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JAY'S TREATY.

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a commission. Three boards of commissioners were named, one, as stated, to estimate the loss sustained by United States citizens in consequence of these irregular captures; a second to determine the losses suffered by British subjects owing to legal impediments in the collection of debts due previous to the revolution, the sum so awarded to be paid by the federal government; the third to determine what river should be constituted as the Saint Croix, named as the north-eastern boundary, to which allusion has previously been made.*

As there was now no ground for withholding the western posts, it was agreed that they should be surrendered on the 1st of June, 1796; the residents in the neighbourhood to have the choice of removing with the garrisons or to become United States citizens. The retention of the western posts had been a great source of complaint, especially with politicians of the republican party, for to the fact of their possession by the British troops they had attributed the hostility of the north-western Indians. The extent to which their own people were the aggressors, in sending surveyors north of the Ohio and taking possession of Indian lands without right, leave, or offer of compensation, never seems to have crossed the minds of United States politicians. The fact is worthy of comment, that peace was obtained owing to Wayne's victory of the 20th of August, ten months before the posts were given over.

It was agreed that there should be a reciprocity of inland trade and intercourse, including the common navigation of the Mississippi; British vessels to be admitted into American harbours to the highest port of entry. The territories of the Hudson's Bay Company were not included. United States vessels were not admitted to the harbours of the North American colonies. The fact of being an alien was not to prevent the possession of land in either country. In the case of war, there was to be no confiscation of debts or of public or private stocks held in either country.

The subject which it was found impossible to accommodate * [Ante., p. 156.]

was that of impressment. Great Britain engaged in the struggle with France would not agree to renounce this right to man her fleet. The modern conception of sea power now recognized, which we Owe to a United States writer,* will make the view then taken by Great Britain more intelligible. The only security to United States seamen was renunciation of the right of impressment on a vessel carrying the United States flag. But this proviso would have increased the difficulty. There was a great number of British seamen in the United States marine, and such seamen as were desirous of avoiding service in the navy would have sought this protection. Jay argued that naturalized citizens had the same rights as those native born. In England, it was argued no one had the right to renounce his allegiance or withdraw himself from the service of his country. Jay found it impossible to obtain concessions on this point, and was too able a statesman to risk the treaty by perseverance in a demand which he saw, perhaps felt, could not be conceded. He also failed in obtaining an equal participation in the West India trade. Great Britain declined to depart from her commercial system except by onerous concessions that Jay could not grant.

Conditions were entered into for governing the action of privateers; for determining what was contraband; and for establishing the laws by which they should be governed; the privileges they should possess in entering the port of either nation; and the shelter they should obtain for themselves and their prizes. No foreign enlistment was to be allowed by either nation for service in a war in which that nation was neutral and the other nation engaged. Any person charged with murder or forgery, on both sides, was to be extradited.

Nothing in Washington's career more redounds to the establishment of his character for prudence and statesmanship than the conclusion of this celebrated treaty. There could

*The two works of captain Mahon, of the U. S. navy: "The influence of Sea Power upon history,' "The influence of Sea Power upon the French revolution and empire."

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MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

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be no misunderstanding as to the direction in which the country was drifting. Madison was endeavouring, by his own feeling of hostility to England, to awaken a sense of wrong with regard to every proceeding of Great Britain and to lead the United States to embark in the contest on the side of France. In this view he was urged on by the dishonest, remorseless complicity of Jefferson, actuated on one side by his leanings to France; on the other, by his pursuit of official power. His whole effort was to discredit the administration of Washington, and to carry the popular vote by the worst of pandering to the passions that he had been active in awakening. The treaty created in favour of the government the most powerful impression with all who were representatives of intelligence and property. As might have been looked for, Jay's efforts were met by a torrent of vituperation. At no time in the history of the United States has political opposition been so bitter, so continued and so unscrupulous. Every possible device was imagined to prevent the ratification of the treaty. Even after the senate, by a vote of twenty to ten, which was the exact twothirds majority, had advised the ratification,* meetings were held to petition the president against its acceptance. The proceedings were characterized by a most energetic virulence of spirit. No effort was spared to awaken antagonism against all connected with England. This agitation was not, however, to remain unopposed. Very strong feeling was called forth on the part of those who thought otherwise. Meetings were held in every state to sustain the president in his policy. They were attended by an overwhelming majority of the classes who represented the industry, the intelligence and the patriotism of the country, and who had anything to lose by war and tumult and political confusion.

In 1796, when the treaty was of representatives, the virulent Washington had then ratified it.

communicated to the house opposition was continued. It is not my duty to enter

into this passage of United States history. There is little to tempt any writer, whatever his nationality, to follow the proceedings, except in the interest of truth, and from the necessity of unshrinkingly placing on record the events of the time. The feeling with the opponents of the government was that the house of representatives might prevent the treaty being carried into effect by refusing the necessary supplies. Finally, the resolution that it was expedient to pass the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect was voted by fifty-one to forty-eight. Even at this early date it was a question of north and south. Only four New England members voted against the treaty. South of the Potomac only four voted for it. Three of the New England members were supporters of Mr. Samuel Adams, the revolutionary agitator, then governor of Massachusetts. Few governors ever received so pointed a rebuff. He saw fit to send a message describing the treaty as "pregnant of evil," and suggested amendments in the constitution, giving additional power to the house of representatives. The senate voted that it would be an interference with the power entrusted to the central government, for the state legislatures to decide on the British treaty. The lower house, by a large majority, counselled a respectful submission on the part of the people to the constituted authorities.

To my mind, it has been necessary to give this brief history of this famous treaty, for it was the first in the many that followed in the establishment of the commercial relations between the two countries. Not simply from the effect it had upon the international connections which came into operation, but that we may know the extent to which pure political feeling can be enlisted in the determination of questions entirely out of its domain. In the struggle for political power and amid the promptings of personal ambition we can never hope that it will be otherwise. It will ever be found that, with men urged onwards by party combinations and their own private interest, the most aggressive and skilfully organized opposition to a measure of

1796]

FACTIOUS OPPOSITION.

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beneficence is to be experienced. This consequence, however, brings with it its retribution, for it forcibly directs attention to the principle at stake and the merits of the point involved. It is then the contrary sentiments of patriotism and duty are called into activity, and the country becomes awakened to the possible results attendant on the mischievous energy of a faction conducting a remorseless, unscrupulous opposition. It is a constantly recurring experience to be undergone in constitutional governments. The effort is by force of numbers to blight the influence of reason, justice and truth. The only remedy is to give political education to these numbers, so that they may not be misled by dishonest declamation and tricky cunning and special ingenuity, but may learn to discern that pure gold is not identical with the tinsel and spurious metal that they are asked to accept as its substitute. It is now well understood that the success of any dishonest agitator is dependent upon the ignorance or want of reason of the audience that he is striving to influence.