we all are, to obey the law. We are not State enforcing officers, like an assistant foreman, an assistant mine foreman, or a fire boss in the State of Pennsylvania and in many other States of the Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Maize.

We have listed on our calendar Mr. Foisie, president of the Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast.

Mr. Foisie, if you wish to present a statement, instead of reading it, we shall be glad to have you do so.

Mr. FOISIE. I have a reasonably short statement, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have you put it in the record and make such comments as you wish.

Mr. FOISIE. I am very happy to submit it for the record, Mr. Chairman; I have no other comments to offer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Foisie.

(Mr. Foisie presented the following statement:)

STATEMENT TO HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS IN HEARING ON H. R.

2239

My name is F. P. Foisie. It is my understanding that this committee requests the water-front employers of the Pacific coast to give of their experience with rules and practices under their labor agreements which restrict production. In our 9 years of contracts with the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union we have suffered such restrictions on production under the names of slow-down, make-work, and job-action. The terms add up to about the same in meaning and are commonly used interchangeably, though there are differences between them in technique. They are all, of course, against the war effort because they impede the flow of war cargoes and waste manpower.

The longshoremen's slow-down on the Pacific coast was conceived and introduced by the union's leaders immediately following the 1934 strike. It has been cultivated and extended until the habit has become fastened upon the industry. Efforts to rid this industry of this habit as a contribution to winning the war have been blocked persistently by the Longshoremen's Union president and his associates.

Common forms of the union organized slow-down include:

1. Cutting down the size of the loads of cargo far below what is both safe and reasonable.

2. Slowing the number of hoists per hour.

3. Forcing useless handling, such as compelling teamsters to discharge from truck to floor of dock instead of direct to left board, so that longshoremen would then have to be employed to load from floor to lift board.

4. Half of the men working, half loafing, in hold of ship and on dock.

5. Handling loads in rigid rotation.

6. Sleeping on the job.

7. Leaving the place of work.

8. "Turning to" late and quitting early.

9. Refusing to allow gangs or men to work steadily for one employer, instead forcing them to work interchangeably for all employers in the port.

10. Refusing to permit men to be shifted as the work necessitates, instead freezing them in idleness; pay for work not done.

11. Forcing unnecessary men on the job.

The effect of these many forms of slow-down is serious both in delay to convoys and wastage in manpower. Vessels have missed convoys and have been forced to sail without full cargo. Convoys have been delayed in sailing. Manpower which is short and getting shorter, nevertheless is wasted.

In the port of San Francisco, for example, a measure of wastage is that it takes three longshoremen now to do the work of two formerly. A third of the registered longshoremen are therefore wasted. This is confirmed by official records of the War Shipping Administration which show that the longshoremen on the Pacific coast handle a third less tons per man per hour than longshoremen in the port of New York.

Responsibility for the organized slow-down rests primarily with the union president and his immediate associates. The majority of the longshoremen are men of fine character, good craftsmen, sterling citizens. They have no use for the slow-down; refuse to yield to it personally; realize that it is hurtful to

the long-range interest of organized labor; and destructive to the war effort. But a compact, tightly organized minority applies the slow-down program effectively and blocks the rest of the longshoremen. The principal machinery of this organized minority is the organization of gang stewards who control the gang, take the authority of the gang foreman away from him, and see to it that the union grievance committee disciplines foremen who refuse to take program.

With the war, efforts were renewed to rid this industry of its restrictive rules and practices. But they continue almost unabated.

When limitations were agreed to on sling loads in 1937, the union pledged that this would not be used to decrease production. Sling-load limits were used to cut production and all attempts to remove such limits are resisted.

The labor agreement provides that the work would be carried on as directed by the employer. This has not been done, and is not being done. The union is in control of the work and publishes that fact.

In the last wage award, the coast arbitrator, Dean Wayne L. Morse, granted an increase in the hope that it would serve as an inducement to restore reasonable efficiency. Vain hope. Not a single longshoreman among the 12,000 at any time in the past 9 years has lost his right to work no matter how flagrantly he indulged in the slow-down. The union always blocked such discharge.

Control of the job has been taken by the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union through control of the foremen who are unionized within the ranks of the longshoremen locals. The foremen in Puget Sound early found it necessary to create their own foreman's local union and to take out a charter in the American Federation of Labor as a measure of protection against domination by the Congress of Industrial Organizations Longshoremen's Union.

Foremen are, and continue to be intimidated by the longshore officials and grievance committees. Only recently a major in the Army Transport Service, formerly a stevedore foreman, was threatened by a longshoreman he discharged for smoking in the hold of the vessel, with blocking the major from coming back as a stevedore foreman after the war.

An order of the Maritime Industry Board prohibiting the union from penalizing foremen for carrying out orders of the Board or of his employer was bitterly opposed by the union's representatives on the Board.

Foremen on the Pacific-coast waterfront have no power to hire and no effective power to fire, no matter how grievous the case for discharge, even though the union's representatives have the right to review discharge.

In March of last year the War Shipping Administration created a Pacific Coast Maritime Industry Board for the purpose of increasing efficiency. A representative of the public was selected as chairman. Two representatives of the Longshoreman's Union and two of the Waterfront Employers Association were appointed to complete the Board.

After a year of effort, that Board has largely failed in its efforts to increase efficiency because of the persistence of the union opposition to ridding the industry of restrictive rules and practices. An effort to increase the sling load of a single commodity-cement—at the request of the Navy yielded during an experimental period an increase in tons per hatch hour of 68 percent, and of tons per man-hour of 123 percent. Yet an order by the Board to make such increased sling load on cement generally applicable was opposed by the union officials who succeeded in having the order suspended.

An effort of the Board to have cargo delivered direct to lift aboard by teamster, thus avoiding the unnecessary use of longshoremen, has been vehemently opposed by the longshoremen's union president, who sought to make a jurisdiction dispute of this make-work program, and who has threatened refusal by the longshoremen to handle cargo loaded in this economical way.

In not a single instance of the dozen appearances before the Board has the union's president suggested or worked for the elimination of any restrictive rules or practices. Instead, he has persistently opposed all efforts to eliminate any of them.

In the effort of the Board to have foreman take out withdrawal cards opposition of the union officials has been implacable.

It has been estimated by a staff member of the Pacific Maritime Industry Board that eliminating restrictive rules and practices would at once increase efficiency at least 25 percent.

The bill which this committee has under consideration, H. R. 2239, would prohibit all restrictive rules and practices under labor agreements and would require that supervisory forces should not be members of the labor union they are called upon to direct.

The experience of the water fronts of the Pacific coast indicates that apparently such legislation is going to be necessary if this industry is to meet its urgent and vital war obligation. F. P. FOISIE,

President, Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast. The CHAIRMAN. We are now pleased to hear Mr. Wadsworth, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York. Mr. Wadsworth has been with us so many times I am sure he feels quite at home.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. WADSWORTH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

MI. WADSWORTH. MI. Chairman, you and your colleagues on this committee have been very courteous to me in the past, and I thank you for the courtesy extended to me today in permitting me to appear here in behalf of H. R. 1742, a bill to provide further for the successful prosecution of the war through a system of civilian selective war service, with the aid of the Selective Service System.

It is probably unnecessary for me to remind you that Senator Austin, of Vermont, has introduced a bill, the exact duplicate of this, in the Senate, and for something like 5 or 6 weeks some very, very interesting hearings have been held by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs upon this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement, but perhaps the committee will indulge me if I make a few observations about our present conditions and prospects. I am not sure that every member of the committee will agree with me, but nevertheless I entertain the conviction that the strain of this war, that the strain being imposed upon the American people by this war, will grow heavier and heavier as time goes on.

I think a glance at the maps will indicate that we are but at the rim, as it were, of the battleground. That is most certainly true with respect to Europe, and it is most certainly true with respect to the Pacific, in our contest with Japan; and it is most certainly true with respect to our intention to aid China.

Our military forces have done splendidly. We should be very, very proud of them. I think a major portion of their success up to this time has been due to the fact that all their operations have been planned well in advance; planned by men trained in planning great operations, not waiting until an emergency overtakes them, but endeavoring to anticipate emergencies and strains and stresses and being ready, if such a thing is possible, to meet them when the time

comes.

A perfect example of long-range planning was our expedition to north Africa, an amazing performance in planning alone. Many, many months were spent by those charged with the duty, under the law, in that planning. Mr. Chairman, under the law, the War Department General Staff is charged with the duty of planning. The act of 1920 imposes that duty upon them. Many, many months were spent at that, and the achievement was remarkable.

Without intending in the slightest degree to reflect upon the men who are at the head of our agencies here at home, I think scarce any one will deny the fact that up to this point, up to this very day, the waging of this war upon the home front has not been planned systematically. Conscientious efforts have been made, some of them rather

desperate in their nature, to catch up with events and actually to mobilize this country 100 percent in the direction of urging and winning this war in the shortest possible time.

None of us will deny, I am sure, that there is much of confusion prevalent over the country among the civilian population today; that many of the measures taken thus far are what might be termed "hit or miss measures," unsupported by law of any kind or, if supported here and there by law, a very flimsy foundation.

I am willing to concede that these men who are making these efforts are doing their level best. I do contend, however, that they cannot possibly succeed in mobilizing the whole strength of America in the winning of this war and especially winning it in a shorter period than would otherwise be the case, unless they have, sustaining them, a law enacted by the Congress as representative of the people.

Let me remind you of some of the events of recent weeks, of some of the devices to which various agencies of our Government have resorted in an endeavor to meet the manpower situation which, after all, is the fundamental and vital thing in our whole effort; the handling of the manpower of the United States, whether it be in the military forces or on the home front.

It became apparent in the summer of 1942 that an ever-increasing dislocation or maldistribution of our manpower was hindering our effort. The effect of that maldistribution was felt first, I believe, upon the farms. You are all familiar with that; the draining of men away from the land to the factories and to the military forces. And it is well to remember in that connection that of all the men drained away from the land, 60 percent have gone into industry as contrasted with 40 percent into the military forces.

The effect of that draining away from the land was cumulative. It commenced back in 1941, to be exact. It was not felt much, if at all, during 1941. It began to be felt in the summer of 1942, as the draining increased, and as the draining to industry went along and ever increasing. At the same time, our military necessities compelled the Selective Service System at the request of the military authorities to continue filling their quotas by taking men not only from other occupations, all kinds of occupations, but from the land itself.

As I say, by the summer of 1942 that began to be felt. By the autumn of 1942 it began to be serious. By the spring of 1943, we will say at this time, the situation is exceedingly critical, due I contend, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that no one has planned. And, as a matter of fact, it has been impossible for any agent of the Government to do any effective planning because there is no law which will sustain him in the effort.

of

Recognizing the critical situation with respect to the distribution manpower, the executive agencies of the Government have resorted to various devices in a desperate attempt to cure the situation. And I may say to you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of this committee, that this situation was recognized and foreseen in the summer of 1942 by the War Manpower Commission, whose chairman is Mr. McNutt; for during that summer of 1942 Mr. McNutt appointed informally, as it were, a group of men in his Commission and asked them to prepare a bill for national service.

That group of men worked upon that bill in the late summer of 1942, to my own knowledge. I was in touch with some of them, immensely interested in it, because I began myself to be deeply concerned about the prospect.

Senator Austin, of Vermont, introduced a bill in the Senate, a rather simple amendment to the selective-service law, providing in effect for national service for civilians. The bill was brief. It did not pretend to cover some of the problems which would arise in connection with the establishment of such a system. But it was to the point and it brought up the principle involved and contained in H. R. 1742.

Hearings were held upon that bill in October of 1942 by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and Chairman McNutt, himself, as a witness before that committee, made a very interesting and significant statement. I can paraphrase it rather briefly.

He said, in effect, that there were three things the Government might do to cure the situation, to solve the problem. First, it might indulge in exhortation. And he said he had no confidence whatsoever in the effectiveness of such tactics. Second, he said the Government might resort to indirect pressures or threats against persons here and there in our civilian population, in the belief that by threatening or pressing them, whether they be employers or employees, or people who are engaged in nonessential occupations, the situation might be cured. And he said quite frankly that he did not believe in that kind of thing.

Finally he said that the remaining device or tactic to which the Government might resort would be the establishment by law of the obligation of the civilian to serve his country in a noncombatant capacity where most needed, and he believed that the enactment of such a law was inevitable.

That was in October of 1942. An Executive order was issued by the President shortly thereafter expanding and elaborating the power given to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Nothing more was heard of the bill which was then in preparation in Mr. McNutt's organization and since that time no forthright statement has come from Mr. McNutt as to whether or not he, as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, was in favor of the thing which he said he thought was inevitable.

Mr. KILDAY. Since when was that?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The testimony to which I refer was given in October of 1942.

Mr. KILDAY. Since what event was it that you had not heard any more from him?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The issuance of an Executive order by the President elaborating and expanding the functions of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, which was on December 5. Mr. KILDAY. That is when he got the power individually? Mr. WADSWORTH. If you call it power.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, as far as it could be delegated by Executive order.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. And it is interesting to note, if you will read the Executive order, that the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission is directed to accomplish these things in accordance with the law-words to that effect. And, Mr. Chairman, there is not any law worthy of the name.