Brentano's MindMark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well as attempts to improve or develop it. Textor argues that there is no plausible version of this doctrine, and rejects it in favour of a mark of the mental proposed by Brentano's student Husserl: mental phenomena have no appearances. The second part of the book develops and defends Brentano's view about the structure of perceptual awareness. Awareness of a mental activity and this mental activity are not distinct mental acts, the first representing the second. They are one and the same activity that has several objects. Textor shows that Brentano held that intentionality is plural - directedness is directedness on some objects - and shows how the plural conception solves thorny problems. The third part of the book is devoted to Brentano's view of pleasure and pain. Textor draws out parallels between enjoying an activity and awareness of it and argues that enjoying an activity and the activity enjoyed are not distinct. The final part of the book extends the plural view to the conscious mental life of a thinker at a time (the unity of synchronic consciousness): it is one mental act with many objects. |
Contents
The Regress and the Duplication Argument | |
Threats and a Mystery | |
Attention Adumbration and a Neglected Mark of the Mental | |
Consciousness | |
The Structure of Enjoyment | |
The Nature of Enjoyment | |
Brentanos Mental Monism | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
acknowledgement adumbrations argue Aristotle Aristotle’s awareness of hearing awareness of perceiving blue Brentano’s Thesis Brentano’s view Caston chapter Chisholm colour concepts consciousness Consider contrast Descartes descriptive psychology desire directed distinct mental acts distinguish Duplication Argument enjoyment epistemic example existence experience feeling Franz Brentano Hamilton hearing F Hedonic Hence Higher-Order View Husserl Husserl’s Thesis immanent object immediate evidence infinite regress inner perception intentional correlate intentional object introspection judgement knowledge Kriegel Leibniz mark Mental Monism mental phenomena mind mode of presentation MT’s killing Non-Spatiality notice notion observation one’s attention Othello Oxford pain perceptual constancy Phenomenological phenomenon Philosophical Philosophy of Mind physical objects physical phenomena plausible plural primary object Primitivism problem properties propositional attitudes propositional knowledge Psychologie refers Regress Argument Reid relation Ryle secondary object seems sensation sense sensory pleasure sentence smelling soul spatial Stumpf suggests take pleasure things tone translation and emphasis visual