of mankind. The great body of mankind must either labour or perish. They have but little time to think, or to compare ; and without thinking or comparing, they certainly cannot form conclusions of any value. To men thus situated, it is, therefore, absolutely necessary, that they should be furnished with such truths as are fundamental and sufficient, and that they should be assured what these are beyond every reasonable doubt. But this is a work which philosophy has never accomplished, and is plainly unable to accomplish. As a source of moral instruction, therefore, it is fatally defective.

It is remarkable, that philosophers could never agree on the two greatest and most important of all moral subjects, the character of God, and the supreme good of man. The diversity of their opinions concerning them was wonderful; and the more they inquired and discoursed, the more numerous, distant, and discordant their instructions became. What, then, must have been the situation of their disciples? How perfectly must they have been at a loss concerning their whole duty, and their whole interest ? At such a loss they actually were. Perplexed, despairing altogether of arriving at truth, they followed their traditions, and left the philosopher to himself; deciding, as God has decided in the text, that the reasonings of the wise are vain.

III. Philosophy was never able to determine whether all the things necessary to salvation were known by itself, or not.

Had reason been able to discover that certain truths were fundamental, it could have never determined whether there were not other truths of the same indispensable importance and necessity, which were still hidden from its view. This also was a fatal defect. It is not enough to know what is indispensable to our salvation, unless we also know that we possess all the truths which are of this absolute importance. The ignorance of one such doctrine must, of course, be fatal to us. I speak not here of ignorance which is necessary and unavoidable, but of that which is voluntary, which flows from sloth, indifference, and neglect, from the love of error and the hatred of truth. In such ignorance, philosophy left all its votaries, and all its

disciples, and in the doubt, fear, anxiety, and despair to which such ignorance conducts every serious man; or in the apathy and licentiousness, to which it prompts the thoughtless and the sensual.

IV. Philosophers have differed endlessly, and must of course differ from each other.

Their systems have been widely diverse in almost all respects, and about almost all things. They have dissented unceasingly concerning God and religion, concerning human duty and human interests, concerning virtue and vice, concerning the divine government and moral obligation, concerning the nature of the soul, and the character and destination of man. They have contended alike about fundamental and circumstantial doctrines, about expiation and acceptance, about worship and forgiveness. Nor have infidels been, in any material degree, more harmonious than their predecessors. That this discordance is a thing of course, is proved beyond all debate, by its actual existence in all ages and nations, in all the sects of philosophy, and among the individuals of each sect. This fact unanswerably evinces, that its foundation is laid in the nature of the case, and that it is inseparable from the character and circumstances of the men. None of them confided in the doctrines of others, although each pertinaciously adhered to his own. Against each his rivals argued, and pointed the shafts of contempt and ridicule. The people at large, when they gave them any attention, disbelieved sometimes one, sometimes another, and generally all. That such must be the case might easily have been foreseen; for it was impossible that they should know who was in the right, and who was in the wrong; or whether any were right, or all were wrong. Thus they accomplished, and plainly could accomplish, nothing.

V. Philosophy is necessarily defective in evidence.

The evidence of doctrines, taught philosophically, is argument exhibited in a course of reasoning. In the case under consideration, such evidence is necessarily defective. multitude of instances, it is imperfectly discernible, even by

the philosopher himself. In subjects so extensive, complicated, and abstruse, as those involved in a moral system, it is impossible for the human mind to comprehend, with distinctness and satisfaction to itself, even a moderate part of that which it is highly important to know. Hence the philosopher himself is very frequently at a loss, unsatisfied, and wavering. The best arguments which he possesses he will undoubtedly communicate to others, not because they are sound and satisfactory even to himself, but because they are the best which he is able to devise. But these arguments, even when they appear to him clear and convincing, will, when presented to other minds, have less force than was attributed to them by his own. He, in many instances, will doubt their solidity; they will deny it.

As many, even of those which he esteems his best proofs, will appear to others feeble and futile, so this fact will lessen the force of all. When the teacher so often halts, those who are taught will almost of course believe, that he is universally lame, and will attach to him little or no credit.

In support of these observations, I refer such as think it necessary, to the doctrines of Plato and Cicero concerning subjects of religion, and to the arguments with which these distinguished men have laboured to sustain them. How few of these doctrines will now bear an examination, and how few of the arguments by which they are supported? It is ever to be remembered, that the Gentiles had no doctrines but such as theirs, and such as were worse than theirs; and no evidence to prove their truth or probability but these very arguments, and others less clear, and less conclusive.

At the same time, the people at large can never understand to any great length this kind of proof. It requires no small degree of intelligence to discern, clearly and satisfactorily, the reasonings contained in a philosophical book. Learned men are often puzzled; unlearned men know little or nothing of the subject; and at once lay it aside in despair.

Let this case be illustrated by a plain example. How few of our own uneducated countrymen would be able to comprehend the system of thought, and the arguments by which it is

supported, contained in Mr. Locke's Essay on the Understanding, or Paley's Moral Philosophy, or Bishop Butler's Analogy, or President Edwards' Treatise on the Freedom of the Will. Yet each of these books is written with far more clearness and conclusiveness than those of any ancient philosopher, and the common people of this country are incomparably more enlightened than those of Greece and Rome. Plainly, then, the writings of the ancient philosophers must have been of little or no use to the great body of their countrymen.

VI. The philosophers taught contradictory doctrines with the same confidence, earnestness, and evidence.

This was done to a great extent by the same individual, and still more by different individuals of the same sect. Most of all the different sects, while they contradicted each other endlessly, asserted their respective dogmas in the same strenuous and decisive manner, and supported them with reasonings which they professedly considered as being conclusive. Of these, a considerable number were ingenious men; and some, persons of great talents. The whole force of their ingenuity and their reputation was, in each case, added to their respective dogmas. The writer was here posted against himself. Individuals were arrayed against other individuals, and sects were embodied against other sects. The number, skill, and prowess of the combatants were, to the eye of a spectator, equal. All claimed the victory; and it was impossible for any one who surveyed the conflict, to determine where the victory lay. Accordingly, one class, or one individual, had at one time the greatest number of adherents, or at least of admirers; and another, at another. What sober man could be willing to rest his soul and his salvation on such instruction as this.

But the evil extended much farther than the account which I have here given. All these men taught truth and falsehood, sober sense and contemptible absurdity, virtue and vice, in the same system, in the same treatise, and not unfrequently on the same page. All these, also, were supported with the same ingenuity, with the same confidence, and with arguments pos

sessing apparently the same force. What, then, was to be done by those whom they taught? Was the whole to be swallowed? How loathsome, as well as obnoxious, must be the dose? Was the whole to be rejected? Of what value, then, were the instructions? Was the truth to be separated by the reader from the falsehood, and the right from the wrong? This was beyond his power. '

VII. Philosophers were totally destitute of authority.

Wherever evidence is wanting, and instructions and precepts are yet to be given, its place must be supplied by authority. In other words, the teacher must be known, or at least believed, to be so wise, so skilled in the things which are taught, as to be obeyed on account of his character. In this respect philosophy has ever been totally defective. No philosopher ever possessed such a character as to place him clearly above those by whom he was contradicted and decried. No philosopher ever possessed the character which I have mentioned above, and which is plainly indispensable for this great purpose. Many of them were generally acknowledged to be ingenious, and some of them to be learned; but not one of them was regarded as being sufficiently intelligent, sincere, and wise to be believed and obeyed on the ground of his personal reputation. Not one of them, therefore, had any decisive influence. Socrates is acknowledged to have been the wisest and best of the Greek philosophers. Yet Socrates had no material influence over the Athenians. On the contrary, they evidently regarded him as a mere projector of reformation; unauthorized; an enemy to the established religion; a proper object of public odium; and justly meriting death from the government of his country.

Nor is the authority of infidels, at the present time, on a higher scale. Mr. Hume has undoubtedly obtained as much reputation as any man of this class, and greater efforts have been made to give him a distinguished place on the roll of fame than have ever been made in behalf of any of his associates. Yet in his integrity, probably, no sober man confides. Of his wisdom no such man is satisfied, and his skill in moral