Syllabus 126 C. Cls. ity of the Housing Authority in connection with the Government's program to furnish emergency housing for veterans of World War II, the general plan being to demount and separate into their component parts the housing units originally constructed for war workers and to reerect them as temporary houses in various locations where there existed a shortage of private facilities for veterans. Under its contract plaintiff was to demount and "panelize" 1,500 housing units at various military posts "as shall be assigned from time to time by the contracting officer" and to transport and erect them as family dwelling units in various other locations. The contractor was to be reimbursed on a cost basis, plus a fixed overhead and a fixed fee. Proceed orders were issued to plaintiff for 1,049 of these units. The work on 515 units was completed; orders on 211 were canceled before any work was done; further work on 205 units was canceled after these units had been demounted and panelized; work on 85 units was suspended and later canceled. In the instant suit plaintiff seeks to recover damages for failure to issue proceed orders for the 451 units not covered by such orders, and for cancellation of proceed orders which were issued, and for cancellation of further work on some of the uncompleted units, and for the suspension and final termination of the contract as to others. United States ~ 74 Same; cancellation because of shortage of funds.-Plaintiff's first cause of action is for the suspension of the work on the 85 units prior to completion and for the final cancellation of the contract as to these units. Upon the evidence, it is held that the suspension of the work on these 85 units was a breach of the contract for which the defendant is not to be excused, although the reason for the suspension was a shortage of funds. 74 United States Same; recovery allowed for proportionate cost of maintaining organization during suspension of work.-Where it is shown by the evidence that defendant held out to plaintiff the hope that the Government would have the money to go ahead with the contract, plaintiff was justified in maintaining its organization for that purpose, and is entitled to recover reimbursement for a proper proportion of its payroll for wages and overhead, allocable to the 85 units, for a reasonable period. Judgment for $8,230.50. United States 74 Same; exact amount of damages not ascertainable.—Uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude recovery where the fact of damage is clearly established, as it is in the instant 713 Opinion of the Court case, provided there is a reasonable basis of computation, although the result be only approximate, or if there is a basis for a reasoned conclusion. Same; cancellation orders authorized under the contract. Upon the other items of its claim with respect to the cancellation orders as to work on other units, no recovery is allowable, since it is shown that such cancellation orders were within the authority of the contracting officer under the contract, and plaintiff has been paid the amount due on cancellation in accordance with the terms of the contract. Mr. David Morgulas, for the plaintiff. Messrs. M. Carl Levine, Morgulas & Foreman were on the briefs. Mr. Carl Eardley, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren E. Burger, for the defendant. WHITAKER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: In December 1945 the defendant, through the instrumentality of the Housing Authority, embarked on a program to furnish emergency housing for veterans of World War II. The general plan was to demount and separate into their component parts, called panelizing, the housing units constructed for war workers, and to transport them to various locations where there was a shortage of private housing facilities for veterans, and there to erect them as temporary houses for their use. On December 28, 1945, plaintiff entered into such a contract with the defendant, under which the plaintiff was to demount and panelize 1500 housing units "as shall be assigned from time to time by the contracting officer" at various military posts and to transport and to erect them as family dwelling units in various other locations. Proceed orders were issued for 1049 of these units. The work on 515 of the units was completed. The proceed orders as to 211 of the units were canceled before any work was done. Further work on 205 of the units was canceled after these units had been demounted and panelized. The work on 85 of the units was suspended for a time and then later canceled. Opinion of the Court 126 C. Cls. The following table sets out the action taken with respect to each proceed order: Plaintiff's suit is for damages for the failure to issue proceed orders as to the 451 units not covered by proceed orders, and for damages for the cancellation of the proceed orders, which were issued, and for cancellation of further work on some of the uncompleted units, and the suspension of work and final termination of the contract as to others. Its first cause of action is for the suspension of the work on 85 units prior to completion, and for the final cancellation of plaintiff's contract as to them. The contract provided that the consideration to be received by the contractor was reimbursement for its costs and a fixed fee plus a fixed overhead. The principal issue in the case is whether the defendant is liable for damages resulting from suspending operations on the contract and the subsequent cancellation of the contract. In December 1946 defendant notified plaintiff and other contractors that it might be necessary to stop the program, of which plaintiff's contract was a part, on account of the 713 Opinion of the Court shortage of funds, until the passage of a deficiency bill by Congress, and then on January 14, 1947, defendant sent the plaintiff the following telegram: PENDING READJUSTMENT OF FUNDS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE 7-8-9 NEWARK, PORARY. Plaintiff stopped work as directed. On March 18, 1947, the defendant sent plaintiff another telegram, which reads as follows: THE FUNDS PROVIDED FOR COST INCURRED ON SUSPENDED UNITS PRIOR TO SUSPENSION TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PROBABLE CREDITS ON SUBCONTRACTS WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTED IF NO FURTHER WORK WAS PERFORMED. IT IS NOT INTENDED AT THIS TIME THAT YOU SHOULD CANCEL SUBCONTRACTS AND EFFECT THESE CREDITS. IT IS DESIRED THAT THESE UNITS BE HELD IN SUSPENSION AND NOT CANCELED PENDING THE OUTCOME OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THEIR COMPLETION. And on April 16, 1947, defendant telegraphed plaintiff again as follows: REGRET UNABLE RETURN YOUR TELEPHONE CALL YESTERDAY. On July 29, 1947, Congress passed a deficiency appropriation bill which permitted the Housing Authority to continue with the program. However, prior to its passage defendant decided, and so notified plaintiff and other contractors, that it would not continue with the program on the basis previously contracted for, but would let lump-sum contracts for the completion of the work on a competitive basis. Plaintiff was not interested in bidding on such a contract and declined the defendant's invitation of September 15, 1947, to do so. Accordingly, on October 23, 1947, plaintiff's Opinion of the Court 126 C. Cls. contract for the 85 units was canceled and a lump-sum contract for the completion of these buildings was let to another company. Until April 25, 1947, plaintiff was engaged in the completion of other units, work on which was not canceled or suspended, but after that time it did no further work on any of the 1,500 units involved. It alleges, however, that it kept a number of employees on its payroll thereafter and until formal cancellation of its contract as to these 85 units, in anticipation of resumption of work on the uncompleted buildings, and it sues for their salaries and for a portion of its home office overhead. The suspension of the work on these 85 units was of course a breach of contract, and it was a breach of contract for which defendant is not to be excused, although the reason for the suspension was a shortage of funds. A man cannot be excused from performance of his contract because he runs short of the money necessary to perform it. The other party enters into it on the promise that the money will be paid. If it is not paid, the promise is broken. So it is with the Government. See Joplin v. United States, 89 C. Cls. 345, 359-361; Johnson v. City of New York, 191 Appls. Div. 205, affirmed 231 N. Y. 564. Defendant does not seriously dispute this. Plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever damages it may have suffered by reason of this breach. Plaintiff says that during the period that the work was in suspension it kept a number of employees on its payroll in anticipation of resumption of the work, and it sues to recover their wages, together with a portion of its home office overhead. We think defendant's conduct was a sufficient inducement for plaintiff to keep some, if not all, of these employees on its payroll, and that it was justified in doing so. Its initial telegram of January 14, 1947, suspending the work, concluded with this statement: "Expect this suspension will be temporary." Then, about two months later, on March 18, 1947, it wired plaintiff in part: *It is not intended at this time that you should cancel subcontracts and effect these credits [that is, credits on the subcontracts]. It is desired that these |