ed on the carnal or fleshy nature, it produces nothing better than briars and thorns.

Should it be said, that this garden was a literal garden, that the tree of life was a literal tree, and that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was also literal; I should be glad to be informed, what evidence can be educed in support of such an idea. Where is the garden now? Where is the tree of life now? Where is the tree of knowledge of good and evil now? Are those trees now growing on the earth as literal trees? We are not informed, in the scripture, that this garden was carried off to heaven, or that either of those trees was removed. It is written, that God drove the man whom he had made out of the garden, and placed cherubims and a flaming sword at the east of the garden, to prevent the man from approaching the tree of life. If the garden were literal, why could not Adam have gone into it on the north, south, or west side? But the east is the birth-place of light, and the cherubims and the flaming sword represent the law with its executive authority, which produces guilt or condemnation in the mind, and which is the death Adam died on the very day of transgression.

The path-way of understanding is now open and clear. God saw fit, in his plan of divine wisdom, to make the creature subject to vanity; to give him a mortal constitution; to fix in his nature those faculties which would, in their operation, oppose the spirit of the heavenly nature. It is, therefore, said, that God put enmity between the seed of the woman, and that of the serpent. And it was by the passions which arose from the fleshy nature, that the whole mind became carnal, and man was captivated thereby. But perhaps the objector will say, this denies the liberty of the will, and makes God the author of

sin. To which I reply, desiring the reader to recollect what I have said of sin in showing its nature; by which it is discovered, that God may be the innocent and holy cause of that, which, in a limited sense, is sin; but as it respects the meaning of God, it is intended for good. It is not casting any disagreeable reflections on the Almighty, to say he determined all things for good; and to believe he supercedes all the affairs of the universe, not excepting sin, is a million times more to the honor of God than to believe he cannot, or that he does not when he can. The reader will then ask, if God must be considered as the first, the holy, and the innocent cause of sin, is there any unholy or impure causes? I answer, there is, but in a limited sense. There is no divine holiness in any fleshly or carnal exercise; there is no holiness nor purity in all the deceptions ever experienced by imperfect beings; and these are the immediate causes of sin; and as such, they make the best of men on earth groan, and cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?"

If

If it should be granted, that sin will finally terminate for good, in the moral system, it will then be necessary to admit that God is its first cause, or we cannot say that God is the author of all good. we say, that sin is not for the good of God's system, but is a damage, we must also say that God would have prevented its taking place, if it had been in his power; if it were not in his power, he is not Almighty; neither can we say he is Supreme in an unlimited sense, as he was not superior to the causes which produced sin. But, to say, that God is the author of sin, says the reader, sounds very badly, let you put what coloring you please upon it; and if I believed it, I should not dare to say it.

Well, what shall I say, in order to please? Say the Devil was the author of sin. But did the Devil make himself? No; God made him an holy angel, and he made himself a devil, by transgression. Well, God made an angel, and that angel made a devil of himself, or any thing else, proves that God was the first cause as directly as any thing which I have argued. The objector will further say, that that angel was made a moral agent, and therefore ought to be considered the author of his own sin. But I say, in reply, that if God produced an agency, and that agency produced sin, it argues that God is the first cause, and agency the second and effective cause. If this mode of reasoning be faulted, I ask, is not God the origin and cause of all moral righteousness? None can be perverse enough to say no; then I ask, again, If moral agency, created by God, be not the original cause of moral righteousness, by what rule of reasoning can it be made the original cause of transgression? But I have before refuted the notion about this sinning angel. I now call the attention of the reader to man, which is our proper study; and attend to the objection as it respects the liberty of the will. But, in the first place, for the sake of the argument, I will consent to any liberty of the will which is contended for; and then ask, what was the cause of man's having liberty of will? My opponent must allow it was God. Well, if God produced a liberty of will in man, and that liberty of will produced sin, is there any great difficulty in seeing, that that is making God the original cause of sin, in every sense in which I have argued it? What would the objector wish to be understood to mean, by will? If it be any thing more or less than choice, I am at a loss about it. If it be choice, then what we have to look into, is the liberty of

choice. In order for choice to take place, the mind must have perceptions of two, or more objects; and that object which has the most influence on the judgment and passions, will be the chosen object; and choice, in this instance, has not even the shadow of liberty. None will be vain enough to say, that will, or choice, has any liberty before it exists, and choice does not exist until an object is chosen; and to say, choice has liberty to refuse an object after it is chosen, is using violence on terms. And the same will be the conclusion if we take the word will. A person is invited, by two friends, to make them a visit the same afternoon, at their respective houses; he wishes to visit both but cannot at the same time. In this circumstance, honored with both their invitations, he feels at a real loss what answer to make; both insist on his compliance, with equal earnestness, and with equal influence on his judgment and passions, he still remains without a determination. To end the affair, one of his friends says, I will go with you, this afternoon, and visit our friend, if you and he will return the visit next week. This decides in the mind of him who was first invited, as the other consents to the proposal. Now, choice, or will, is in favor of visiting, according to the last proposal made. Until the man willed to go, the will to go did not exist; it could have no liberty before it did exist; and after it did, to say, that that will which was to go one way, was at liberty to go the other, is using the violence before mentioned. It is then evident, that will, or choice, has no possible liberty. The objector will now move his position, and say, it is the mind that has this liberty to choose, or not choose ; to will, or not will. In order to determine this matter justly, I first ask, does the power of choos

ing exist in the mind, or in the object chosen? If it be answered, that the power of choice is in the mind, and not in the object which influences the mind, the man who was at a loss to determine which of his friends to visit, while the objects were in equal force on his mind, was entirely ignorant of it; and admitting it was so, it might as well have been otherwise, for the power of choosing in his mind, did him no good; he was after all, dependent on a certain circumstance, which, being attached to one object, made it preferable to the other.-Again, admitting the power of choice to be attributed to the mind, and not to the object which gives perceptions to the mind and influences it, it must be as easy for the mind to chose a minor, as a major object. It will be granted, on all sides, that persons may choose an object in preference to another, which is not half so valuable; but this is always in consequence of error in judgment. Now it is as objects appear to the mind, that we ought to consider them in our present query. Supposing a poor man, who has a wife and some hungry children to feed, is offered a dollar or a guinea, for a day's work; he does not know the value of either, not being acquainted with money, or its value, or the nature of the metals which are stamped with value. He consults, or means to consult the good of those for whom he is willing to labor, and would if possible receive that which would do the most towards removing their wants; and says to himself, the dollar is much the largest, and the probability is, it is worth three times as much as the guinea; it is finally his opinion that that is the case. Now I ask in relation to my argument, which of those pieces of money will he be most likely to choose? The answer is, the dollar. But I ask, why? If his mind be