tion they cease to be several sects, and, so far as the Exclusive System is concerned, are to be regarded as one sect formed on a more comprehensive principle.

If, indeed, it were not only settled that there are certain essential and fundamental doctrines of the gospel, but also which these doctrines are, there might be some reason in considering such as should reject them as virtually renouncing the religion. But while the question, which these doctrines are, is the very question at issue, it is manifestly premature for either party to begin to act upon it, as if it had already been decided by a competent authority. The obvious fact seems to be strangely and unaccountably overlooked, that man's fallibility applies to his judgment respecting fundamentals; nay, that it applies in a twofold degree. It is a question whether these doctrines are doctrines of Christianity; and, if doctrines of Christianity, it is a question whether they are fundamental doctrines; both of which questions are disputed, and in both of which he may be mistaken. Were I to reject what I myself regard as essential and fundamental doctrines of Christianity, the case would be different, I allow; but this is not pretended. It is not pretended that both parties admit the doctrines in question to be essential and fundamental; but only that you hold certain doctrines to be so, which I do not. Well then, what is to be done? Why, you must convince me that I am wrong, if you can; but, pending this controversy, you must remember that you are only a party to it, and not party and umpire too. Convince me that I am wrong, if you can; but till you have done this, you must not think, in your conduct towards me, to take it for granted that I am wrong; for this is the point to be proved, not taken for granted.

The Exclusionist will say, perhaps, that he does not assume the right of deciding this point on authority, but merely as a matter of opinion, and sincere convietion. He will say, that, in his opinion, I have renounced essentials of Christianity, and consequently am no Christian; and further, that the assertion is always understood with this qualifying clause. Nay, he may contend, that this is one of those interesting questions, on which a man cannot help making up an opinion on one side or the other; and after his opinion is made up, to deny him the right to express it would not be to secure, but to destroy liberty. Everything like authority being disclaimed, it may be asked, in a tone of triumph, whether this is not a subject on which a man in a free country may hold and avow his honest convictions.

Certainly he may, so long as he can do it without interfering with the rights of others. It will hardly be pretended, however, that the declaration of an opinion, merely as an opinion, is always allowable, when this declaration, true or false, must injure others. It is an acknowledged principle, and in free countries too, that we have no right to scatter about our opinions, as opinions, without considering the effect it will have on others. I do not mean by this, that our lips should be sealed on the subject of our religious differences; but I do mean, that when we open them to denounce others, and prejudice the community against them, it is not enough to say in justification, that we speak as we think.

But waiving this point, I deny the fact itself on which the whole argument is based. It is not true that the supporters of the Exclusive System avow and advocate what they term fundamentals, as mere matters of opinion.

Doctrines of minor importance they will allow to be regarded in this light, and therefore as still open to discussion; presenting questions, respecting which fair and good minds may differ. But when they come to speak of doctrines accounted by themselves essential and fundamental, their tone and manner are changed; and they speak of them, not as mere matters of opinion, but as established verities, which none are at liberty to reject, or even to doubt, and which all must see as they see, whose understandings are not darkened by moral prejudices. On other topics they would be understood to speak as they think; but on these they would be understood to speak as they know, and they are so understood in fact by a large majority of their followers; and their language, accordingly, is in the highest degree confident and overbearing, and owes not a little of its effect on the credulous and timid to this very circumstance. Nor is this all. They not only advance what they consider fundamental doctrines as established verities, but proceed immediately to act on them as established verities. The charge against Exclusionists is, not that they hold certain opinions, or that they avow and advocate their honest convictions; but that they take up certain opinions, which are mere opinions, and advance them as established verities, and act on them as such; and this, too, when they know that the feelings, reputation, and substantial interests of others are endangered or seriously injured thereby. The charge is, that forgetting their fallibility, they act towards others, and to the great prejudice of others, precisely as if they thought themselves infallible, and in a way to be justified only on such an assumption.

To this it may be replied, that notwithstanding our acknowledged fallibility, we are under the necessity of acting on opinion, and oftentimes on mere opinion and disputed opinion, and in direct collision with the opinions, wishes, and interests of those whom we oppose. This is true in certain cases; but it is not true in any case so far parallel with that in question, as to warrant reasoning from one to another. Thus, the construction put upon a law is in some sense a mere matter of opinion among the judges, and often of disputed opinion; and yet this opinion is enforced. But then it should be remembered, that the judges are invested with authority for this very purpose; and it will hardly be pretended, that any Christian, or body of Christians, is invested with a like authority to decree what construction shall be put on the word of God. Again, I may think my neighbor unworthy of confidence, and on the strength of this opinion I may proceed against him so far as to withhold my confidence and my society; and 1 have a perfect right to do this, because my confidence and society are my own, and at my own disposal; but it will hardly be pretended, that the christian name and privileges are in the same sense my own, and at my disposal. Further, I may think my neighbor is not only unworthy of confidence, but a dangerous member of the community; and on the strength of this opinion I may feel called upon, not only to withhold my own confidence and society, but to denounce him publicly. And this, also, I may do in those cases provided for by the laws, because in such cases a competent tribunal exists before which I may be arraigned, where the accused will have an opportunity, if he has been wronged, to assert and establish his innocence. But it will hardly be pretended, 2

VOL. IV.-NO. I.

that in matters of faith and conscience a competent tribunal of this kind has been established amongst us, to which the injured party can appeal for redress; for to say that he may appeal to the tribunal of public opinion, is merely to answer me, and to attempt to blind me, by a figure of speech.

'Who art thou that judgest another man's servant ? To his own master he standeth, or faileth.' The head of the church has been pleased to leave the questions at issue among his followers, open and undecided, with an express direction that the wheat and the tares be permitted to grow together until the harvest. Any attempt, therefore, to prejudge these questions, and act on such unauthorized prejudices, is precisely as if in civil jurisprudence a man should anticipate the legal sentence, take the law into his own hands, and proceed against a supposed offender, just as if he had been tried and condemned by the proper tribunal. You are aware, that this would be accounted a high misdemeanor in the freest countries; and as the misdemeanor has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the judgment, but consists in its being usurpation of authority, it obviously remains the same, though the supposed offender should afterwards be proved to be a real offender. For the same reason, if it should turn out hereafter, that the Exclusionist is right in his opinions, it will not justify him in having acted on them; for he did not know that he was right, and he had no authority to injure others by acting on this presumption. We are amazed at the air of confidence with which Exclusionists often appeal for justification to the example of Jesus Christ and his apostles. As if Jesus Christ and his apostles