New Conversations on the Problems of Identity, Consciousness and Mind
Springer, 2019 - PHILOSOPHY
This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.
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account of conscious African philosophy answer approach argue argument Aribiah attempt Attoe behaviour Blackwell bodily body body-only brain processes C. S. Momoh Chalmers Chimakonam claim cognitive concepts conscious experience conscious mental experience consciousness and mind conversational thinking criterion David Chalmers Dennett Descartes Egbai eliminative materialism entity equiphenomenalism essay explaining consciousness explanation of consciousness explanatory model feel first-person data functions Hard Problem human brain human mind idea identify immaterial important individual individual’s interaction internal Jonathan logic material materialist Menkiti mental properties metaphysical mind-body problem mind’s monism Nagel nature nervous system neural activities neurons neurophilosophy neuroscience neuroscientific objective one’s Oxford panpsychism Patricia Churchland perceive perception personal identity phenomenal philosophy of mind physical physicalist Plato problem of consciousness property dualism proto-phenomenalism psychological qualia questions sata sciousness Segun sensations sense organs sense-phenomenalism soul SpringerBriefs subjective account subjective experiences substance dualism systematised theory of consciousness thing third-person data thought University Press Velmans