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quirements for 1943 of the 6 principal war production industries, namely, shipbuilding, aircraft, ordnance, mining, lumber, railroads-the total requirements reach the figure of 2,977,500.
May I offer it for the record ?
Mr. BELL. I am practically through, except for two or three things that I would like to say.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
WHERE MANPOWER IS REQUIRED OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES
I. SHIPBUILDING (a) Shipyards building ships: Requirements now 70,000 (Admiral Land). Yards had a total of more than 130,000 new jobs to fill during the first quarter of 1943—replacement needs exceeded 200,000. Total intake requirements 262,000 employees--deficit of more than 70,000 employees. [Much of the present difficulty due to turn-over rate which amounted to 11.2 percent per month of the total working force for the period—2 percent represented withdrawals to enter the armed services.]
Requirements during the remainder of 1943: 150,000 in order to maintain the accelerated production schedule.
(6) Manufacturing plants engaged in maritime production (employing about 1,000,000 persons at the beginning of this year): Need to meet program, 300,000 to 350,000.
(c) Vessel personnel : Needed for 1943, 30,000 to 50,000.
The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board: Admit that demands for space are far beyond the ability of the War Shipping Administration and the British Ministry of War Transport to provide. Indeed, the United States having just completed 8,080,000 tons of new ships in 1942, and scheduled to build 18,800,000 tons this year, and with Great Britain a sizable total of her own, the Allied merchant fleet will still be only 50 percent of the tonnage that could be used.
[The key to this war is shipping.]
1942: Produced only 48,000 military planes, 12,000 short of our goal of 60,000.
1943: Production goal 125,000 planes. December 1942, approximately 600,000 workers employed. If 125,000 planes are to be produced in 1943, a large proportion being bombers requiring more labor, 2,000,000 persons will be required by December 1943, an increase of 1,400,000.
III. ORDNANCE INDUSTRY
December 1942: Employed 1,800,000. Peak needs late summer or early fall 1943, 2,100,000. Increase, 300,000.
Lost more miners than could hire. During 1942, 32,000 copper miners shifted to higher-paid jobs. Need, all types mining, 7,500.
V. LUMBER Need 70,000 new workers entire country to bring production up to critical needs.
Needs for 1943, 350,000 to 450,000.
Total manpower needed these industries : Shipbuilding, 650,000 to 750,000; aircraft, 1,400,000; ordnance, 300,000; mining, 7,500; lumber, 70,000; railroads, 350,000 to 450,000; total, 2,977,500—armed services and farm needs not included.
Secretary Wickard, on January 8, 1943, stated 2,000,000 additional workers needed in agriculture in the next 6 months.
Mr. BELL. I would like to offer for the record table No. 3 pertaining to quit rates for selected war industries, dated February 1, 1943, published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. (The table is as follows:)
TABLE 3.—Quit rates for selected war industries, February 1943
In the above table are given quit rates for strategic war industries for which the publication of other turnover data has been restricted.
1 January 1943 figures revised.
Mr. BELL. Now, one or two suggestions, and I will be through.
The question has been raised here regarding acceptance by an employer of persons assigned under this act. I feel this problem, if there is one, should be considered from two angles; first, the employer requesting assignment of persons, he, in my opinion, should be compelled to accept for employment those assigned. By his request he denotes he is not in a position to pick over the available supply offered to him. He seeks allocation, and should take whoever is allocated to him just as the employee takes the particular employer of those seeking his services that is allocated to him.
To compel the employer not requesting help to take workers might well be of doubtful validity without provisions for compensation. It would be a dangerous practice giving the Government power to add to an employer's pay roll, and I suggest that if you find this problem needs further consideration, or needs to be dealt with further in this bill, that in section 4, of the proposed bill which has to do with the
assignment of workers, an amendment might be incorporated reading somewhat like this:
In accordance with such regulations, to require that every employer engaged in war work, requesting the allocation of manpower for employment, shall accept for employment in such service such persons so assigned thereto.
The people who have opposed this legislation have talked of monumental generalities. They have not gotten down to facts, or given figures, and I feel have been selfish in the formations of their ideas respecting this legislation.
I would like to offer for the record a copy of an agreement between railroad executives and the executives of the various brotherhoods within railroad group.
The CHAIRMAN. How many pages are there?
The CHAIRMAN. I would rather you would do that in lieu of putting it in the record.
Mr. Bell. This memorandum was written as the result of management and labor in the railroad industry getting together to see what they could do about the manpower problem. They say that they will need 350,000 to 400,000 new workers in 1943. One of the most significant things stated in this memo, in my mind, in view of the testimony which was given here yesterday regarding practices in railroad operations I shall read from paragraph (g): "Cooperation to solve management's problems does not mean lowering of established standards. If present workers are to stay on, or new workers are to come into the industry, employment will have to be made more attractive than at present. Surplus manpower has gone for the duration."
I offer that statement because of the inquiries made relative to featherbedding during the last few days.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.
Mr. BELL. Now, may I briefly conclude with one other statement that I would like to offer? With further reference to the railroad situation, I obtained from the United States Railroad Retirement Board certain figures that I would like to offer. The railroads of the country last November needed 32,060 more workers. There was a surplus throughout the country on the different roads which was not available which would be if this law were enforced, of 2,754. In December 1942 the railroads needed 40,910 workers, and the surplus had dropped from 2,754 down to 802.
On January 31 the railroads of this country needed 45,688 workers, and the surplus had dropped from 802 to 425. This was the condition after putting 105,000 additional workers on since July 1942.
On February 28, 1943, the railroads needed 57,715 workers, and surpluses had dropped down to 289.
March 31, 1943, railroads needed 67,314, surpluses dropped to 228.
I offer this to combat the testimony which has been presented recently suggesting the nonexistence of a serious manpower problem in the railroad industry. These facts are obtained from figures which are submitted monthly by every railroad in the country to the United States Retirement Board.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.
Mr. BELL. That, sir, concludes all the testimony that I care to offer at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Dr. Walton P. Cole, pastor, Second Church of Boston, Brookline, Mass.
Will you come around and give us something about your qualifications and experience, and tell us for whom you appear?
STATEMENT OF DR. WALTON P. COLE, PASTOR, SECOND CHURCH OF
BOSTON, BROOKLINE, MASS.
Dr. COLE. Mr. Chairman, I am appearing before your committee as a member of the Citizens Committee for a National War Service Act, and in my private capacity, private citizen.
I left a busy parish in the midst of Holy Week because contemporary Calvary is a very real thing to me, as a minister, and I feel a sense of responsibility to help bring this war to a decisive conclusion in the shortest possible time and with the absolute minimum of loss of human life.
Obviously, I do not come before the committee as an industrial leader, or a military expert, nor one of those swivel-chair amateur strategists in military affairs to instruct you. I have come simply as a parish minister.
I am concerned about human lives and spiritual values. The Second Church in Boston which I have the honor to serve happens to be the Old North Church of which Paul Revere was once a distinguished member. It happens that Old Ironsides, that historic frigate, was built in a shipyard—I think this is interesting—of one of my parishioners, and yet I am not here primarily because of my interest in the history of this parish. I am here because my church, like thousands of churches, has a war-service flag.
Tomorrow night will be Good Friday: When I get back to my parish, and go into my Good Friday activities, I shall stand in the chapel' and face my church service flag, and I am an ordinary minister, but I have exactly the same feelings which every other minister has. Those stars, to me, are faces, faces of young men whom I know. I think of the boy who, for several years, carried the cross in our processions as the choir would march_into the chapel. I want to know what is going to happen to him. I am concerned about him. I want to know if he is going to be savagely executed by the Japanese. I am also worried about him in this regard: Will he die needlessly because we failed to give him the complete support he deserved ? Our church, like many parishes in the country, has a war-service council. We are interested in answering in a practical way a very real question, What can we do for the men and women in the services; what can we do for their families ?
Now, in the course of my activities—incidentally, I have been doing work for the Boston Rumor Clinic in the analysis and counteraction of Nazi propaganda in New England, as well as in the country at large—and I speak to many representative audiences in the course of a month, and just by circumstances I think I am in a position to judge, to some extent, the attitude of thousands of people in all walks of life. I have come to know in advance some of the questions I will be asked at the forum period. Invariably there will be this question: How long is this war going to last? Now, usually
that is framed in a very personal way. Some mother will wait until the rest of the questions have been asked and she may say very quietly at the end of the lecture, “When do you think my boy is coming back from north Africa ?" I think it is a fair question. You and I sent a boy to north Africa to do a job for us, and an unpleasant job that has to be done, to maintain spiritual values in this world, and you and I are responsible for helping him on with that job, and try to get him back alive if we possibly can, and to bring this war to a decisive end in the shortest possible time.
Well, I am here on Thursday of Holy Week to express a conviction and report an attitude, a deep conviction, and I think a very widespread attitude. It is this: We have just not been fair, completely fair, to the young men who are on a dangerous mission for us. We have not been lacking in the will to help, but we have viewed it from a very ineffective and impractical angle from the home front. We mobilize a fighting army, and we have failed to mobilize the homefront forces which could give our men the tools to win victory. We are in a total war and we are still waging it on the home front in a fragmentary manner.
Now, I will not ignore the progress that has been made in certain areas, but the task as a whole simply has not been performed. The blunt truth is we still claim to be the arsenal of democracy, and we still have to say to our leading allies, "We will give you help later, as soon as God let us," and it took Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, whose country has been bombed for more than 2,000 consecutive days, to remind us politically, but I think rather pertinently—God helps those who help themselves. The truth is that we have not yet helped ourselves as much as we should. Frankly, I am not unduly impressed when I hear the specific production schedules have been met because a question crosses my mind: Were the schedules high enough in the first place? Why were not the schedules high enough so that our fighting men and our allies might have had the planes and the tanks which they needed then and where they needed them? I am no expert, obviously, on productive schedules, but I am enough of a mathematician to know this: if the schedules had been two or three times as high, and if we had been mobilized so we could have met higher goals of production, mobilized, I mean, on the home front, then we might have sent China a little more than the meager 3 percent we sent her of all that she asked. I am enough of a mathematician to realize that every increase in shipbuilding, for example, means that we can move men and materials to the battle fronts of the war in shorter time, and the formula, so far as I am concerned, is not-time means money, but time means lives, lives saved instead of lives wasted.
The question you and I need to ask, if I may be bold enough to say it, is a very simple one: How many of our men will we kill needlessly because our production schedules are still too slow? Senator Truman's committee just disclosed that in 1942 12.000.000 dead-weight tons of cargo shipping were lost by the United Nations. We have been congratulating ourselves on our shipbuilding achievements, great as they have been, I think a little prematurely. The unwelcome truth is, and you may have read this in your paper, that in 1942 we lost more ship tonnage than we built, more of the new construction by the United States and Great Britain.