to prosecute the mission shall be applied for. He has a not large fleet, but one perhaps sufficient, since Corea is so near at hand, to enable him to look out for the general interest of the station, and at the same time to spare a few vessels for the particular purpose. I have favored this proposition and have now to ask for it your consideration. While I have indicated one advantage only that would be secured by this course, I do not wish to say that the expedition might not be well left in the admiral's hands. There are numerous precedents for deputing such authority to a naval commander-in-chief, and the instances are not few in which that course has resulted most satisfactorily. Yet I think the admiral would prefer to be associated with me. And looking to the facts that such work naturally belongs to my own branch of the public service, that I have the advantage of a not inconsiderable experience in matters of eastern politics and trade, and that the negotiation may cover over a considerable period, it seems well that we should be associated, and this would be more satisfactory to me. But should the President prefer to confer the authority upon the admiral alone, I shall, remembering that the general objects, and not individual preferences or ambitions, are to be consulted, render to him any assistance within my power that he may wish. GEO. F. SEWARD. No. 223. Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. Fish. WASHINGTON, April 22, 1870. (Received April 30.) SIR: It is well known that the principles on which our intercourse with China has for many years been conducted have been clearly defined by the mission of Mr. Burlingame, and that this demonstration of them has drawn forth grave remonstrances from the mass of foreigners on the spot. The principles referred to appear authoritatively in the SewardBurlingame treaty and the Clarendon-Burlingame correspondence; the views of the merchants in the addresses which they presented to Mr. Ross Browne. I may state the former as follows: The United States and Great Britain desire to acknowledge the perfect independence and general Sovereignty of China within her own borders, and to conform their intercourse with her to the usual courses,* that is to say, they will respect *I have not chosen to dwell here on the fact that the existing treaties do impair the Sovereignty of China; they have been made and accepted, and until China complains of them, or they are otherwise shown to be unnecessary, impolitic, or wrong, we need not greatly discuss them. The proposition as stated touches only matters not dealt with in the treaties or affected by them. her territory and they will not use force or threats of force to urge her on in the path of progress, nor will they allow force to be used in the settlement of disputes and claims, excepting as they would when dealing with a western state. To these fundamental principles the merchants take exception at length. The sum of these objections is founded in the following sentences, which I extract from the documents mentioned: We believe that not only is there a right on the part of western states to insist on steps that will further the cause of civilization in China, but a clear duty in that direction; and that the advancement of China without anarchy and rebellion cannot be had by waiting until her own government is content to move. Lord Clarendon has laid down rules of action for our ministers and consuls and our community, which would prove entirely inadequate if any crisis occurred demanding extraordinary measures. The questions thus stated may be defined as follows: 1st. How may western states best promote the cause of civilization and good government in China? 2d. How may they best protect the legitimate interests of their peoples in that empire? The one may be concisely termed the question of progress, the other that of dealing with the central government. I shall treat them separately and in the order above given. When the merchants say that western states have the right, and add that it is their duty, "to insist on steps that will further the cause of civilization in China," they seem to go a long way. If it is their right they may support that right by force of arms. If it is their duty it may be their duty to use arms. There was a time when European potentates defended the claims of discoveries to and over great districts, and the peoples inhabiting them. Discovery was enough to vest the title to sovereignty, and lest the two greatest defenders of the faith should thus come into collision the outside world was divided between them. To Spain was awarded the regions of eternal youth, which the fancy of the age believed to exist in the golden West. The East, scarcely inferior to Europe in wealth and civilization, was awarded to the mariners of Portugal. France and England as well adopted the theory, and contentions arose out of it which led even to acts of war and woe. To this day the nations of Europe would not hesitate to assume jurisdiction over islands of the sea, or of districts not already taken possession of by western states or advanced in power and civilization. It is only a few years since one of the greatest men of France, M. Guizot, then secretary for foreign affairs, in explaining the circumstances under which the French mission to China of 1844, a peaceful one, was being sent out, declared that if the interests of France should demand it the govern ment would not hesitate to seize an island on the coast of China. Ata later date France has pushed conquests in Cochin China. Russia is at this moment extending her domains in Asia. England never fails for an excuse when it is desirable to assume authority over the outlying states of her Indian territory. Even America, when it suited her purpose, asked for access to the ports of Japan. She used soft words, but a great fieet gave emphasis to them. In fact moderation has ever been observed when there has been the ability to command respect. When this has not existed the interests, or supposed interests, of greater states have never halted. Conquest and aggrandizement have been the rule, and the observers of the rule have not yet disappeared. It is true that generally the purposes of western states are at the present time more or less cloaked and covered over. When it was the |