(Descriptions of 1943 and 1944 floods are as follows:)

DESCRIPTION OF THE 1943 FLOODS

MISSOURI RIVER BASIN

1. Three successive floods ravaged the Missouri River Basin during the spring of 1943, inundating 2,260,000 acres of land along the main stem and tributaries, and inflicting calculable damages, direct and indirect, that according to latest available estimates total $65,000,000.

2. The March-April flood was caused by the rapid melting of snow on the Great Plains in the northern part of the basin, together with the formation and breaking of serious ice jams on the main stem in the general vicinity of Bismarck and above. This flood, which caused the highest stages since 1881 on the main stem from Pierre, S. Dak., to Rulo, Nebr., interrupted rail, air, and highway services, delayed production in essential industries, and inundated thousands of acres of land along the main stem and many of the tributaries, principally in North and South Dakota and Montana.

3. Two protracted periods of rainfall over the basins of the Grand, the Osage, and Gasconade Rivers, the first from May 6 to 11, and the second from May 15 to 20, caused flood stages to be exceeded from Glasgow, Mo., to the mouth of the main stem, and raised the river between the mouth of the Osage and St. Charles, Mo., to the highest general levels since 1844. The Osage River was above flood stage almost to its headwaters, and below the Bagnell Reservoir it exceeded by 5 feet the highest stages for the past 100 years. The Grand River rose to about 101⁄2 feet above flood levels and the Gasconade River exceeded flood stages by about 5 feet. Agricultural land, towns, railroads, and highways along the lower Missouri and the Osage and Gasconade suffered heavily.

4. The third flood in the basin occurred in June, following heavy rains over southeast Nebraska, southwest Iowa, northwest Missouri, and northcentral and northeast Kansas. Precipitations over this area occurring June 8, 10, 11, 15, and 16 averaged from 6 to 7 inches, and at some stations amounted to as much as 7 inches per day. The peak run-off from the rains of June 15 and 16 coincided with the arrival at Kansas City of a crest from the Yellowstone River which had been augmented by rain-swollen tributaries in the Dakotas and Nebraska. The resulting flood reached the highest levels since 1917 at St. Joseph, Mo., and generally the highest levels since 1903 from Kansas City to the mouth of the Osage River. Tributaries of the Missouri from Nebraska City, Nebr., to Boonville, Mo., were near or above flood stages for several days. The Kansas River, between Manhattan and the mouth, and the Grand River at Chillicothe, reached stages about 6 feet and 11% feet, respectively, above flood levels. Agricultural land and towns along the Missouri, Kansas, and upper Osage, and other tributaries in the lower basin suffered flood losses and again railroads and highway service was disrupted and facilities were damaged.

DESCRIPTION OF THE APRIL 1944 FLOOD

MISSOURI RIVER BASIN

1. During the period from about March 20 to 26, 1944, the flow from the spring break-up in the Yellowstone moved into the main stem of the Missouri River at the junction near the North Dakota-Montana boundary. The Missouri River was still frozen, and the water in general moved under the ice, lifting the ice cover as much as 8 to 9 feet at Williston and Bismarck. When the water reached Mobridge, on about April 5, 6, and 7, it was practically coincident with the ice break-up in that locality. This flow condition, augmented with practically bankfull flow from such tributaries as the Cannonball, Grand, Moreau, and Cheyenne, produced high stages from about Mobridge on downstream through South Dakota. 2. On April 10 and 11, and principally during the night of April 10, heavy precipitation, ranging from 1 inch to 3 inches, fell over the entire Missouri Basin below about Sioux City, Iowa. The run-off from this heavy rainfall was just right to coincide with the crest moving down from South Dakota. Then, again, just about the time the crest was nearing Kansas City, on April 21 to 22, heavy rains, as much as 1 inch to 3 inches each 24 hours, fell along the main stem from below Omaha to the mouth and in the big tributary watersheds of the Kansas, Osage, and Grand. As a result, the spring break-up, combined with the

run-off from the heavy rainfall mentioned above, with generally heavy rainfall for the entire period, produced flood conditions on the Missouri River from the Dakotas to the mouth which almost equaled, and in some places exceeded as much as 2 feet, maximum stages of 1943. In addition, flood conditions occurred on most of the tributaries from Montana to the mouth. Thus, the April 1944 flood can be considered a record flood from the standpoint of the amount of the valley flooded; furthermore, it is the only single flood of record that has produced flood stages from near the headwaters to the mouth, except for the possibility of the 1844 flood, for which few details are known.

Mr. MACLEAY. I have a telegram from the Upper Missouri River Valley Association, addressed to me, dated June 7:

Our organization urges passage of flood-control bill H. R. 4485, embodying Pick plan, without amendment unless approved by Army engineers. Similar telegrams sent to Nebraska and South Dakota Senators.

Now, this morning there was placed in the record an editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and I would like to place in the record an editorial from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat bearing on the same subject, if I may do so.

Senator OVERTON. Very well; it will be printed in the record. (Editorial from St. Louis Globe-Democrat is as follows:)

[From the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, June 3, 1944]

MISSOURI PROGRAM IS IN DANGER

The Senate's vote on Wednesday, refusing to take up the river and harbor bill, is a clear indication of the dilatory tactics the irrigation interests propose to pursue to defeat the flood control and water development program for the Missouri Valley. Congress is expected to adjourn for the summer recess about June 23 and probably will not convene again until after Labor Day.

Hearings are now in progress on the flood-control bill, which includes the Pick plan, but consideration of both the flood control and river and harbor bills are now deferred until after the Senate has disposed of the bill to extend the life of the Office of Price Administration.

The charge was made on the floor of the Senate, and not denied, that the irrigation interests intend to filibuster against the bills. With several appropriation bills still to be considered in the Senate, the irrigationists obviously believe their strategy will delay final action on the Missouri River program until after the summer recess, and possibly at this session.

This selfish strategy is an illustration of the disunity which in the past has prevented the Missouri Valley from obtaining the flood control and water development program which this basin so desperately needs. In the lower Missouri Valley States the paramount need is for flood control. The primary concern of the upper valley States is irrigation. The two objectives are not irreconcilable. The conflict lies only in the best method to achieve them.

It is not only the States in the lower Missouri Valley which have a direct interest in flood control. Much of the flood damage suffered in recent years in the Mississippi Valley between the mouth of the Missouri and the mouth of the Ohio is directly attributable to the flood waters of the Missouri.

Figures of the United States Weather Bureau show that in the last 20 years, not including 1944, there have been 244 lives lost in floods in the Missouri Valley. The property loss during this period amounted to $163,936,428, a yearly average of more than $8,000,000. During the same period, property damage on the upper Mississippi River totaled $97,383,536, or an annual average of nearly $5,000,000. Most of this loss was suffered in the stretch of the river between St. Louis and Cairo, Ill.

These figures, which do not include the loss in valuable farm land through erosion, emphasize the lower valley's urgent need for a valley-wide flood-control program. The flood waters which caused this damage did not originate in the States which are leading the fight against the Pick plan-Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota.

By building the reservoirs provided for in the Pick plan on the main stem of the Missouri River below the mouth of the Yellowstone River, supplemented by

other flood-control works in the lower valley, devastating floods could be prevented without interfering with the needs of the upper valley States for irrigation. The Army engineers have testified at the congressional hearings that as soon as these reservoirs are completed, Fort Peck Reservoir, which was constructed primarily for navigation, can be operated solely in the interest of irrigation.

If the Missouri Valley is to have flood control in the immediate future, it must be through a plan developed and controlled by existing agencies of the Government. Such a plan is the Pick plan, prepared by the Army engineers. It has the support of all the lower valley States, and with the compromise agreed to by the Army engineers, which would authorize the Bureau of Reclamation to build dams in the upper reaches of the Missouri for irrigation, it should also satisfy the interests of the upper valley States.

Mr. MACLEAY. I think everything else that I had planned to say has been covered by the other statements, particularly the point that the Fort Peck Reservoir in 1943 saved Council Bluffs and Kansas City approximately a hundred million dollars. It almost paid for itself, because the Army engineers were able to hold back enough water so as to reduce the flood heights at Kansas City 2 feet. Mayor Gage testified to that effect, and Mr. Scott had that in his paper.

The Valley Association hopes the committee will report the bill favorably and that the Senate will adopt it. We need flood-control protection now. We have needed it sadly for a long time. You see, the Missouri River is a part of a great system. If the Missouri goes in flood and hits the Mississippi when we have high water there, there is no place for the Missouri River water to go, and it backs up. If, when the Missouri floods get to the Ohio as they did in 1943, the Ohio is high because the Wabash is in flood, and the Mississippi at the junction, the confluence of the Missouri, was high because the Illinois was in flood, the whole thing spreads out all over the country.

It is the same thing that happened, the Senator will remember, in 1927. We had had high water all through that country. We had high water on the Ohio. We had high water on the Illinois. The city of Beardstown was surrounded by water for 9 months, but everything was going along in pretty good shape on the lower river. The levees were holding on the lower river, and they were in pretty fair shape until there came torrential rains along the latter part of April in the Arkansas Basin, and the Arkansas came tearing down to the Mississippi and found the full river, and we had a flood there for 300 miles that was nearly 60 miles wide. I was all over it and all around it. That is what happened out there. That is the reason we must have flood control

Senator OVERTON. I lived through it.

Mr. MACLEAY. Yes, sir; I appreciate that.

That is why we must have for flood control one central authority which has the power everywhere to say what shall be done with dif ferent works in different parts of the valley. It is one problem.

Now, we are just as much interested in the Ohio as we are in the Missouri and the Arkansas. We have worked very faithfully and worked very closely with Allan Jordan in helping to get the adoption of these various projects in the Ohio Basin, because the Ohio has a tremendous effect. In fact, I think it is really the bad boy. It is a short river, short rivers come flowing into it from the south, generally, and from the mountains, and they have flash floods, quick floods, that come down there; and every year they lose $2,000,000 or $3,000,000 in

the Ohio Basin. And then in 1937 they had a flood that cost $500,000,000. In 1936, when I was in Pittsburgh and the Golden Triangle was under water, there was $250,000,000 loss there, and it all happened inside of 4 or 5 days, and by that time there was 12 feet of water in the Roosevelt Hotel, which is right downtown in the center of the business district.

These things, gentlemen of the committee, are of vital importance; they are of tremendous importance. It is a loss of wealth to the entire country, and when a thing like this happens we lose an average out there, as we did for 20 years, of $50,000,000 a year in that midcontinent area. Fifty million dollars a year is a lot of money, and that means a loss of trade that is not included in that. That is dead, cold property loss. There is a tremendous loss of trade. There is a tremendous loss of business. And then on top of all that, in addition to the poor lives that are lost, there is the terrible loss of morale, the terrible feeling of the men who spend their lives building homes, building farms, getting property, organizing a competency for themselves and their children, and it is all washed away-washed away in 1 week, without any recourse whatever, and they are charity patients. They start out again if they can find something to start with. It is a deplorable situation, and it is one that the Army engineers can cure if they are given the authority by the Congress to do it, and they are the only body that can do it. They are the only people who should have control of the flood-control works. And I am speaking only of flood control now. That is the big problem in that entire country. It is much bigger than any other.

That is all I care to say, gentlemen.

Senator OVERTON. Just one question, Mr. Macleay. I would like to get some figures in the record, and I don't know whether you are in a position to give them or not. I may get it from the Army engineers.

How does the average annual loss from flood in the lower Missouri River compare with the average annual loss of crop production and other losses on account of drought in the other portions of the Missouri River Basin?

Mr. MACLEAY. I couldn't answer that question, but I will say this: That is, I couldn't answer it accurately, so I will not attempt to answer it. I will say this, as has been testified to here: That there are 2,500,000 acres of the finest agricultural land in America in the Missouri Basin that cannot be cultivated except occasionally, at great hazard, on account of floods. Much of that land cannot be cultivated at all; and the so-called Pick plan will reclaim for cultivation 2,500,000 acres of the finest land that lies outdoors. There isn't any finer land anywhere.

Senator OVERTON. And will reclaim it promptly.

Mr. MACLEAY. It will reclaim it immediately, and that land will be available for cultivation.

Senator OVERTON. I think the record shows that there are 4,000,000 acres that are under irrigation in the basin of the Missouri.

Mr. MACLEAY. Yes, sir. Four million, eight hundred thousand I think were the figures of the Commissioner of Reclamation. Senator OVERTON. That is right, is it, Mr. Sloan? Mr. SLOAN. It is proposed irrigation?

Mr. MACLEAY. That are already under irrigation.

Mr. SLOAN. Five million that are now irrigated.

Senator MILLIKIN. Mr. Chairman.

Senator OVERTON. All right.

Senator MILLIKIN. You do not see any necessary conflict between flood control and irrigation, do you?

Mr. MACLEAY. I see no conflict between flood control, irrigation, or navigation.

Senator MILLIKIN. No.

Mr. MACLEAY. This whole thing can be worked out by the Army engineers and the Department of Reclamation.

Senator MILLIKIN. I am just talking about flood control. You see no conflict between flood control and irrigation?

Mr. MACLEAY. There isn't any conflict between any of the uses of this water.

Senator MILLIKIN. All right. Now, when did your association last meet?

Mr. MACLEAY. October.

Senator MILLIKIN. I understood you to say that your association approved Governor Sharpe's statement.

Mr. MACLEAY. Members of our executive committee approved it. Senator MILLIKIN. What is that?

Mr. MACLEAY. Members of our executive committee approved it. Senator MILLIKIN. But not the association?

Mr. MACLEAY. Not the association as a whole; no. The association has not met as a whole body.

Senator MILLIKIN. Of course that is the point.

Mr. MACLEAY. It has been approved by members of our board. Senator MILLIKIN. Yes. And your various boards within the association?

Mr. MACLEAY. Committees. The committees.

Senator MILLIKIN. The committees within the association?

Mr. MACLEAY. Yes.

Senator MILLIKIN. They submit their findings to the association as a whole, do they not?

Mr. MACLEAY. When we meet again at our next annual meeting, then we have meetings of all of our committees, and everything is all gone over again, and our plans are set up for the ensuing year.

Senator MILLIKIN. And until there is such submission and the whole association has a chance to pass on any particular recommendation, you don't know whether it is the final recommendation of the whole association?

Mr. MACLEAY. Well, of course I couldn't say that it will be, but I have a pretty good idea because I am in very close touch with all the members of our association all over the country. I know how our people feel about this.

Senator OVERTON. I thank you very much, Mr. Macleay.

(Mr. Macleay withdrew from the committee table.)

Senator OVERTON. Now, Colonel Reber, if we have time, maybe. It is 4:30; we shall go a half hour longer if that is agreeable to you, Senator Burton.

Senator BURTON. Quite right.

Senator OVERTON. I do not want to hurry you if you don't get through.

Colonel REBER. I can finish easily, sir.