tion. There are some persons in England, haters of Russia, who believe that the Bulgarians have nothing to do but to hold out some time, and that Russia will fall to pieces of herself or undergo some remarkable change. But even a great disaster in foreign war, which alone would upset the established order there, would not in overturning it make much difference in external questions of this kind. Men point to the assassination of the late emperor, or the acquittal by a St. Petersburg jury of officials and nobles of the asssassins of the grand police master, Count Trepoff, but the stone-throwing spirit, the self-depreciation of the capital, and the occasional outbursts of violent Nihilism are only the natural results of the autocratic system. Like Malet's conspiracy before the campaign of France, they reveal weakness, but their existence is not inconsistent with that of a widespread patriotic feeling, or of the power to make patriotic sacrifice. absorb an orthodox population belonging | seems as though there were a still greater to the Hellenic branch of the Eastern difficulty in Russia's way in the unconChurch, but the Bulgarians were not sup-querable spirit of independence of the posed to be endowed with so much love Roumanians, the Bulgarians, and the of independence and power of resistance southern Slavs. Every attempt at coerthat they were likely to stand out against cion only makes them more permanently Russia. By doing so they have embarked, hostile to autocratic rule, and when the however, in a hopeless struggle in which opposite policy is pursued and they are the sympathy that is bestowed upon them left to themselves, they do not appear to is hardly likely to find expression in ac- repent at all. The possession of such remarkable qualities of self-government by these small peoples has led many to try of late to force to the front in practical politics that which has long been one of the favorite dreams of political speculation. It may be considered to be the policy of the more liberal elements in English Conservatism and of the more prudent amongst English Liberals, to set up, if there is a possibility of doing so, some kind of Balkan confederation. If, indeed, a Balkan confederation, even with the support of Austria and of England, would not in a military sense be strong enough to hold its own against Russia, nevertheless, in any time that may be left to us, before Russia once again presses on, it may be possible to bring about, if not confederation, at all events a cordial understanding. Certainly the Greeks, the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs are young peoples, worth helping to defend. One of the difficulties in the way of producing anything like settlement in the Balkan question, or, let us say, in the European branch of the Eastern question, has been the existence of mutual jealousies or even hatreds. The Greeks dislike the Austrians, partly because the Austrians were supposed to intend some day to go to Salonica, and so to cut greater Greece in half, partly because the Austrians were the protectors of Servia, and the Servians claim some part of Macedonia and Albania, which the Greeks expected rather to come to their share. On the other hand, although both the Greeks and the Bulgarians were at various times somewhat pro-Russian and anti-Austrian, there was the most violent hatred between these two races, because Bulgaria had been promised in the Treaty of San Stefano many districts which are claimed as Hellenic by Greece; and because, in short, both peoples had, as indeed they still have, a longing for the same parts of Macedonia. Cold comfort, I fear, all this for the Bulgarians and for the weaker generally in the Balkan States and in the world outside; and yet the Bulgarians have deserved better things of us. By their wise and prudent policy, and by the self-restraint which has been exercised by the whole people, they have on the one hand held their own, and on the other, made an armed occupation difficult. Their spirit of independence was well known, but the ability which they have displayed in war and in finance was somewhat of a surprise. Russia believed that the withdrawal of the Russian officers would disorganize them, and immediately afterwards they were successful in a very serious war. Through all the provocations of the Kaulbars mission, and in the total absence of a supreme direction of their affairs, although under a monarchic system, perfect order has never ceased to reign, nor the taxes to come in with regularity. Verily, the Bulgarians deserve the thanks of all free men in Europe. It used to be said by Russian officers that the road to Constantinople lay through Vienna, but it now A confederation in the Balkan provinces must mean the confederation of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Roumania, of which Roumania, Greece, and Servia almost equally dislike Bulgaria. Such an arrangement seemed at first sight to resemble a RUSSIA. to wait a century if need be, for, as one of confederation between three not very an agreement in advance whether Bulgaria friendly cats and an altogether hostile or Greece should conduct insurrections dog. The difficulties are still very great, in particular villages whenever Turkey extinct. but they are not so great as they were, for was in extremis, and which should annex the dislikes are now distinctly less accent- them whenever Turkey was uated. King Milan has even privately There would not be much desire, it apsuggested a personal union between Servia pears, on the part of Greece to hurry matand Bulgaria, thus raising questions which ters if once she had a clear agreement The present Greek I will discuss in the next article of this upon this point. series. Bulgaria, too, has appointed a prime minister, at all events, would be Unless content that Greece should wait for any diplomatic agent at Athens. Hungary, with her anti-Russian policy, number of years, provided that this quesshould prevent it, Austria would still look tion were not to be settled against her in with disfavor upon a Balkan confedera- the interval. Greece asks, of course, for tion of the smaller powers, and would be that Janina which was promised her by inclined to join with Russia to prevent the powers and which is one of the chief her own permanent exclusion from the cities of her people. She believes that Mediterranean coast, to which she does Albania will gravitate towards her, alnot at present desire to go, but from which though she is apprehensive both of Ausshe does not wish to be entirely shut off. trian and of Italian ambition in that quarBy our action at Berlin we cut the south-ter; but the point to which she attaches ern Slavs in half by planting Austria be- the most importance is delimitation in tween Servia and Montenegro, an arrange- Macedonia, and then she will be content ment which does not seem likely to be permanent. The Austrian difficulty is, perhaps, the greatest difficulty which now remains in the way of confederation, and it is no difficulty in the way of the formation of a Balkan confederacy under Austrian headship. There is another incident, beside the one just named, which shows that the relations of Greece to Bulgaria are better than they were. An arrangement had been concluded between M. Tricoupis and the Bulgarian government, before the deposition of Prince Alexander, for the delimitation on a map of the respective spheres of influence of Greece and Bulgaria in Macedonia. This dividing the skin of the beast before he is dead, which is as a rule imprudent, is perhaps neces-rately to gauge quality, but roughly speaksary in the case of Turkey, to prevent those conflicts of interest, occasionally threatening even armed struggle in the field, which break out from time to time between the Greeks, the Servians, and the Bulgarians. Unredeemed Roumania is chiefly Austrian, and therefore we hear little about the completion of the unity of the Roumanian people, although, curiously enough, the majority of the Roumanian people live outside Roumania, but the other three principal States of the Balkan peninsula are bitterly at enmity among themselves about Macedonia · arrayed against Bulgarians, and Greeks against both. The troubles in Macedonia which were expected by Lord Salisbury in January last came, however, from none of these, but from Russia as he believed. The delimitation of the sphere of influence which had been arranged of course meant As Balkan confederation is not likely for many years to come, or is not likely soon enough to be of effective value to stay the approach of Russia to Constantinople, we have to admit that if Russia is to be kept out of the Macedonian plain, Austria, with or without alliances, must bar her advance. Unfortunately Austria is not strong enough. As Austrians and Russians have not been tried the one against the other, it is impossible accu ing it may be said that putting quality on one side the Russian army ought to be equal to the armies of Germany and Austria combined. The Russian annual contingent of the regular peace army has risen to two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men, which is only slightly under those of Austria and Germany together. The Russian peace army is nominally in the present year eight hundred and forty thousand men, but, really, if we take into account the Cossacks permanently embodied, it amounts to eight hundred and Servians ninety thousand men, whilst even the smaller figure exceeds the peace armies of Austria and Germany combined. The total force of trained men which ought to be easily and rapidly mobilized by Russia, considering the figures of her contingents and the character of her military system, is about four million as against two mil lion for Germany, and twelve hundred and fifty thousand for Austria. More slowly, if she has guns for them and guns if not in stock could probably be pretty easily obtained-Russia could place six millions of men in the field. The power of Russia to realize in fact the promise of her paper figures has recently been denied, but the necessity of taking into account the Russian military movement which began after the failures of 1878 has not been sufficiently kept in mind. If we were to credit the figures given by the German government to the German Parliament in January last, we should believe that these results were secured by Russia at a cost exceeding the annual charge of the united army budgets of Germany and of Austria, for the official German figures give 785,906,259 marks for Russia. But Prince Bismarck deceives the German Parliament by estimating the rouble at three shillings when it is worth less than two. It is the Russian "gold" or "metallic" rouble that is worth a little over three shillings of our money. The "silver" rouble is the paper rouble, now worth but twenty-one pence three farthings. Colonel Rau, Marga, and most, if not all, of the authorities, except the Intelligence Department book, have made the same mistake, and reckon the rouble at from 3.75 francs to 3.50 francs. On the other hand, there is a large extraordinary military expenditure in Russia which it is not easy to find in the Russian budget, as, for example, a large part of the expenditure upon the Transcaspian Railway now being rapidly constructed by General Annenkoff, and calls are made upon both the village communities and the provincial Zemstvoes for matters which in other countries would be at the charge of the State. In any case, however, the figure given by the German government as 785,906,259 marks, is the figure of the Russian budget which should have been stated at 495,428,078 marks only (at the rate at which the rouble then stood; now less) a pretty considerable deception practised towards the German people. Men are cheap in Russia. By whatever test we take, excepting quality, which has not yet been employed, Russia ought to be from two and a half to three times as strong as Austria. The Russian trained cavalry is even stronger in proportion than are her numbers generally. It outnumbers the trained cavalry of Germany and of Austria together, and is sometimes even said to be more than three times as numerous as that of the dual monarchy, although Austria-Hungary is strong in cavalry, and has almost as large a cavalry force as France. It may be assumed that Germany will not only give no cause of offence to her tremendous neighbor, but will try to avoid being compromised by Austria or by England. If she had ever to intervene as against Russia she would try to do so when Russia was already weakened by a long struggle. There are no very probable causes of war between Russia and Germany, except indeed the intensely bitter feeling between the two peoples, for Germany has ceased to concern herself with the Russification of the so-called German provinces of Russia, and is herself engaged in the similar policy of Germanizing Prussian Poland. Russia is well protected by fortresses against a possible German advance whilst she might be engaged elsewhere, especially by the Polish quadrilateral, in which, of Mödlin, Demblin, and Terespol, the last-named is familiar to us now as Brest-Litovsk, but the others are hardly recognizable at all under their new names. Russia has lately taken to the Japanese system of frequently changing the names of cities, just as the town council of Paris changes those of streets. Towards Austria Russia has till lately had virtually no fortresses, and the difference is instructive, for Austria is far more likely to be her enemy than Germany. Lutzk, now to be called Michaïlo grad, and Dubno, old places of arms, are to be re-fortified, and there is a talk of an entrenched camp, but substantially the Russian frontier towards Austria is an open one, where, instead of fortresses, Russia has troops, especially a numerous cavalry. And yet it is on this frontier that she expects to have to fight. The meaning of this absence of fortresses upon one frontier and of their presence upon the other is, that in a war with Austria Russia expects to act on the offensive, assisted by a Ruthenian insurrection in Galicia; and so she no more fortifies her frontiers against Austria than she fortifies them against Turkey. On the other hand, it may be noted that she fortifies her frontier towards Germany, so as to be able quietly to attack Austria at her will. Russia proudly refuses to fortify her capital, a fact which would be significant of her consciousness of strength, were it not that Vienna also is virtually an open town, for the fortifications were stopped owing to the objections of the town council in 1867. The probabilities are that, in the event of a war with Austria, Russia would be able to enter Galicia, along an open frontier of more than six hundred miles, and take Przemysl, and Lemberg, and Cracow, in spite of the fortifications now being pressed forward with feverish haste. Looking to the nature of the Polish climate it is to be hoped that it will not be discovered when spring comes that snowworks form the bulk of the new fortifications. The disposition of the Russian railways alone is sufficient to show plainly that she means to take the offensive. She has special reasons for occupying Galicia. She would be glad enough to keep it, because it is at the present time a gathering-place for disaffected Poles. She would easily gain popularity there, by giving to the peasantry the lands of the Polish nobles, and thus could raise the Ruthenians. Galicia forms the road towards Vienna, where the Eastern question is to be settled. In the vast plains of Galicia two hundred thousand Russian cavalry would find a splendid field for war, and there they would be able to carry out against Austria those wonderful manoeuvres of the new dragoons with horse artillery, which the foreign officers, in 1886, were not allowed to see. The Russian manœuvres of 1886 were conducted by forces of forty thousand men at Krasnoe Selo (for the edification of the foreign officers), and of one hundred and sixty-two thousand men, of whom nearly twenty thousand were cavalry, with five hundred and twenty-eight guns, between Wilna and Warsaw. hundred and two thousand men with six Germany does not put two hundred and fifty guns in the field at the annual autumn manoeuvres. Austria is miserably equipped with fortresses and is trying in haste to repair her deficiencies in this respect. 79 a Russian annexation of Galicia, Germany might not very much regret, because Austria in Galicia protects the Poles, a course which is a permanent slur upon the action of Germany in this matter. or really considerable dismemberment of But a further Austria Germany could not permit, unless under downright fear of France. I have assumed that Italy would possibly not have the will, and that England and the small Balkan States, even if not divided amongst themselves or partly neutral, would not have the power to give effective assistance to Austria in the field. Italy would be to her a more useful friend than England or the Balkan States. I have already said, in a previous article, that Italy would not save Austria gratis; but it is not improbable that she might save or try to save her for a price, and although a curious fact, it is a fact, that Vienna is more likely to be saved from a temporary Russian occupation by Italy than by Germany. Russia is anxious to weaken, and if she cannot really weaken, then, to hamper Italy, and is not unacquainted with the origin of the recent attacks upon Massowah, a fact which the French press denies, but of which the Russian newspapers boast. It is certain that Italy regards the Russian policy in the Balkan peninsula as iniquitous, as harmful to European interests generally, and as hurtful to Italian interests in particular, and that Italy would join a group of powers to oppose it by force. If opposition by force is imfears of Austria, or even to the buying possible, owing to the weakness or the off of Austria by Russia, then Italy would join England in putting on the drag as much as possible. Whatever may be the feeling in Hungary, it must be admitted Austria in a Galicia war with Russia from Russia rather than fight. She has that Austria will put up with a good deal would have no special advantage that I done so in the past; and to give a single can see, save one, that, namely, of being example of humiliation out of many, I able to raise a splendid but not very large need only mention how at various times fighting body of aristocratic Poles from and on various questions she had to reother lands to serve against the hereditary monstrate with the Bulgarian government enemy of their race on behalf of the least in the days of the "Russian ministers " unpopular of the three partitioning pow-in Bulgaria, and received from the latter ers. No doubt Germany, without actually replies couched in terms of gross and appearing to move, would quietly collect intentional discourtesy. troops on the Polish frontier and watch Russia, but it is doubtful whether she would be able to detain a very large force of Russian troops in Poland proper, except militia and garrison battalions. She could not prevent the loss of Galicia to Austria, though she might interfere to prevent the ultimate destruction of Austria as a power. A partial dismemberment of Austria, by unable rapidly to assist Austria in the munications does not average more than seventeen days a year. I cannot agree in the Yate or Malleson proposals, and feel that there is indeed no arguing with gentlemen who believe that we can make use of Persians against Russian troops. vostock; but if Italy were with us, it is probable that we should be tempted by the possession of a formidable allied fleet to attack Russia in the Black Sea―an enterprise in which we should undoubtedly fail. The Russians expect to be attacked in the Black Sea, but a careful Whilst the Austrian military position, examination of the character of that sea, in spite of the desire of the emperor for as well as of the Baltic, shows that not by military reform, is still weak, I cannot the strength of her fleets, but by the nat- find words too strong to praise the politiural strength of her position Russia is in cal ability with which the Austrian Empire those directions virtually impregnable. is being kept at peace and kept together. There are some who think that the Ma- The Austrian Empire is a marvel of hometan population of the Caucasus might equilibrium. The old simile of a house of still be made use of against Russia, but cards is exactly applicable to its situation, this view is as obsolete a superstition as and just as in the exercises of acrobats, the belief in Poland. The Russian colo- when seven or nine men are borne by one nists of the Caucasus have now become upon his shoulders, it is rather skill than Cossacks for military purposes, and Rus- strength which sustains them; so if we sia has no more patriotic people than the look to the Austrian constitution, which Black Sea and the Caucasian Cossacks. we shall have to consider in the next Those who think that while India could paper in this series, it is a miracle how the defend itself upon the Helmund the troops fabric stands at all. At the same time it from England, with a Turkish army-if is impossible for Austria, although she the Turkish alliance were obtained—can maintain her stability in times of should be thrown into the Caucasus in peace, to impose upon either her Russian order to prevent the despatch of troops by or her German neighbors as to her strength the Caspian towards Herat, are proposing for war. Prince Bismarck is obliged, with a course which the highest authorities whatever words of public and private reject. praise for the speeches of the Austrian Colonel Malleson is the chief exponent and Hungarian statesmen, to add the of the view which I wish to combat. I French and Russian forces together upon know not which, indeed, it is that he pro- his fingers, and to deduct from them the poses - a landing at Anapa and march on Austrian and the German, with doubts as Stavropol, or a landing at Poti and march to the attitude of Italy, doubts as to the on Tiflis. In the latter case we should be attitude of England, and contemptuous destroyed by fever, and in the former certainty as to the attitude of Turkey. If crushed by Russian numbers. Colonel Austria could have presented Prince BisMalleson seems to think that the Caucasus marck not only with an English alliance, has not long been Russian. Stavropol but with an English, Turkish, and Italian and its district have been Russian since alliance, he might possibly have allowed the seventeenth century, and Tiflis since her to provoke a general war; but with the 1801. It is the Circassian highlands difficulties attendant upon a concession of which alone held out against the Russians, territory to Italy, except in the last resort, and into them we cannot penetrate. Or and with Turkey at the feet of Russia, it does he wish us to repeat Hobart's 1877 was difficult for Prince Bismarck to go experiment of a Soukhoum Kali landing? further than to say for Austria, "Fight by This is mere map-maker's warfare. From all means, if you feel yourself strong Soukhoum Kali we could go nowhere, and enough to beat Russia single-handed. our spies when sent into the mountain France and Germany will see all fair,' valleys would discover that the Circas- and you can hardly expect anybody effectsians are gone and replaced by Kouban ually to help you." Prince Bismarck deals Cossacks. But even during the Crimean with foreign affairs on the principles upon war the Caucasus did not rise, though which they were dealt with by King Henry Schamyl was in his home. The Jingo VIII. of England, when that king was plan appears to be to march on Tiflis in pitted against the acutest intellects of the winter, but the Vladikavkas military road, Empire and of France. His policy is a which I know well myself, is perfectly plain and simple policy, and not a policy passible in winter for Russian troops, and of astuteness and cunning, and almost even the "Géographie Militaire," which necessarily at the present time consists in asserts that it is sometimes blocked by counting heads. ice, admits that the interruption of com A good deal of indignation has been |