ANTILYNCHING AND PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1950 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3 OF THE The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p. m., Hon. William T. Byrne (chairman) presiding. Mr. BYRNE. We are ready to start the hearing now. I believe our first witness this afternoon is Dr. Griffith of New York. You may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF DR. H. M. GRIFFITH, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, INC., NEW YORK, N. Y. Dr. GRIFFITH. Gentlemen of the committee, the National Economic Council, an organization including a representative cross section of the American public on a national scale, is opposed to enactment of this or similar legislation, and urges you to reject it. This was prepared, Mr. Chairman, particularly with reference to H. R. 4682. In spite of the fact that this legislation appears to be an effort to further humanitarian purposes, we believe that, if enacted, it should and would be held unconstitutional, not only as to the letter of the Constitution but also as repugnant to our whole governmental system and subversive of the very liberties which it professes to secure. This legislation would be an attempted Federal invasion of rights belonging only to the States and local communities as well as matters not in our fundamental law within the power of any branch of Government, whether Federal, State, or local. As the distinguished members of this committee know, the powers of the Federal Government are delegated and limited. Only that which is given it in the Constitution, or is found by necessary implication, belongs to the Federal power. Insofar as any of the objects sought to be gained by this bill are within the province of any legislative body, they clearly are not within the province of the Congress. They relate to the general police power reserved to the several States and in certain respects, in differing measure, delegated to the local communities by the States. But there are fundamental rights of the citizen which, since they exist prior to and independent of any government, are not susceptible to the power of any officeholder or combination of officeholders, however, associated. Against the exercise of these basic rights any legislation, no matter how enacted or by whom, is and must remain a nullity. It is not binding upon the citizen and it is his duty to ignore it. In spite of its professed concern for "civil rights," this bill would arbitrarily attempt to quench certain of these unalienable rights. It is, for example, an unalienable right of a free man to choose his own associates and associations. Likewise, combinations of free men possess the right to select their own associates and associations. This necessarily involves choice. And to say that it involves choice is simply another way of saying that it involves discrimination. This word "discrimination," so smeared and ridiculed as antisocial and somehow immoral, is at the very foundation of all free life. If my companions and associates are to be chosen for me by others, even by legislators, then I am not a freeman. But, if I am to select them for myself, I must as a matter of course discriminate between those with whom I wish to associate and those with whom I do not wish to associate. Whatever reason I have for my discrimination belongs to me alone, and cannot be rightly questioned by anybody, whether Congressmen, members of a State legislature, or village selectmen. The idea that there is a "freedom not to be discriminated against" is both a distortion of the idea of freedom of association and plain hokum. Every one of us discriminates against somebody and in favor of somebody else every hour of every day, nor could civilized life go on without the exercise of such discrimination. Yet, because it takes place in the external world, it can be called "social," and such legislation as this proposes to abolish it. The moment it is abolished, that moment, in the name of "civil liberties," you have embraced the philosophy of totalitarianism and chosen to live with it. Another facet of unalienable freedom is the exercise of one's own religious faith. This right is not conferred upon us by any political instrument, even the Constitution. It is a right given to each man by God, and for which the individual is accountable to nobody, save to God alone. To say that he is accountable to government of any kind is to say that a man is not religiously free. Now, the whole pattern of thought implicit in so-called civil-rights legislation is repugnant to and destructive of this basic religious freedom. It is found most clearly of all in so-called FEPC legislation, but it is interwoven in this proposed legislation as well. And it is thoroughly bad. No matter what religion I profess, it is my right to believe and practice it in my daily life. It happens that I am a Protestant Christian, but if I held any other faith my right to practice what it enjoins would be the same. It is a part of my religious faith, and also an ingredient of my religious freedom, to believe that profession and practice of the Christian faith make a man better than he would be without such faith and practice. If this were not so, there would be no point in thinking the Christian religion desirable or in urging others to embrace it. This being the case, I have a perfect right, in my daily life, to act upon my belief, and to prefer association socially and in business with those who profess the same faith. · If I am an employer, I have a right, which no government can take away, to prefer Christian employees as more trustworthy, and to employ them, exclusively if I will. Or, I have a right, if I choose, to employ none but Jews, or none but Negroes. The attempt to brand such a course of action "antisocial" and "bigoted" is an attempt to destroy my own freedom with meretricious and meaningless slogans. On the other hand, if I think that profession and practice of some other religion than my own renders someone else less trustworthy, then I have a perfect right, which no legislature or court can touch, not to employ such person. Of course, that is discrimination based upon religion. As a matter of fact, any man may be wrong about the actual effect of his own religion. It may make men worse rather than better. But that is the concern of nobody else. The point is, the so-called "right" not to be discriminated against because of one's religion is not a right, does not exist, and cannot be made into a right by legislation. Erecting it into a "right" by the legislative process can only be a pretended and attempted interference with the free exercise of my own religion, which is a right. And, if the assumption of power by any government or branch of government to tell me that I cannot discriminate in social and business associations according to the tenets of my religious faith is once conceded, then the substance of religious liberty is gone. The attempt to give the form of law to a Federal invasion of an area prohibited to it, and of other areas in which no legislation by any governmental power is competent, can be viewed as nothing less than a deliberate effort to destroy our Federal-State constitutional balance and our fundamental freedom in the interest of a unitary, monolithic state with supreme powers over all life, unchecked by constitutional limitations. When viewed in conjunction with other legislation of the same general character, the intention is obvious. This is not to say that everyone who proposes, supports, or votes for such measures as this intends the destruction of our balanced system of government and our individual freedom. Many sincere, well-meaning persons support such legislation merely because they believe in the nobility of its professed objective. They do not see the real nature of what is proposed or the inevitable, tragic results that must follow. Yet, such good intent is no argument for the legislation; its evil nature and its inexorably evil effects are and will be unaffected by the good will of sincere people who mistakenly support it. This legislation is unnecessary. The Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the several States, together with legislative enactments already existing thereunder, are adequate to protect exercise of the unquestioned civil rights belonging to every American. In any cases of bona fide denial of civil rights the fault is not with the law, but with its enforcement. Yet, the way to secure enforcement of a good law is not to enact a bad law. As a matter of practical procedure, enactment of this legislation would make enforcement of presently existing but inadequately enforced good laws almost impossible. The way in which good but unenforced laws may be made effective is by the slow and patient process of making them acceptable to the conscience of the community in which they are to be enforced. The whole history of law is a demonstration of this elementary principle. If the community is not ready for enforcement, then coercion will not make it more ready, but rather the opposite. It is strange that so many could so soon have forgotten the attempt to coerce what was once described as "an experiment noble in purpose." If the cry for full and lawful civil rights for everybody is sincere, then why embrace a course of action which, by alienating millions will cause bitterness instead of concord, disruption and violence instead of mutual respect and friendship? Respect and friendship must in their nature be won patiently and sometimes only by slow degrees; they cannot be forced, and the attempt to force some people to love other people may only result in both groups hating each other. Situations such as this are not new in American life. A hundred or more years ago numbers of groups such as the Irish-were subject to severe social and economic disabilities, some of which even led to rioting, arson, and bloodshed. If the type of legislation now being considered had been adopted then, in all human probability the condition would still be festering in American life. But since nobody then proposed such solutions as are now proposed, the passage of time did its work; mutual respect was attained, and those groups have either disappeared as groups or are almost entirely integrated into the American community. In the case of the Negro race, because of the peculiar historical background, the process may take longer. It may not result in an interbred race, and there is no reason to hope that it should. But enactment of such legislation as this is bound to set the clock of understanding back, not advance it. We are not bound to enact this or similar legislation by virtue of any international agreements. In the text of this bill, as well as in other similar bills, it is represented that because the United States has ratified the UN Charter this country is now in a different position with regard to the civil liberties of those within its borders than it was before such ratification. The same is implied of the so-called "universal declaration of human rights" of the UN. The implication, though not expressly stated, seems to be that we are now bound, under article VI of the Constitution, to consider the UN Charter and UN declarations as having the force of treaties and as being as much the supreme law of the land as the Constitution itself. It is difficult to see how anyone learned in the law could fall into such egregious error. Quite apart from the actual content of either the UN Charter or the UN declaration, no treaty can amend the Constitution; and, while treaties have the force of law as do Federal statutes in relation to State constitutions and laws, treaties, like laws of Congress, are nugatory insofar as they run contrary to the Constitution. In other words, the Constitution cannot be amended by the device of treaty-making. So that if the provisions of the present bill are unconstitutional, as I think they are, not even a hundred treaties could give them validity. If, for example, the United States should conclude a treaty with a foreign nation providing, inter alia, that the right of protection of citizens against unlawful search and seizure should be suspended for 10 years, such a treaty would be void in the United States as against the constitutional guarantee. Mr. DENTON. What do you say about the Migratory Bird case? That was enacted under a statute after treaty with Canada to protect migratory birds. Dr. GRIFFITH. I am sorry; I didn't get your point. |