testimony might well be read by some of the members of the board in considering these cases.

Mr. FOSTER. I think so, too.

Mr. JONES. What would you mean by clear and convincing proof? That is the point. If that presumption is allowed in all cases, it becomes pretty important as to how it can be rebutted in the case of where there has been some imposition.

Mr. FOSTER. Of course that term "clear and convincing evidence," as a lawyer, Mr. Jones, you realize it is pretty hard to define. But I think it would depend on the circumstance of each case, just what is clear and convincing evidence. I do not think it should be evidence that is so flimsy that it is just drawn arbitrarily from someone's imagination, but I think it should have a sound basis in fact, and not in theory.

Mr. JONES. Do you recall any ruling of the Veterans' Administration on what is clear and convincing evidence?

Mr. FOSTER. No, sir; I do not. I am not too familiar with the rulings of the Veterans' Administration in that respect. I am a little outside of that phase of the work in the DAV, and I am not too familiar with their rulings.

Mr. JONES. That is all.

Mr. EVINS. Thank you, Mr. Foster. Thank you very kindly for your splendid testimony.

Mr. Wilson of the American Veterans is here, and we welcome you, Mr. Wilson. We are very glad to hear you. You may give your full name and your capacity with your organization and proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF RUFUS H. WILSON, ASSISTANT SERVICE

DIRECTOR OF AMVETS

Mr. WILSON. My name is Rufus H. Wilson. I am the assistant service director of AMVETS.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, AMVETS appreciate the opportunity of appearing before the committee this morning in order that we might present our views on H. R. 5891 and 5892, bills which would amend veterans' regulations to establish for certain persons who served in the Armed Forces a further presumption of serviceconnection for active psychosis.

AMVETS are in essential endorsement of H. R. 5891 which would allow a 2-year presumptive period for the service-connecting of all psychosis resulting from service in the Armed Forces of the United States. This bill would in effect amend Public Law 239 which allowed such a presumptive period for the purposes of out-patient and medical treatment only.

We have previously urged that the presumption on psychosis be extended to 3 years. However, we realize that it is very improbable that the Congress would see fit to pass such a liberal bill in view of the legislative background of Public Law 239 which was passed during the first session of this Congress.

AMVETS were extremely concerned at the action taken by the Congress in the passage of Public Law 239. Any radical departure from the historic manner of considering veterans' problems deserves the closest scrutiny and study.

In our opinion that scrutiny was not granted when this matter was considered by the Senate. The action which was taken by the Senate and subsequently agreed to by the House was a complete breaking away from the historic aspect of service-connecting presumptive disability claims. For the first time in history the Congress has seen fit to determine that certain veterans' disabilities are due to service in the Armed Forces for purposes of out-patient and hospital treatment only. The same Congress has also determined in fact that such disabilities do not make these veterans entitled to compensation.

We are aware that the House of Representatives, particularly this committee, by the original reporting and passage of H. R. 320, carried out in full the intent of the recommendations that had been made by the advocates of this proposal. We are also aware that it was the general feeling of the Members of the House of Representatives, after H. R. 320 was passed by this body last year and later amended by the Senate, that the Senate version was the only bill that stood a logical chance of passage during the closing days of the session.

However, we believe that now the Congress has had sufficient time to adequately appraise their previous action, and we are therefore very glad that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs has seen fit to give further thought to the subject. We are extremely hopeful that you will see fit to report H. R. 5891 or 5892, and we are hopeful that the House of Representatives and the Senate will see fit to pass one of these bills into law without delay.

Some time ago the Veterans' Administration was requested to make a report concerning H. R. 320 by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. The report made by the VA, in our opinion, carries an impression not in keeping with the facts; and we are of the opinion that it was very possibly this report that caused the action to be taken by the Senate concerning this matter.

In response to an inquiry by a Senate committee the VA stated:

There is nothing in the circumstances of military service in time of war which creates the presumption of fact that a delayed manifestation of a psychosis some time after discharge is in any way related to fact or circumstances of service. They further stated:

If circumstances of service so conflict with the mental make-up of an individual as to cause a psychosis, that psychosis would have become existant at that time and not many months or years after service.

I might divert here just a moment and say I completely agree with the statement made by Dr. Shapiro this morning. I think he outlined very clearly the reasons why these presumptive psychoses should be service-connected.

Mr. EVINS. Mr. Wilson, are you able to trace down who made that statement in the VA?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. The statement was signed by Major Clark, the Deputy Administrator, and was sent to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and appeared in the VA official report. Mr. EVINS. It was signed by him?

Mr. WILSON. I do not know who made it. I could probably find out. Mr. EVINS. You may proceed.

Mr. WILSON. AMVETS contend that the position taken by the Veterans' Administration was incorrect. We have had many, many experiences with veterans who have had mental break-downs and de

veloped a psychosis 3, 4, and even 5 years after service as a direct result of their period of active duty in the Armed Forces.

We have been firmly convinced for a long period of time that this mental breakdown was caused directly by the transition from a civilian life to a military life during a time of war and then a subsequent transition back to the original way of living.

There are many perfectly normal people within the United States who do not have the mental capacity or the emotional make-up to allow them to make such a drastic change without serious mental disturbances. If these disturbances are caused by military service, then the Federal Government has an obligation to recognize them as such. The files of the Veterans' Administration are replete with evidence proving that many such cases should be service-connected. In addition, the large number of World War II veterans now suffering from psychosis offer even more adequate proof of our contention of the normal rigors of military life making a substantial contribution to physical and mental breakdown.

It is true that the present law states that circumstances of service will be taken into consideration when considering a veteran's claim. It is also true that present regulations of the VĂ state that reasonable doubt in all cases will be resolved in favor of the veteran. However, despite these concessions by law and by regulations, there are thousands of cases that have been disallowed, due to the failure of veterans to have the mental capacity to effecetively prosecute their claims by making the Veterans' Administration aware of the circumstances of service. There are thousands of other cases disallowed as a result of a misinterpretation by the Veterans' Administration of the doctrine of reasonable doubt.

The Senate saw fit in its discussion of Public Law 239, prior to its amended passage, to state that many of these veterans covered would be entitled to only hospitalization and out-patient treatment at State institutions at Federal expense in the event the amended version became law.

If we were to accept the theories advanced by the Senate in their reporting of H. R. 320, this statement would very possibly be correct; but we fail to see where such a statement has anything to do with whether or not service connection should be allowed for a disability.

The fact that medical facilities in some sections of the country do not exist for the proper treatment of psychosis does not negate the responsibility of the Federal Government to recognize that a certain disability is due to a man's service when the evidence so indicates. And certainly also such a generalized statement does not remove a Federal obligation to pay compensation for disability incurred in service.

As an analogy, certainly the Congress would not say that a man should not draw compensation or receive medical treatment for a gunshot wound because there was not a hospital available for the purpose of treating him for that gunshot wound in the event such medical attention was desired and needed.

This brings up another point. In their report on H. R. 320 last year, the Veterans' Administration attempted-in our opinion, once again—to draw a wide cleavage between presumptive disabilities and

direct service-connected disabilities. By so doing, we believed they - placed into being an assumption that a presumptive case should not have equal consideration with nonpresumptive cases.

Speaking from knowledge gained from discussing these matters constantly with people who spend their lives working with veterans' problems, AMVETS completely and absolutely refute such an argument. We believe that veterans who have disabilities service connected as a result of presumption have those disabilities in fact as a result of their service.

The Congress has taken the same position on this matter many times. Chronic diseases are service connected because medical science has been unable to ascertain what causes them. AMVETS believe that the individuals on VA compensation rolls as a result of presumptive conditions have disabilities which by every measure are due to their service. Certainly it is more than coincidental that so many such cases are prevalent and certainly also the rigors of military life have more than just a passing effect on veterans who turn up several months after service with these serious afflictions.

The House of Representatives and particularly this committee has had this matter under consideration for several sessions, culminating in your report of H. R. 320 during the first session of this Congress. AMVETS believe that you have ample testimony and evidence before you to convince you of the merits of this legislation. We therefore ask that you reenunciate the philosophy you originally expressed in the House version of H. R. 320 and immediately take action to report

H. R. 5891.

Mr. EVINS. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, for your very excellent statement. I think that is a splendid statement which you have given the committee. Of course you favor the 3-year presumptive period?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. But as I explained in my statement, in view of the action taken by the Senate, I believe it is highly improbable that they would go along with a 3-year presumptive.

Mr. EVINS. You made a very excellent statement on page 3, that there are many perfectly normal people within the United States who do not have the mental capacity or the emotional make-up to allow them to make such a drastic change without serious mental disturbances. And based upon your experiences, you say these develop 3, 4, and 5 years after being discharged from the service.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. Similar to the Disabled American Veterans and the other organizations, we have service officers throughout the country who constantly send cases to us to be presented to the Board of Veterans' Appeals or to the central office of the Veterans' Administration.

We constantly run across cases of that nature where these people people come home from the service; they have been through every bit of the war that any man could possibly take; and they get a job and they last 6 months, and they get another job and they last 6 months.

Just as Dr. Shapiro stated, these people do not like to complain about any mental disturbances they might have. Certainly their folks try to shield them from any such conditions. And as a result, by the time their condition is finally diagnosed, it is far past a 1-year presumptive now allowable by Veterans' Administration regulations, and the man is just out in the cold unless he can definitely prove that his condition is service-connected.

Incidentally, along that line, Mr. Evins, AMVETS would certainly have no objection if a rebuttable presumption was put in the law. We were not at all in agreement with the regulation that came out pursuant to Public Law 239, although I understand it was necessary.

Certainly we think if a man has a condition that is caused by misconduct, an automobile accident, or something else that might cause psychosis, we do not believe that he should be placed on serviceconnected rolls.

Mr. EVINS. You probably have put your finger on the difficulty when you made those quotations that were made to the Senate.

Mr. Devereux, any questions?

Mr. DEVEREUX. No; I have no questions.

Mr. EVINS. Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. I think Mr. Wilson's statement is very clear and a good strong argument for this law. The 2-year period would be satisfactory, though, to your organization, the 2-year presumption? Mr. WILSON. Not satisfactory, sir, but acceptable.

Mr. JONES. That is easing up to it anyhow. That is all I care to ask. Mr. EVINS. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Thank you very kindly for your statement.

Are there any other witnesses who have signified a desire to testify? If not, I think the committee will have a brief executive session. (Thereupon, at 11:22 a. m., the committee proceeded to other business.)

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