10

THE GERMAN EMPIRE WEAKENED. [CHAP. XLII.

the Capitulation extorted from the Emperor Leopold, in 1658, had the same tendency, by rendering the territorial Princes less dependent on the grants of their people;' and, as this Capitulation was wrung from Leopold through the influence of France, it must be regarded as a direct consequence of the Thirty Years' War. The enhancement of the power of the Electors of Bavaria and Brandenburg by this means, is particularly striking. In Bavaria, the States, which were seldom assembled, intrusted the administration of financial matters to a committee appointed for a long term of years; with which the Elector found the transaction of business much more easy and convenient. The power of the Prince made still greater progress in Brandenburg under Frederick William, the "Great Elector." After the year 1653 the States of the Mark were no longer assembled. Their grants were replaced by an excise and a tax on provisions, which the Elector had introduced in 1641, immediately after his accession; and, as these did away with the direct taxes levied monthly and yearly, they were popular with the householders, and there was no difficulty in making them perpetual. The conduct of Frederick William in Prussia was still more arbitrary. When the sovereignty of that Duchy was finally confirmed to him by the Peace of Oliva, he put an end, though not without a hard struggle, to the authority of the Prussian States, by abrogating their right of taxation; and he signalized this act of despotic authority by the perpetual imprisonment of Rhode, Burgomaster of Könisberg, and by the execution of Colonel Von Kalkstein, another assertor of the popular rights.

But it was in the direct ratio of the increase of strength in its separate States, that the strength of the Empire as a Confederation was diminished, because the interests of its various territorial Princes were not only separate from, but frequently hostile to, those of the general Confederation and of the Emperor. The minor States, which could not hope to make themselves important and respected alone, attained that end by combining together. Hence, the Catholic and Protestant Leagues, formed under French influence soon after the Peace of Westphalia, and under the pretext of maintaining its provisions. These Leagues became still more hostile to the Imperial power, when, soon after the election of Leopold, they were united in one under the title of the Rhenish League.

It must be confessed that the personal character of the Emperor 'Menzel, Neuere Gesch. der Deutschen, B. iv. S. 324.

CHAP. XLII.]

DECLINE OF IMPERIAL AUTHORITY.

11

Leopold contributed not a little to produce this state of things. Leopold, who reigned during forty-seven years as the contemporary of Louis XIV., was in every respect the foil of the French Monarch. Hence much of the diversity in the political development of Germany and France. While the Imperial authority was being diluted by that of the German Electors and Princes, Louis was epitomizing the State into his own person. Under Leopold, the Diets, the chief bond of German Federation, lost all their importance. That of 1663, summoned on account of the Turkish War, he opened not in person; and he afterwards attended it only as a kind of visitor. He took no care to terminate its disputes on the important subject of the Capitulations of future Emperors, and permitted the Assembly to be interminable. Thus the authority and constitution of the Diet became completely changed. Henceforth neither Emperor nor Prince of the Empire appeared in it in person, and the Imperial Assembly shrank into a mere congress of ambassadors and deputies without plenipotentiary authority, who, before they could act, were obliged to apply to their principals for instructions. Business was reduced to a mere empty observance of forms and ceremonies, and a perpetual contest of the most trivial kind arose about degrees of rank and titles. Hence, from the Court and Diet, formality penetrated through all the ranks of the German people. Even in the promotion of science, literature, and art, which add so much to the grandeur of a nation by extending its moral influence, Leopold, though a more learned Prince than Louis, showed himself less judicious and efficient. Louis promoted the vernacular literature of France by every means in his power, and with such success that he rendered the French tongue the universal language of educated Europe. On the other hand, little or no Imperial patronage shone on German literature, because almost all the men of geuius were Protestants. Leopold, who, being bred up to the Church, had received a scholastic education, amused himself by inditing Latin epigrams and epistles, and by conversing in that language with the learned; while, with his courtiers and family, and in the literary assemblies which he held in his apartments in the winter, the conversation was usually in Spanish or Italian. Hence German literature was still confined in the chains of scholastic bondage.

France, after the Peace of Westphalia, presents a picture the very reverse of this. The scattered elements of political power, instead of being divided and dissipated, were concentrated in a

12

STATE OF SPAIN.

[CHAP. XLII. narrow focus, and an intense nationality was developed. The progress of France, like that of Germany, had been arrested by the consequences of the Reformation, and by the long wars of religion under the Valois. It was Henry IV. who first restored tranquillity, and prepared France to take that place in Europe to which her resources and situation called her. But with the demands for liberty of conscience had been mixed up a republican spirit, to which even Henry's own example as the leader of a faction may have contributed; and this was further nourished by the immunities which he granted to the Hugonots. It was often difficult to distinguish between those who merely desired religious freedom and those who wished to overthrow the monarchy. Richelieu subdued this dangerous faction and founded the absolute integrity of the French monarchy. Having thus secured domestic unity and strength, he turned his attention to the affairs of Europe; and by his able, but unscrupulous policy, well seconded by Mazarin, France secured, at the Peace of Westphalia, the advantages already related, which were further extended by the Peace of the Pyrenees, in 1658.

Thus, when Louis XIV. assumed the reigns of government he had only to follow the course marked out for him. Without wishing to detract from the merit of that Prince, it may be safely affirmed that the state of Europe contributed very much to facilitate his political career. It was principally the weakness of Germany, resulting from the misfortunes of the Thirty Years' War, and that of the Spanish branch of the House of Austria, which created the strength of France, and helped her to become for a while the dictator of Europe. Spain, at the Peace of Westphalia, was still, indeed, to all appearance, a great Power. She possessed Naples, Sicily, and Milan, Franche-Comté, and Flanders, besides immense territories in both the Indies. Yet this vast Empire, from the necessity it entailed of defending remote provinces connected with it by no natural tie, was a source rather of weakness than of strength. France, entrenched within her own boundaries, and with scarce a single foreign possession, was a much more formidable Power. Spain was also internally weakened through bad government, fanaticism, and bigotry. The spirit of the two neighbouring countries was entirely opposite. While France was founding a new era of progress, Spain was falling back into the middle ages. In spite of the declining condition of the kingdom, the number and the wealth of ecclesiastics increased to such a degree that, in 1636, the Cortes of Madrid, in return

CHAP. XLII.]

STATE OF ENGLAND.

13

for a grant, obtained from Philip IV. a promise that for the next six years no more religious foundations should be established yet even this limited promise appears not to have been fulfilled.1 At the same time, while most of the principal towns of Spain had lost the greater part of their trade, with a corresponding decay in their population; while whole districts were in some instances reduced almost to desolation, and the kingdom to a state of universal bankruptcy, the Court of Spain, mindful rather of its ancient grandeur than of its present misfortunes, kept up a splendour and magnificence far above its means, and opened in this way another source of poverty. Add to all these evils the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal. The annexation of Portugal during a period of sixty years had tended to revive the declining power and glory of Spain; and now she was not only deprived of this support, but the long wars which she entered into for the recovery of that kingdom also became a source of weakness to herself and of strength to her enemies.

If the condition of Germany and Spain favoured the progress of France, that of England offered no obstruction. Cromwell, who assumed the reigns of power soon after the Peace of Westphalia, flung his sword into the French scale; and the two succeeding Stuarts, the pensioners of Louis, seldom ventured to dispute his behests. It was not till the accession of William III. that England again became a considerable Power in the European system. From this time was established a new balance of power, which may be best explained by throwing a hasty glance on the origin and progress of that system.

The first well-marked symptoms of that national jealousy which ultimately produced the theory of the balance of power, may be traced to the ambition of the House of Austria, and the suspicion that it was aiming at a universal monarchy. During the reign of Charles V., such a consummation seemed no improbable event. Master of Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, a great part of Italy, besides his possessions in the Indies, that Monarch seemed to encircle the earth with his power, and to threaten the liberties of all Europe. It was natural that France, whose dominions were surrounded by those of the Emperor, should first take alarm; and hence the struggle between Charles and Francis I. recorded in the preceding volumes. But France had to maintain the struggle almost alone. She sought, indeed, allies, and her treaties with the Porte show how the ideas of religion were already beginning

1 Sempère, Hist. des Cortés, ch. xxxi.

14

THEORY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.

[CHAP. XLII. to be superseded by political ones; indeed, the subsequent alliances between Catholics and Heretics were hardly so monstrous as this between Christians and Infidels. France also sought the aid of England, and sometimes obtained it; but from about as much regard for the balance of European power as was entertained by the Turks themselves. The policy of England, then directed by the counsels of Wolsey, had for its object, as we have before attempted to show, rather the national advantage, or even sometimes the personal aggrandizement of the great Cardinal, than the establishment of a balance of power. So far from this being the case, English policy was often adverse to such a balance, and, instead of supporting France, was thrown into the scale of her gigantic adversary. Henry VIII. himself was, perhaps, more influenced by a feeling of pride at the power he could display by intervening between two such powerful sovereigns, than by any regard to a political balance. Nay, it may well be doubted whether Francis was ever actuated by any abstract ideas of that kind, and whether he was not rather governed in his hostility to Charles sometimes by ambition and the love of military glory, sometimes by the requirements of self-defence, or the cravings of unsatisfied resentment.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the rivalry between France and Austria first gave rise to the idea of a balance of power. So great was the impression of alarm created by the exorbitant power of the House of Habsburg, that even the abdication of Charles V., and its severance into two branches, could not dissipate it. Half a century after that event, Henry IV., or his minister Sully, as we have before related, formed the scheme of opposing the Theocratic Monarchy, supposed to be the object of that House, by a Christian Commonwealth, in which all the nations of Europe should be united ;' a design in which, however chimerical it may appear, we see the first formal announcement of the theory of the balance of power as a rule of European policy. After the death of Henry IV., French politics changed for a while, and a friendly feeling was even established with Spain; but on the accession of Richelieu to power, Henry's anti-Austrian policy, though not his extravagant scheme, was renewed, and was continued, as already related, by Mazarin.

We are thus brought down to the Thirty Years' War and Peace of Westphalia, which, as we have said, first in any degree practically established the European equilibrium. We mean not

See Vol. iii. p. 63.