the two branches of the legislature, which no good citizen would wish to fee diffevered: it helps to keep the government of the country in the house of commons, in which, it would not perhaps long continue to retide, if fo powerful and wealthy a part of the nation as the peerage compofe, were excluded from all fhare and intereft in its conftitution. If there be a few boroughs fo circumftanced as to lie at the difpofal of the crown, whilst the number of fuch is known and fmall, they may be tolerated with little danger. For where would be the impropriety, or the inconveniency, if the king at once fhould nominate a limited number of his fervants to feats in parliament; or, what is the fame thing, if feats in parliament were annexed to the poffeffion of certain of the noft efficient and refponfible offices in the ftate? The present representation, after all thefe deductions, and under the confufion in which it confeffedly lies, is ftill in fuch a degree popular; or rather the reprefentatives are fo connected with the mass of the community, by a fociety of interefts and paffions, that the will of the people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails.

Upon the whole, in the feveral plans which have been fuggefted, of an equal or a reformed reprefentation, it will be difficult to difcover any propofal that has a tendency to throw more of the bufinefs of the nation into the houfe of commons, or to collect a set of men more fit to tranfact that bufinefs, or in general more interested in the national happinefs and profperity. One confequence, however, may be expected from thefe projects, namely, "lefs flexi"bility to the influence of the crown." And fince the diminution of this influence, is the declared, and perhaps the fole defign of the various fchemes that have been produced, whether for regulating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying

the

the constitution of parliament by the exclufion of placemen and penfioners; it is obvious to remark, that the more apt and natural, as well as the more fafe and quiet way of attaining the fame end, would be, by a direct reduction of the patronage of the crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding farther confequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be fuppreffed for the prefent; but provifions of law be devised, which fhould for the future restrain within certain limits, the number and value of the offices in the donation of the king.

But whilft we difpute concerning different fchemes of reformation, all directed to the fame end, a previous doubt occurs in the debate, whether the end itself be good, or fafe-whether the influence fo loudly complained of can be destroyed, or even much diminished, without danger to the state. Whilft the zeal of fome men beholds this influence with a jealoufy, which nothing but its entire abolition can appease, many wife and virtuous politicians deem a confiderable portion of it to be as neceffary a part of the British conftitution, as any other ingredient in the compofition-to be that, indeed, which gives cohefion and folidity to the whole. Were the measures of government, fay they, opposed from nothing but principle, government ought to have nothing but the rectitude of its measures to fupport them; but fince oppofition fprings from other motives, government muft poffefs an influence to counteract these motives; to produce, not a bias of the paffions, but a neutrality: it must have some weight to caft into the fcale to fet the balance even. It is the nature of power always to prefs upon the boundaries which confine it. Licentioufnefs, faction, envy, impatience of control or inferiority, the fecret pleasure of mortifying the great, or the hope of difpoffeffing them; a conftant willingaefs to queftion and thwart whatever is dictated or even proposed by

another;

a other; a difpofition common to all bodies of men to extend the claims and authority of their order; above all, that love of power and of fhowing it, which refides more or less in every human breast, and which, in popular affemblies, is inflamed, like every other paffion, by communication and encouragement: these motives, added to private defigns and refentments, cherished alfo by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great fhare of power already poffeffed by the houfe of commons, might induce a majority, or at leaft a large party of men in that affembly, to unite in endeavouring to draw to themselves the whole government of the ftate; or at least so to obftruct the conduct of public affairs, by a wanton and perverfe oppofition, as to render it impoffible for the wifeft ftatefman to carry forwards the business of the nation with fuccefs or fatisfaction.

Some paffages of our national hiftory afford grounds for these apprehenfions. Before the acceffion of James the Firft, or, at leaft, during the reigns of his three immediate predeceffors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his measures in parliament by intimidation. A fenfe of perfonal danger kept the members of the house of commons in fubjection. A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at last the parliament and nation from flavery. That overbearing fyftem, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his fon. After the restoration there fuc-. ceeded in its place, and fince the revolution has been methodically purfued, the more fuccefsful expedient of influence. Now we remember what pafled between the lofs of terror, and the establishment of influence. The tranfactions of that interval, whatever we may think of their occafion or effect, no friend of regal government would wish to fee revived. But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the fame doctrine. in

the

the British colonies of North America, the late af femblies poffeffed much of the power and conflitution of our houfe of commons. The king and government of Great Britain held no patronage in the country, which could create attachment and influence, fufficient to counteract that reftlefs, arrogating fpirit, which in popular affemblies, when left to itfelf, will never brook an authority, that checks and interferes with its own. To this caufe, excited perhaps by fome unfeafonable provocations, we may attribute, as to their true and proper original, we will not fay the misfortunes, but the changes that have taken place in the British empire. The admonition, which fuch examples fuggeft, will have its weight with thofe, who are content with the general frame of the English conftitution; and who confider ftability amongst the firft perfections of any govern

ment.

We proteft however against any construction, by which what is here faid fhall be attempted to be applied to the juftification of bribery, or of any clandeftine reward or folicitation whatever. The very fecrecy of fuch negociations confeffes or begets a consciousness of guilt; which, when the mind is once taught to endure without uneafinefs, the character is prepared for every compliance. And there is the greater danger in thefe corrupt practices, as the extent of their operation is unlimited and unknown. Our apology relates folely to that influence, which refults from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments. Nor does the influence, which we defend, require any facrifice of perfonal probity. In political, above all other fubjects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures on each fide of a queftion, are often fo equally poized, that the wifeft judgments may be held in fufpenfe. There I call fubjects of indifference. But again, when the fubject is not indifferent in itfelf, it will appear fuch to a great

part

part of those to whom it is propofed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reafons by which either fide is fupported. Thefe are fubjects of apparent indifference. This indifference occurs ftill more frequently in perfonal contefts; in which, we do not often difcover any reafon of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to another. These cafes compofe the province of influence; that is, the decision in thefe cafes will inevitably be determined by influence of fome fort or other. The only doubt is, what influence fhall be admitted. If you remove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for influence from a different quarter. If motives of expe&ation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fucceed in their place, acting probably in an oppofite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the question. There exift, as we have feen, paffions in the human heart, which will always make a frong party against the executive power of a mixed government. According as the difpofition of parliament is friendly or adverfe to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the bufinefs of empire will be tranfacted with cafe and convenience, or embarraffed with endless contention and difficulty. Nor is it a conclufion founded in juftice or warranted by expe: ience, that, becaufe men are induced by views of intereft to yield their confent to meafurcs, concertiing which their judgment decides nothing, they may be brought by the fane influence, to act in deliberate oppofition to knowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country fince the revolution, will find few even of the most questionable measures of adminiftration, about which the beft inftructed judgment might not