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(The following letter was submitted by Mr. Miller and is to be made a part of his statement:)


Washington, D. C., April 22, 1943.
Chairman, House Committee on Military Affairs,

Washingion, D. C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN MAY: While testifying before your committee yesterday, April 21, against H. R. 1742, the Wadsworth bill, I used the following quotation from one of the lectures said to have been given in the Army's orientation course in Fort Scott, Kans. :

"The Army may be forced, by public opinion, to take over the direction of many activities now considered to be not the province of the military.”

You questioned the undersigned as to who was the author of the statement above quoted, and at that time I advised you I had read it in PM and could not remember the name of the author.

I now have before me a copy of PM of Friday, March 12, 1943, and on page 4 there is a reproduction of a page of the instructor's manuscript, containing Methods of Psychological Warfare-lecture-author, F. E. Gillette, lieutenant colonel, Infantry, giving list of references, with the above-quoted portion encircled by crayon mark, which is preceded by the following: .

“The remedy of this condition is outside our province as Army officers, although some day, if the condition gets bad enough, the Army may be forced *

I agree with you that there should be further investigation into the matter of such lectures. I sincerely trust that the House Military Affairs Committee, or some other committee of the Congress, will make an investigation of the Army's orientation course in Fort Scott, Kans., and especially develop the type of candidates selected by the Army to receive the course. Appreciating the privilege of appearing before your committee, I am, Sincerely yours,


National Legislative Representative. The CHAIRMAN. We have listed as the next witness representing the Congress of Industrial Organizations Mr. Van Bittner, vice president of the steelworkers, but I am informed by my clerk that the organization wishes to substitute Mr. Flynn, who will appear for Mr. Bittner.

Will you come around, Mr. Flynn? Mr. Flynn, will you state your qualifications, tell us who you are, and your interest in this legislation?



Mr. FLYNN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want, first of all, to express Mr. Bittner's apologies for not being able to be here. He is now a member of the War Labor Board, and he had a very important case that cropped up overnight, and he had to sit in on it this morning.

My name is T. F. Flynn, international representative of the United Steelworkers of America, presently assigned to our Washington office, which is located at 1718 Jackson Place NW. The statement that I am about to make to the committee was prepared by Mr. Bittner, assistant to the president of the United Steelworkers of America,

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which represents at the present time some 700,000-odd steelworkers in this country and Canada. Mr. Bittner's statement is as follows:

It is my understanding that this committee is now holding hearings with respect to five bills, all of which claim to be related to the question of the most effective use of the Nation's manpower. Two of these, the Fulmer and the Bankhead bills, relate to farm labor specifically. Since I do not claim to speak as an expert on farm labor or the farmlabor problem, I shall leave the discussion of these bills to the head of the C. I. O. United Cannery Agricultural and Packing Workers, who is here this morning.

The remaining three bills to which I should like to address my remarks are the Austin-Wadsworth bill, the Colmer bill, and the Smith bill. Mr. Pressman, general counsel of the C. I. O., has already discussed the details of the latter two bills. While I shall speak primarily of the Austin-Wadsworth bill, much of my statement may be equally applied to all three bills.

Let me state at the outset that I consider it both fortunate and wise that the committee undertook to conduct its hearings in the form of an investigation into this entire group of bills all at once. In adopting that procedure the committee has recognized the important fact that before we can turn to a consideration of the details of this bill or that bill in this manpower field, it is important for us to consider in a more general way the nature of the manpower problem as we face it today and the kind of approach that has to be made to its solution.

It is for that reason that I wish to impress upon the members of this committee 'this morning with all the sincerity at my command that I do not appear here merely to make a statement in favor of one or another bill or against one or another bill. The important job which we in the labor movement share with you members of this committee is the job of deciding what is the best means of achieving the maximum 'use of the Nation's manpower. Once we have decided that question, we are in a position to decide whether the bills before you contribute to or interfere with the maximum use of the Nation's manpower.

It is for that reason that it is completely misleading to conceive that labor opposes the Austin-Wadsworth labor draft bill because the simple fact is that the bill will make no contribution whatsoever to the maximum use of the Nation's manpower, and as a matter of fact carries with it grave dangers of interference with that program.

I know that the Austin-Wadsworth bill must seem to many people to be a simple solution to a lot of vexing problems. When we find that at a given moment the operation of a plant requires more men than are immediately available in the vicinity, it appears simple and direct to pass a law saying that the Government shall have the power to seize men by the scruff of the neck, tear them from their families and homes, and bring them to the neighborhood of the plant.

But let me pose a few simple questions to the committee. How much progress will have been made in that process of forcing workers to the vicinity of the plant if 2 weeks after the workers have been delivered there a material shortage should force the plant to close down for several days, a week, or a month, leaving the transported manpower unused for that period ? How much progress will have been made if 1 week after the workers have been transported to the

area of the plant a new contract should be awarded and a new plant start operating in the area from which the workers have been moved! How much progress will have been made if the plant to which the workers have been moved should complete its contract in a month, 2 months, 6 months, and then find that it is left without any further contract so that the manpower of the transported workers cannot be used ?

I do no pose these questions as merely hypothetical inquiries. These are actual situations. I can cite to you instances of steel plants and I mention steel because it is the industry with which I am most familiar-in which skilled workmen are available and carried on the pay rolls of the company but given only 3 and 4 days' work a week. I could cite to you instances where steel-fabricating plants, ready for valuable war production, with a full labor supply available for operation, were unable to operate because contracts for the materials which were needed were awarded to a few dominant companies which then set about building new plants in areas of labor shortage. I could cite to you instances in the steel industry where plants doubled and tripled their labor forces to perform a contract, only to find that upon completion of the contract there was an excessive supply of the finished product or the production of that product was being discontinued so that the plant was no longer able to operate and no longer able to make use of the doubled and tripled labor force.

Stop and think about that for a moment. Consider a case which I have cited to the Senate Military Affairs Committee in connection with this same Austin-Wadsworth bill. A plant in Pennsylvania is awarded a contract for the construction of tanks. It trebles its labor force to a total of 9,000 men. Two months ago it is told that production of that kind of tank is discontinued in favor of a heavier model. Within 2 months six or seven thousand of these men are laid off. No provision has been made in advance for the use of the facilities of the plant. No provision has been made in advance for the continuous use of the manpower of those thousands of workers.

I cite to you these instances so that you can appreciate that this is not a problem to which there is a simple answer, such as a labor draft. It is a problem which is an integral part of the problem of planning production. It is an inseparable part of the problem of allocating materials, planning their arrival at the time and at the place where they are needed. It is a problem of scheduling the production of the component parts of the planes and the tanks

and the guns and the ships so that each part arrives on the assembly line at the time it is needed. We can set up all the machinery we like, complicated or simple, for the moving of men from one place to another. Unless the movement of those men, however, is part of a unified and integrated production plan, the movement of those men can mean wasted manpower, not increased use of manpower, and wasted transportation facilities.

It is for this reason that I say to you that these bills which you are now considering are not merely no contribution to the real manpower and production problems of this war; they are more than that they constitute a dangerous snare and delusion.

A labor-draft law does not solve the problem of allocating materials so that manpower will not be wasted waiting for their ar

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rival. A labor-draft law will not solve the problem of scheduling production so that assembly-line manpower will not be wasted awaiting the arrival of needed parts. A labor-draft law will not solve the problems of housing, sanitation, and transportation, which today make impossible the recruitment of workers in crowded war cen

A labor-draft law will not solve the problems of contract allocation which may today create and complicate manpower shortages in some areas while unused labor is available in other areas.

The posing of these issues shows how impossible it is to think of manpower just as a matter of moving workers around. Manpower is part and parcel of the single problem of production planning and organization—the single problem of directing materials, machinery, and men to the right place at the right time.

To discuss manpower just as a problem of a labor draft is to divert the attention of the Nation from the real underlying issues. To pass a labor-draft bill would be to lull the Nation into a sense of false security with the notion that we have solved our manpower problem when in fact we would not even have touched it.

We urge, of course, the undisputed truth in a democracy that greater efficiency and spirit may be expected from free men working at their machines with the will and strength of men who produce because they want to produce for themselves and for their Nation. I cannot believe that anyone in a democracy would wish to trade that kind of worker for men brought to work at bayonet's point by a compulsory method. That is undoubtedly a strong part of the reason why this bill is opposed not merely by the representatives of labor but also by the most responsible spokesmen for employers as well. Over and above all of this, however, is the fact that the crowning danger to our production effort will be injected by the enactment of any measure such as the Austin-Wadsworth labor-draft bill at a time when our basic need is the kind of integration and coordination of our production machinery which is suggested by the Tolan-KilgorePepper bill.

This committee exists for the purpose of considering matters related to military affairs. From one point of view it might of course be said that there is nothing in our national scene today which does not fall within that sphere under present-day circumstances. Without debating, therefore, the technical questions of jurisdiction, this committee could make a substantial contribution to a constructive evaluation and strengthening of our mational war production machinery by directing its attention to the basic problem presented by the Tolan-Kilgore-Pepper bill. It is extremely unfortunate that instead of directing its attention to that problem the committee has permitted itself to be used through these bills now before it as a forum for concentration upon measures directed primarily at castigating the workers of America, measures which make no contribution to the effective organization of the national production, measures which at the present time can serve only to create confusion and divert attention from the serious concern which we all must have with the single task of winning the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Mr. Van Bittner's statement?
Mr. FLYNN. Yes.

The Chairman. I assume, of course, that you are not prepared to discuss the statement except to appear for the purpose of presenting it to the committee?

Mr. FLYNN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, sir, and we regret that Mr. Van Bittner could not be here personally.

Mr. FLYNX. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness suggested by the Congress of Industrial Organizations is Mr. Donald Henderson.

Is Mr. Henderson here! Will you come around, Mr. Henderson, please, sir, and tell us about this legislation and what you want to say about it.



Mr. HENDERSON. My name is Donald Henderson, general president of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, affiliated with the C. I. O.

I am representing a union that has locals and contracts and represents workers in the harvesting, growing, processing, and packing of agricultural commodities. These workers are in practically 32 to 35 States of the country. The union stands almost alone in the field, and therefore I speak generally in the interest of the agricultural wage workers and sharecroppers of the United States on the problem before the committee.

I wish to confine my remarks to H. R. 1728 and to S. 729. I am not sure whether technically S. 729 is before the committee, but it deals with the same general problem of attempting to meet the problem of manpower in agriculture as the Fulmer bill, II. R. 1728.

The CHAIRMAN. Senate 729 is before the committee.

Mr. HENDERSON. The committee, in considering these two bills, is, of course, considering a very serious problem, namely, the effective utilization of agricultural resources to the problem of winning the war, and specifically with reference to the most effective use of manpower in agriculture to the problem of winning the war. The two hills cover not only the problem of manpower so far as agricultural wage labor and sharecroppers are con«erned, but they cover the problem of manpower so far as the farmer is concerned.

The Fulmer bill is misnamed the Emergency Farm Labor Act of 1943, and the general discussion in the press has tended to create the idea that we are discussing only the problem of farm-wage labor. We are discussing the problem of both farm-wage labor and the problems of farmers or farm operators. I am speaking primarily from the point of view of the agricultural worker, the farm-wage worker, but the problem involved involves all of agriculture.

What is this problem? It is the problem basically of converting agriculture to a war footing; converting agriculture from a farming as usual basis to a war footing. There is no industry in the United States about which there has been done less and where there needs to

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