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perform at least 75 per cent of all required duties. In other words, they must attain a 75 per cent efficiency. The first result, then, would be that officers and men would so faithfully perform their duties and acquire the necessary knowledge that they might be able to receive the compensation. Failure to do so after a reasonable length of time would mark such officers and men as unfit for service and it is not likely that they would remain in such a position.

The moral effect on the minds of officers and men in the fact that the National Government recognized their services, and in the further fact that they had established their right to serve their country in time of danger, would go far to improving the morale of the National Guard and bring into its service the very best type of citizens.

Under present plans it is difficult to demand the amount of service, particularly from officers, that is necessary. Commanding officers realize the lack of obligation and hesitate to demand more than the officers willingly give. But with such a compensation as is provided in this bill, a full and reasonable return could be fairly demanded.

There is an old saying that "What is worth doing is worth doing well." It might equally be said that what is worth having done is worth paying for.

Many capable officers with this compensation provided could remain in the service when otherwise the demands on their finances might require their resignation.

There is absolutely no doubt in the mind of any careful military student that the National Guard could be developed under this bill, together with such legislation as has already been passed, into a military force quite as efficient for war service as is the Regular Army itself.

The following conclusions may be briefly stated:

First. That a larger military organization, ready for active service is necessary. Second. That this organization must be obtained by voluntary service.

Third. That it is not practicable to increase the Regular Army.

Fourth. That the National Guard is the most available and economical force.

Fifth. That to afford men the time, and to induce them to volunteer their services, some reward should be offered.

Sixth. That by offering a reward which would be a small expense to the National Government, a large and effective military organization could be maintained.

APPENDIX 5.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

During the hearings before the Military Committees of the House and Senate and in correspondence with individual Congressmen, a number of questions have been raised relative to the Federal pay bill for the National Guard. These questions and the answers thereto have been codified and are submitted for the information and use of those interested.

(1) Should compensation be made by the State or by the National Government?

The necessity and demand for this pay result from the character of training required for the use of the National Guard in war service. To answer all State purposes would require a much less degree of training and much less expense. Moreover, the State governments would not require any other branch of the service than the Infantry, while the National Government requires a proper balance of the various arms, and, therefore, the development of the Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer Corps, and Signal Corps.

It would seem, therefore, only reasonable that this extra degree of efficiency and this class of service required by the National Government should be paid for by the National Government.

(2) Under the provisions of this bill can a man be made to serve the National Govern ment in time of war after the expiration of his enlistment or commission?

He can not. This bill applies solely to the Organized Militia or National Guard; that is, that portion of the general militia which volunteers for this special service. When his time has expired, he is in the general militia, and, of course, would be subject to any of the laws applying to the militia in general, but not to this law applying to the Organized Militia only.

It is an inherent power of all governments to demand the services of their citizens for war, even to the extent of drafts or conscriptions, but this is applicable to all citizens.

In other words, a man who has served his term in the Organized Militia and has been discharged either by expiration of term, or by act of the Government, ceases to have any of the special obligations imposed in this bill upon the Organized Militia,

but is subject to the same general obligations toward his Government as any other citizen.

(3) Should the bill provide that regulations be made by the Secretary of War and the National Militia Board?

It is impracticable in a general law to provide for all the details necessary to carry it out. These details must, therefore, be left to some executive. The Secretary of War is the executive representative of the National Government in dealing with all military questions. The militia, under the Constitution, is part of the legal military resources of the Nation. It is only reasonable, therefore, that the Secretary of War, representing the National Government, should have a voice in framing the regulations providing for this pay.

The reason for adding the National Militia Board was to provide a means by which the National Guard should also have representation in framing regulations, in order that such regulations might not operate to the disadvantage instead of to the advantage of the National Guard. Therefore, in the joint action of the Secretary of War and the National Militia Board, the best results should be accomplished.

(4) Will this bill involve the National Government in too much expense?

To answer this question it must be presumed that the National Government needs a much larger force than it now possesses in the Regular Army. This would seem manifest to anyone who has studied war conditions and understands the number of men required, even in a minor war.

To get this additional force this bill presents the most economical method. The States have already established military organizations and are also providing, to a large extent, for their support. By making use of these established organizations, and providing what is necessary to increase their efficiency, much less expense is involved than if the National Government undertook to maintain, entirely on its own account, a sufficient military force.

An active force of 120,000 officers and men could be maintained at a minimum expense, including appropriations already made, of $12,000,000, or an average cost of $100 per man, per annum. The expense to maintain the Regular Army is $1,200 per man per annum. All military preparations require expense. The question is how can the most be obtained for the amount expended. Our contention is that paying the National Guard a sufficient sum to make it an efficient military organization is the most economical method.

(5) Does this bill permit or give the opportunity for an unlimited expenditure by an unlimited increase of the National Guard?

Theoretically, it might appear so, but, as a matter of fact, this is not true. Legally, the States may organize as many of the militia as they may desire. Practically, they are limited by the amount of money they are willing to expend. The experience of the last 10 years shows that it is not practicable to increase either the number or the size of the organizations. Moreover, Congress has the authority, under the Constitution, to limit, not only the number of organizations but the size of the organizations, so far as any benefits conferred by the National Government are concerned.

This bill also provides that appropriations must be made annually, and the amount of appropriatons always will be in the control of Congress.

The question might be raised as to whether this bill should provide for limitations. It would seem unwise to do so until the exact results of the enactment of this bill can be determined by actual practice. Most of the officers believe that its tendency will be to increase the efficiency rather than to increase the number. The amount of pay proposed is not large enough to induce men to undergo the hardships of military training and discipline if they were impelled by no other motive than the money consideration.

Conditions may well be such that the Government will desire to encourage an increase in the National Guard rather than to limit it. It would seem, therefore, wise to leave this question for future determination.

(6) Will the National Guard, if the bill is passed, demand additional compensation? Those who understand the National Guard best answer in the negative. They believe that this bill provides reasonable compensation, and it is not fair to presume that the National Guard will undertake to make any unreasonable demands. By so doing they would only injure the good reputation which they have already striven to obtain. Any unreasonable demands would be met by a just rebuke from Congress. The same question might be raised to most appropriations. Each Congress will determine, in its own judgment and upon existing conditions, the proper appropriations to make.

(7) Does this compensation primarily benefit the National Guard or the National Government?

The primary object of this legislation is to benefit the National Government by securing a higher degree of efficiency in the National Guard, thereby making it a more competent force for war service.

So far as the benefits to the National Guard are concerned, it is merely intended to enable them to devote the time necessary to secure their military training without involving actual expense to them. As a business proposition, any National Guardsman could earn more money by giving the time devoted to the National Guard to the prosecution of his own business affairs.

(8) What would be the effect in the operation of this bill on the pension roll in case of war?

It would have absolutely the effect of lessening the number of pensions. In the first place, in order to receive pay and therefore in order to enter the national service, each officer and man would have to establish his fitness under the prescribed rules. No man, therefore, need be taken into service, except those who are physically qualified.

In the second place, the superior training for war which we are now receiving and which under this bill could be made better, would lead to better sanitation and there would be much less liability to contract disease. The better attention given to the wounded would greatly lessen the number of pensions on this account, as many wounds which have in previous wars rendered men physically unfit for life would be so cared for as to leave no injurious effects.

(9) Will the extra appropriations made by the National Government have a tendency to decrease appropriations made by the States?

Experience has proven quite the contrary. It is doubtful if there is a State in the Union that is not now appropriating a considerably larger sum than it did when the national appropriations were less. In fact, the more liberal policy pursued by the National Government has instilled in the States a pride to do their part. The fact of national support has been made the basis of argument for State support. (10) Will this bill result in a real benefit to the National Guard?

It is impossible to absolutely foretell the result of any legislation until it has been put into practical operation. It is safe, however, to rely upon the judgment of those who are best acquainted with conditions. The request for pay is not the result of any hasty action, but is proposed after long study and mature deliberation on the part of both the National Guard and Regular Army officers.

If

When it was first suggested, many National Guard officers and enlisted men felt that it would destroy the pride of those who desire to serve their Government from a purely patriotic motive, and this feeling to some extent still prevails. It is not a question of what they might be willing to do, but what they might be able to do. they felt that they could afford to devote the time required without compensation, the vast majority would, undoubtedly, prefer to do so. The duties, however, are such that most of them are compelled to ask for assistance. This is particularly true of younger officers. While a number can afford to give their time for nothing, a greater number can not do so. Nor does it appear fair that, while one man is as responsible as another for the defense of his country, the few should devote their time to military training while the larger number evade this obligation.

At present the National Guard is practically unanimous in believing that pay is not only fair and just, but that it would accord national guardsmen the opportunity to devote themselves more earnestly to their military training and very greatly increase their efficiency. They do not believe that receipt of pay would lower their dignity, but on the other hand such a recognition by the National Government would greatly increase their self-respect.

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62D CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (REPT.1117, 3d Session.

MILITIA PAY BILL.

DECEMBER 10, 1912.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. SLAYDEN, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the

following

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.

[To accompany H. R. 8141.]

Mr. Slayden, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following report as the views of the minority on H. R. 8141:

The legislation proposed by the Committee on Military Affairs as a substitute for the bill (H. R. 8141), "to further increase the efficiency of the Organized Militia of the United States and for other purposes,' is a measure that is pregnant with greater possibilities of evil in a financial way, and that gives less assurance of compensating advantages of any kind, than any measure that has ever been enacted by Congress with regard to the State militia. Briefly stated, the principal purpose of the bill is to obligate the United States to pay officers and enlisted men of the Organized Militia, who are not in the service of the General Government, nor under its control, certain percentages of the pay of officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army.

The proponents of the measure estimate that the amounts to be paid under it annually to each militiaman will range from $100 to $360 for officers, and from $45 to $225 for enlisted men; also that, with existing militia organizations recruited only to the minimum prescribed strength, the total annual expenditure for militia pay may be $9,234,729, which, added to the more than $5,000,000 that the advocates of the measure say is the present annual cost of the militia to the United States, will entail upon the General Government a total annual expenditure of between $14,000,000 and $15,000,000 for militia purposes. And this will be the cost at the very beginning of the operation of the proposed law, and it affords no indication as to the enormous increase that will inevitably occur later by reason of the increase in militia strength which it is the plain purpose of the pending measure to bring about, and which can and will be brought about without any additional legislation whatever by Congress if this bill shall pass.

Childish must be the credulity of him who can bring himself to believe that the militia will rest content "with any such reward or compensation" as that proposed by the pending bill, or that, if the bill becomes a law, Congress can successfully resist the tremendous pressure that will certainly be brought to bear upon it for more and more legislation of the same kind. The appetite for pabulum from the Public Treasury grows by what it feeds on, and so does the political strength of the possessor of such an appetite if that possessor happens to be an organized or organizable body of men with widespread political and social affiliations. Those who doubt the applicability of this aphorism to the subject in question will do well to study the history of our pension laws, under which we are now expending about 190 millions of dollars annually with an unascertained additional expenditure necessitated by recent legislation, and all this chiefly on account of a war that was ended nearly half a century ago.

It is well known that for some time before the passage of the famous "arrears of pension act" of January 25, 1879, the annual expenditure had ceased to increase, having become nearly stationary at figures less than $30,000,000. It is also generally admitted that the passage of this act was due in large measure if not wholly to an agitation set on foot and fomented among the old soldiers and in Congress by numerous claim agents who had become alive to the fact that the prosecution of pension claims was an exceedingly profitable industry. Emboldened and encouraged by the success of this effort claim agents and claimants entered upon a course of strenuous and systematic agitation for further liberalization of the pension laws. About this time the two political parties simultaneously discovered that the so-called "old soldier vote" was of much political importance, and each began to vie with the other in efforts to conciliate it and in bidding for its support. The result of all this was that Congress has enacted, and still continues to enact, pension law after pension law of the most unheard of liberality, not to say extravagance, and the end is not yet in sight, although an annual pension bill of more than $200,000,000 in the near future is plainly in sight as the result of existing laws.

What thoughtful and candid man will say that many of our most costly pension laws would have been enacted or that our pension expenditure would ever have reached its present enormous size if it had not been for the fact that for the last 40 years all parties and factions, State and municipal, as well as national, either through fear or prudence have found it necessary or advisable to conciliate and bid for the political support of the veterans of the Civil War, their relatives and friends?

But the veterans of the Civil War, powerful as they once were politically and a source of political terror, as they still are in some localities, have never formed a compact, well-organized, and easily managed body. If with their loose and more or less inefficient organization they could accomplish what they have done in a political way, what may be expected of a widespread military organization, such as the Organized Militia, composed, as it is, of active, intelligent, and aggressive young men, every one of whom is a voter fully alive to his own interest and that of the organization to which he belongs and all of whom have such business or social relations as to make their combined influence very formidable politically? They are fully conscious

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