CHAP. LVII.] RISING OF THE POLES. 485 WE CHAPTER LVII. 2 E must now direct our view to the general affairs of Europe; among which the state of Poland, to which we have alluded in the preceding chapter,' first claims our attention. The first partition of Poland and the Constitution of 1775, guaranteed by Russia, had placed it at the mercy of that Power, more especially by means of the Permanent Council, composed of Russian partisans, and directed by the Russian ambassador. King Stanislaus Poniatowski himself was the mere creature of the Empress Catharine II., and had disgusted the Poles by the subserviency which he displayed towards her and Potemkin. Poland, in short, was administered almost as if it already formed a Russian province. Rumours were afloat of a fresh partition, which should reduce it in reality to that condition, when the breaking out of the war between Russia and the Porte, in 1787, seemed to offer an opportunity for throwing off the Russian yoke. The patriot party, led by Ignatius and Stanislaus Potocki, Kollontay, Kosciuszko, Malachowski, and others, determined to embrace it. Catharine II., desirous that the Poles should assist her in her war against the Turks, proposed an alliance for that purpose to Stanislaus Augustus and the Permanent Council. Such an alliance, however, was contrary to ancient treaties subsisting between Poland and the Porte; and King Stanislaus, however willing to assist his mistress, was unable to do so without appealing to the constitutional, or four-years' diet, which was to meet in October, 1788. As we have related in a former chapter, a complete change had now been effected in the political aspect of Europe through the triple alliance between Great Britain, the United Provinces, and Prussia, with a view to oppose the designs of Russia and Austria; and the Polish patriots, reckoning on the 3 veränderungen; Ségur, Règne de Fred. 2 See vol. iii. p. 215. 486 ENCOURAGED BY PRUSSIA. [CHAP. LVII. aid of Prussia and her allies, resolved to make a stand for liberty. Great efforts were made by men of talent and energy to be elected as nuncios to an Assembly which, it was believed, would alter and fix the destinies of their country. Their first triumph was to convert the Diet, the day after it met, into a Confederation, thus obviating the liberum veto, and leaving matters to be decided by a majority of votes. A note presented to the Diet by Count Bucholtz, the Prussian Minister, October 12th, strongly protesting, in the name of his master, against the alliance proposed by Russia, inspired the patriots with unbounded confidence, especially as the Prussian Cabinet appeared resolved to support its policy by arms; and the Russian ambassador found himself compelled to withdraw his proposal of an alliance. It must be remembered, therefore, as an important element in weighing the subsequent conduct of the King of Prussia towards the Poles, that it was he who first sought their friendship, and by promises and professions encouraged them to expose themselves to all the dangers of a rupture with Russia. Nor did he stop here. He approved the projects of the Poles for reforming their Constitution, and liberating themselves from Russian influence. These projects were invariably communicated to the Prussian Minister, and to Hailes, the English resident at Warsaw; and when the Russian Minister notified that the Empress would regard the slightest change made in the Constitution of 1775 as a violation of treaties, the Prussian Cabinet declared, in a note of November 19th, that no previous guarantee could prevent the Poles from improving their Constitution. Thus encouraged, the Diet, in spite of the threats of Russia, abolished the Permanent Council, January 18th, 1789, increased the army, and instituted a Council of War, independent of the King. But further reforms were too long delayed. It is probable that if the Constitution of May 3rd, 1791, had been established a year or two earlier, before the union of Prussia and Russia, with regard to the affairs of France, had altered all Frederick William's views as to Poland, she would not have lost the Prussian alliance, and that her liberties might have been saved. There was, however, another condition necessary to secure the continued friendship of Prussia. That Power had long coveted the possession of Dantzic and Thorn. In April, 1789, the Marquis Lucchesini was sent to Warsaw to negotiate for the cession of those places, with instructions to denounce as an imposture the idea that Frederick 1 Mém. Oginski, t. i. p. 35 sqq. CHAP. LVII.] TREATY OF WARSAW. 487 William desired a fresh partition of Poland; to assert that he sought only the glory of delivering Europe from the ambition of the barbarians of the North, and of restoring Poland to her former position and liberty. Certain compensations were to be offered to the Poles, and especially an advantageous treaty of commerce with Prussia, England, and Holland. Several of the patriot party were of opinion that the cession should be made.' It was advocated by the English Ministry, though not by the merchants of England; and probably it might have secured the Prussian alliance, and have deprived that country of any motive for a second partition of Poland. But it was opposed by a numerous party in the Diet, and especially by those who were in the interest of Russia. Prussia, in consequence, abandoned the project for the present, but she still kept her eyes fixed in that direction. Meanwhile, as a war with Austria appeared imminent, Frederick William, towards the end of 1789, expressed his desire of forming an intimate connection with the Poles; and urged them to fix, as soon as possible, their form of government. In January, 1790, the Prussian Minister signified that his Court approved of all the reforms hitherto adopted by the Diet; proposed a defensive alliance, coupled with a reduction of duties on Polish commodities; and though he concealed not how much the cession of Thorn and Dantzic was desired, he did not insist upon that point, and all mention of it was omitted in the defensive treaty concluded at Warsaw, March 29th. In the treaty concluded between Prussia and the Ottoman Porte in the previous January, it had been agreed that Galicia, which had fallen to the share of Austria in the first partition of Poland in 1772, should be wrested from her; and the Cabinet of Berlin was inclined to restore this province, or, at all events, a part of it, containing the salt works of Wieliczka, to the Poles, as an equivalent for the cession of Dantzic and Thorn. But, as we have said, the majority of the Diet were averse to cede those ports, especially Dantzic, the key of the Vistula, and the subject was therefore dropped. The sixth article of the Treaty of Warsaw is the most important, as having direct reference to Russia.3 It purported that if any foreign Power whatever, in consequence of preceding acts and stipulations, should assume the right of meddling in the internal affairs of the Polish Republic, his Prus 1 Mém. Oginski, t. i. p. 34. 2 Recueil, t. v. p. 125 sqq. (2nd ed.). 3 See Koch et Schöll, Hist. des Traités, t. xiv. p. 119. The treaty is in Martens, Recueil, t. iv. p. 471. 488 POLISH CONSTITUTION OF 1791. [CHAP. LVII. sian Majesty would first employ his good offices to prevent any hostilities that might arise from such a pretension; and that if these should fail, and Poland should be attacked, he would consider himself bound to afford the assistance stipulated in the present treaty, by which it was agreed that Prussia should furnish 30,000 men. Meanwhile the framing of the new Constitution was proceeding very slowly. The ill success of the Poles in their attempts to establish their independence must in a great measure be ascribed to themselves. Some of the magnates had sold themselves unreservedly to the enemies of their country; others, who played the double game of patriots, were still more dangerous to her. Amongst the former were Branicki, the Crown General, who had married a niece of Potemkin's, and Count Rzewuski; among the latter, the most conspicuous was Felix Potocki, Marshal of Lithuania; but the King himself was included in this category. Potocki affected liberal principles, and, in common with Prince Adam Czartoryski, Malachowski, Marshal of the Diet, and many other nobles, had caused himself to be admitted a citizen of Warsaw. At length the new Constitution was promulgated May 3rd, 1791. The principal articles of it were, that the Roman Catholic faith should be the religion of the State, though dissenters were allowed the exercise of their worship, and full participation in all civil rights; the liberum veto was abolished; and, what was most important of all, the Crown was declared hereditary. The discussion of this article had been attended with great difficulties. To many of the Poles, to abandon the right of election seemed to be to sacrifice their liberties, especially as every noble might aspire to the Throne. The succession was settled, upon the death of King Stanislaus, upon Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, and, in the event of his decease without male issue, on the husband whom he might select for his daughter, with the consent of the States. Should the reigning House become extinct, then the elective right was to revert to the nation. The Elector of Saxony, however, was far from being dazzled with the splendid but precarious offer of the Polish Crown. He replied evasively, and delayed a definitive answer till April, 1792; when he gave a conditional assent, dependent on the approval of the neighbouring Courts, and on certain changes to be made in the Constitution.' The Constitution of May 3rd, and especially the article respecting 1 A résumé of it will be found in Koch and Schöll, t. xiv. p. 125, and in Oginsk, Mém. t. i. p. 130 sqq. 2 Oginski, ibid. p 140. CHAP. LVII.] MACHINATIONS OF CATHARINE II. 489 the hereditary succession of the Crown, was far from being popular. This article was carried in the Diet only by a small majority, while of sixty Dietines or provincial Diets, only ten adopted it.1 Yet the elective right had mainly contributed to nourish anarchy in Poland, and to afford the neighbouring Powers a pretence for interfering in its affairs. The Russian party, by way of thwarting the designs of Prussia on Dantzic and Thorn, had contrived to obtain the insertion of an article prohibiting, under any circumstance, the transfer of any portion of the territory or sovereign rights of Poland to a foreign Power. The Prussian Cabinet was much opposed to the new Polish Constitution. They dreaded that, as the Kingdom was to become hereditary, it might, by a marriage with the Elector's daughter, fall into the hands of a Russian or Austrian Prince, or of a small German Prince entirely dependent on Austria or Russia. But Frederick William at that time dreaded a breach with Russia, and was therefore desirous of conciliating the Poles; and he consequently both directly, and through his Ambassador, Lucchesini, announced, both at Warsaw and Dresden, his satisfaction at the happy revolution which had been accomplished. These, however, as appeared from the result, were mere perfidious compliments, on which the Poles laid too much stress. The Empress Catharine II., on the other hand, viewed the proceedings of the Poles with a displeasure which she did not attempt to conceal. Although the new Constitution substituted an hereditary for an elective monarchy, and maintained the nobility and their privileges, yet the patriot nobles, by their liberal measures, and especially by demanding the citizenship of Warsaw, seemed to adopt the doctrine of equality; and Catharine pretended to recognize in the enthusiasm and effervescence which reigned in Poland, the germ of those principles which agitated France, and menaced every throne in Europe. The altered state of things at the commencement of 1792 enabled her to wreak her vengeance on the unhappy Poles. The Courts of Berlin and Vienna were now reconciled, and jointly occupied in the war against France, while the Peace of Jassy, between Russia and the Turks, to which the English and Dutch had acceded, enabled Catharine to dispose freely of her forces. Her first plan was to occupy Poland without a participator; but from this she was 1 Essen's Bericht, ap. Hermann; Gesch. Russlands, B. vi. S. 354 ff. 2 See his letter to Count Golt, in Ségur, Règne de Fr. Guillaume II. t. iii. Pieces Justif. p. 252; and that to Stanislaus, |