doubt that she loved virtue and himself, he hastened back to his native land, to assure his faithful wife he had ever continued to adore her.

Since that time they have continued to live in the country like the happiest lovers. The rest of the world is nothing to them. Boris is ever the same as he always was—a benevolent man of sense; and Julia proves by her example, that often, under the appearance of youthful levity, the most sublime virtues that adorn a woman lie concealed.

The tenderness of Boris will not allow her to paint her former character in such glowing colours. "You were born," said he, "to be virtuous; a little of vanity, and the fruits of a wrong education, and bad example, were alone the cause of your momentary errors. You needed only once to learn the worth of virtue and true affection, to hate vice for ever. You wonder, perhaps, why I was always silent, and never warned you of the consequences of your levity; but I am perfectly convinced, that reproaches will sooner render a heart callous than reform it. Tenderness and patience on the part of the husband in such a case is the most efficacious remedy. Reproof and censure would only have made you imagine I was jealous. You would have thought yourself injured, and perhaps our hearts might have been divided for ever. The consequences have justified my opinions. Parting at length appeared to me the only remedy I could employ for your reformation. I left you to the conviction of your own heart-not, indeed, with frigid indifference, not without the most heartfelt sorrow; but a ray of hope supported me, and-did not deceive me. You are mine, wholly and for ever mine."

Sometimes Julia would exclaim against the women. Boris defended them. "Believe me, dear Julia," said he," it is chiefly the fault of the men if the women are vicious; and the chief reason the last are bad, is because the former are generally not better."

Boris and Julia are in many things of a different opinion; but both perfectly agree in this, that connubial and parental happiness is the greatest blessing on earth.

OUTLINE OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

UNDER this inscription, we introduce to the acquaintance of our readers, by the name of professor Kant, of Königsberg, in Prussia, a man, who signalized as he is from

the

the novelty, profundity, and importance of his philosophy, could not fail to excite the universal attention of the world, as well as all those various passions of the human mind, to which new doctrines, especially when dignified by some air of consequence, are exposed. No sooner did a large majority. of the nation, which glories in the name of Kant, hail the great man as the illustrious author of a system of reasoning, hitherto in vain attempted by philosophers, than the signal was given to the admirers of old and received doctrines, the haters of novelty and those men, who, in the spirit of the times, dread every kind of innovation, to wage a war of destruction against the new-fangled philosophy of Königsberg. They armed, and some of them met their antagonists, pen in hand, and on philosophic enquiry, like men of honour, in the open field of battle; but, alas! having set their faces against too great a man, they could not compel him to give up even an inch of ground. Others complained, that the enemy's strong holds being situated too far beyond the reach of their ordnance, they had no means left to come at, and encounter him. Now the trumpet of calumny alarmed the world, and warned the dablers in philosophy to be aware of new dangerous doctrines; when at the other hand an outcry was heard of no new doctrines in Kant's philosophy after all.

Such being the conflict of opinions concerning Kant, the following outline of his philosophy will, we hope, have some interest with our readers:

I..

Our knowledge either is or is not independent of experience. In the first case it is pure and a priori; in the second empirical and a posteriori. Infallible marks of priority, with respect to our intuitions and judgments, are absolute necessity and strict universality. The last without the first, affords no sufficient criterion.

II.

Our judgments are either analytical, that is to say, explaining, or synthetical, which means extending. A synthetical judgment may as well be a priori as a posteriori. In the first case, it proceeds from pure intuition; in the second, from experience, and is at the same time preceded by empirical intuition. Every analytical judgment is a priori, and unfolds only what is already comprehended in the conception. .III.

The organs, by which objects of knowledge are conveyed to our mind, are the sensitive and intellectual faculties. The first, produces intuitions, the second, ideas. Intuitions can never become ideas, nor vice versa. Hence those two faculF

VOL. II.

ties,

ties, the produce of which they are, differ not only formally, but also materially; and lest we should be insnared by the partial systems of Locke and Leibnitz, we must well distinguish which part of our knowledge belongs to external impression, and which to any internal modification of our mind.

IV.

All our enquiries after demonstrative knowledge begin within the compass of senses, are transferred to the understanding, and terminate in reason. Hence the three essential parts of metaphysics are transcendental asthetic, transcendental analytic, and transcendental dialectic.

V.

Transcendental asthetic explains the nature of pure intuitions, and fixes their limits.

VI.

We can produce no intuitions from within our mind, but must always have an object of perception. These objects are either within us or without. Hence internal and external

sense.

VII.

When we abstract from our intuitions what is merely empirical, the remainder is pure intuition, either internal or external, as the object belongs to one or the other sense. VIII.

Pure intuition is nothing else but the intuition of the mode by which an object may be represented to our mind. In consequence of that pure space, is the mode by which we conceive the juxta-position of things; pure time is the mode by which we represent to ourselves their succession.

We could not have any representation of empirical space and time. Hence all predicates of space and time are pure, and only by means of pure intuition significative.

X.

When so, the representations of space and time are not abstracted from experience, but pure; not discursive ideas, but simple intuitions a priori.

XI.

Space is a necessary representation, by which all external intuitions, and also the determinate nature of our external senses are possible. Hence space is not produced by the

senses.

XII.

It is the same with respect to time. Only successive things must be substituted for simultaneous, and time considered as connected with the internal and external sense,

XIII. Besides

XIII.

Besides space and time, no object of pure intuition is ima ginable. Consequently it is by space and time only that the whole sphere of pure sense is filled.

XIV.

Without the representations of space and time, no real representation of any thing is possible. For this reason all real objects are subjected to them; and, as far as those objects do not imply any thing more than what is represented by space and time, judgments formed from their appearance are of objective necessity, and strict universality, which is the case with mathematics.

XV.

Let the representations of space and time be taken away, and the whole world of phenomena is annihilated. Hence the universe must not be considered as being in reality what it appears to be, because what appears is only space and time; that is to say, the mode by which the juxta-position and succession of things is viewed by our mind.

XVI.

This transcendental idealism is in direct opposition with the empirical idealism of Berkeley. For, though we cannot penetrate into the essence of things, the transcendental idealism leads directly to their existence.

XVII.

Any adherer to transcendental realism must needs become an empirical idealist, because he takes representations for things. On the contrary, a transcendental idealist will become an empirical realist; for, as he takes the representations of things for mere ideas, and only their appearance for reality; he bestows on the objects of sense existence as phenomenon. But here stands at the same time the limit of our knowledge with respect to the universe as an object of sense. XVIII.

Transcendental analytic resolves the pure intellect into the elements of thinking, and unfolds the theory of conceptions and judgments, which rests on comprehending a variety represented under an objective unity.

XIX.

The faculty of conceiving and judging is one and the same faculty, namely, our understanding. Hence there will be as many pure intellectual notions, or categories, as there are acts of conceiving and judging essentially different from one another.

XX.

Of such acts of conceiving and judging only four are dif

ferent

ferent in kind, namely, concerning and judging from quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

XXI.

Quantity comprehends unity, multitude, or totality; quality reality, negation, or limitation; relations are between substance and accident, cause and effect, action and re-action; to modality belong possibility or impossibility, existence or non-existence, necessity or contingency.

XXII.

We have an intuition a priori of these categories; and conceptions of phenomena cannot be formed but by means of them, nor could we judge of any thing in the world, were it not for their pre-existence in our mind. In the mean time we are not aware of them but by their immediate application to phenomena. Hence the surreptitious error of those philosophers who thought the notions of categories originated in experience.

XXIII.

Nature herself is only thus far possible, that we take those subjective conditions of experience for objective conditions of things represented by experience.

XXIV.

The categories are connected with given objects by means of time; consequently, whatsoever is not an object of intuition, can never be a subject of categories.

XXV.

All objects of external sense belong, by their extension, to the category of quantity. Intensive magnitudes refer to the category of quality; and whatsoever supposes time is connected with the category of relations.

XXVI.

What is in conformity with the formal condition of experience, namely, conceivability, is possible; what is in conformity with the material condition of experience, namely reality, is existing, and what is in conformity with a general condition of experience, namely that it be so conceived as to carry along with itself the conviction, that, according to the constitution of our intellect, it cannot be conceived otherwise, is necessary. Now possibility, existence and necessity make up the category of modality.

XXVII.

Transcendental dialectic acquaints human reason with itself, and directs it to avoid illusion.

XXVIII.

Reason cannot make us acquainted with real objects, but serves to comprehend varieties given by other mental facul