EFFECT ON OUR MERCHANT MARINE

There is no doubt that cash and carry like any other form of embargoes would cripple the American merchant marine the moment war breaks out between important nations. Then on top of that, if after the war we should have to fight, let us say the victor, without a merchant fleet and with cash and carry applied to us by neutrals, we might have to pay a dear price for this nonsensical legislation we can now dispose of here in committee.

Now "cash and carry" applied to us, while blockaded from overseas, would prevent neutral shipping from serving us. Since our Navy is not equipped to operate far from our shores, to carry the war to the enemy overseas by reason of its lack of bases in Europe and of effective bases or allies in Asiatic waters, "cash and carry" is still not desirable.

IT IS NO SOLUTION

There is still another aspect of cash and carry in that it would not serve to keep us out of war. There is not a single effect it could have in the future that would not be a repetition of what happened from August 1914 to October 1915 when the Anglo-French loan was put on the market.

For in 1914 all but an insignificant part of our exports to belligerents was carried in foreign bottoms. We had hardly any ships of our own at the time. Moreover, until the Anglo-French loan all were paid for by cash. Therefore the Allies who had command of the seas got our goods while their command there prevented the Germans from getting those goods. That condition being blamed for involving us in war, a law which does not alter those conditions can hardly be an effective one if its purpose is solely to keep us out of war.

So that once again the outbreak of war abroad would in a few months create a war industry until the credits owned in this country by foreign nations or their nationals shall have been exhausted. Then we would be faced with the necessity for repeal of the ban on foreign loans or sacrifice our industry. Let us not say with assurance what we would do or not do in such event.

But should our choice at that point be to sacrifice the law and not our economic stability, the repeal, refusal to enforce, or lax enforcement of a neutrality law, in wartime, would be far more serious breach of real neutrality than would be a failure to pass such a law in advance in peacetime.

So let us deal with an assumption that underlies the entire warp and woof of the legislation before us. For we do assume that there will and can be no change in the world disposition or balance of power that can affect this country; either its security or its standard of living.

We are all aware that there is a movement abroad contemplating a redistribution of colonies. Such redistribution may conceivably be made and effect a change in control of certain places in the world which might seriously affect our obtaining our indispensable imports and the selling of the goods we would have to sell to pay for those imports.

Were we to compound the difficulties we might have in carrying that trade ourselves by establishing a cash-and-carry precedent that would justify neutrals in yielding to enemy pressure to apply the same rules to us, gentlemen, the curses of your own sons would be upon you and your memories if you do not kill this bill.

Now, if these neutrality laws do not really insulate against the possibilities of our getting into war, if they are a delusion and a snare, if they lull the people into a false sense of security against war, that is bound to have as concomitant relaxing of the zeal for preparedness against war that is necessary, it is vicious legislation. It is a kind of humbuggery on a par with the eighteenth amendment, and hanging as traitors would be too good for its proponents. Personally I would rather be sure than sorry and avoid rushing in where prudent men must be wary of treading.

Hon. SAM D. MCREYNOLDS,

EDMOND WEIL, INC.,

New York, February 25, 1937.

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. MCREYNOLDS: Since I had the honor of appearing before your committee, I have seen a copy of the neutrality bill reported, and I would

greatly appreciate it if you would permit me to extend the remarks presented to the committee in my formal statement, to the following effects:

"The provision in the House bill to prohibit the entering into, or departure from, our ports of belligerent submarines or armed merchant vessels is another principle which can only react to our disadvantage. For if our submarines are to operate effectively against enemy shipping, they must do so in their (European or Asiatic) waters. However, as we have no effective overseas naval bases, particularly in Europe, this provision applied to us would simply hamper us without hindering nations which have naval bases all over the world. Moreover, it will not prevent some nations from carrying on an effective submarine campaign over here in our own waters since some of them have naval bases in our own hemisphere. Let us not forget that we have submarines. They are an important part of our Navy; we have as many of them as almost any other nation in the world.

"As to merchant vessels, why should we deprive them of a right to enter our ports armed since that is the only way they can dare to cross an ocean infested with submarines which sink without warning? This provision is evidently only a devious provision in effect to impose complete isolation on us, contrary to our traditional grand strategy, for no foreign ships would dare to cross the ocean even to pay 'cash and carry' if they cannot protect themselves. This is all the more obvious since the provision only applies to merchant ships but paradoxically enough does not exclude ships which are actually men-of-war. "If we were ever to fight Japan with its superb submarine bases in the western Pacific, the Bonins, Marshalls and Carolines, how could our unarmed merchant boats ever hope to get over and back safely if other nations apply these same rules to us?"

Very respectfully,

CHARLES A. WEIL.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now hear from Dr. Wright.

Mrs. ROGERS. May I ask the Captain a question-if he does not approve of building up our merchant marine as much as possible? Mr. Izac. Absolutely.

STATEMENT OF QUINCY WRIGHT, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO, ILL.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name?

Mr. WRIGHT. Quincy Wright, professor of international law at the University of Chicago, and I am speaking as an expert on international law. In 1921, at the time of the Washington Peace Conference, I acted as adviser on international law for the Navy Depart

ment.

I have here a document which I prepared in consultation with Prof. J. T. Shotwell and Walter Laves entitled "A Constructive Neutrality Policy." I speak in behalf of this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you many copies of the document?

Mr. WRIGHT. I think I have sufficient copies to provide one for each member.

Mr. TINKHAM. Of course, you are an internationalist and you believe in the League of Nations.

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes; I think we should have joined it under certain conditions.

Mr. TINKHAM. That is what I understood.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Doctor, we will be glad to hear you. Mr. WRIGHT. This document sets forth the reasons why I am against mandatory legislation and why I favor discretionary legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to hear you, Doctor. You are somewhat in agreement with my sentiments about the matter.

Mr. TINKHAM. Not with mine, though.

Mr. WRIGHT. I don't wish to repeat what is in the document, but I should like to expand a little on the general philosophy back of it. I do not know whether this should be called neutrality legislation or something else; but it seems to me we should have in mind three objectives. I think we should have a policy which avoids war, which discourages war, and which meets our responsibilities under treaties and under international law. It is with those three objectives in view that this pamphlet was drawn up.

Now, with regard to the first of those points, the avoidance of war; I am not in agreement with those that think we become entangled in wars primarily because of commercial interest. I don't believe it is a correct historical analysis to hold that the bankers and munitions makers got us entangled in the World War. There may be some industrial or financial interests that prosper by war, but I don't believe they exert a decisive influence.

I think, however, in case of a general war involving the great powers of Europe, we cannot deny that there is serious danger of us becoming involved. There have been three great wars since the Declaration of Independence, the Revolution, of which we were the instigators; the Napoleonic wars, in which we became involved in 1798 against France, and then on the side of France against England in 1812; and there was the World War. If there had been other wars involving sea powers we would probably have been involved. There was the Crimean War far away, Bismarck's and Cavour's continental wars, and the Russo-Japanese War, which we assisted in stopping. The only wars which have occurred since we were a Nation and which involved the great powers are those I have referred to. Thus, looking at the matter historically, I think we have to realize the serious danger of becoming involved in general European wars. Now the main factor which leads to our participation, in my opinion, is the natural evolution of public opinion in a neutral country. A negative policy is one the population is less and less inclined to abide by as it suffers humiliations from the belligerents. The only positive thing a neutral can do is to get into the war, and that is what it is likely to do. That is one factor. There is another. We like to think in this country that we are outside the balance of power. When a serious emergency arises, however, very few really think that. For instance, it occurs to us that if one nation should become dominant over all of Europe it would affect our interests. It occurs to us that if Great Britain should be defeated and her Empire divided it would affect our interests. So, in the presence of a general European war we realize that its results are of interest to us and we act accordingly.

My suggestion with respect to avoiding war is this: In the first place, we should regulate those interests which may profit by our going into a war. I have minimized the influence of the financiers and the munition makers, but I think they constitute an interest which should be regulated. If we want to eliminate their influence toward war, the embargo on loans and arms and munitions should apply before the war starts. I think the President should determine when the problems of war and peace have reached such a grave point that consultation among the states is necessary and that at that point the embargoes should be proclaimed.

Mrs. ROGERS. May I interrupt? Do you think that applies to civil wars as in Spain?

Mr. WRIGHT. That situation is a little different, but I think the

same principle applies.

Mr. TINKHAM. If we go into a war there are, and we take one side, against the other.

of course, two sides.

Mr. WRIGHT. My theory is we should observe the treaties which we have accepted.

Mr. SHANLEY. Does that mean the League of Nations under the pact of Paris?

Mr. WRIGHT. That is what it would amount to. I think we should consult with other states when the peace of the world is threatened and if war breaks out should attempt to determine which side is the aggressor or, to use the language of the treaty, has had "recourse to war."

Mr. TINKHAM. In other words, you are not in favor of maintaining the status quo. In other words, guarantee Great Britain's Empire. That is what it amounts to.

Mr. WRIGHT. We should maintain the status quo only against violent changes.

Mr. TINKHAM. In the world as a whole?

Mr. WRIGHT. I should rather put it this way, that we should discourage war. We have agreed in the pact of Paris that we "condemn recourse to war and renounce war as an instrument of national policy." If that amounts to anything, it means no state a party to that pact is entitled to have recourse to war.

Mr. TINKHAM. You know that pact is just an idle gesture and is a nullity.

Mr. WRIGHT. It has been violated several times. The question is very pertinent whether we should affix our signature to a treaty designed to avoid war and then allow it to become a scrap of paper.

Mr. TINKHAM. If you will allow me to state, I was the only one in Washington that predicted that would happen.

Mr. IzAC. Say we are the big boys and we will guarantee peace? Mr. TINKHAM. That is the point.

Mr. WRIGHT. I think our policy should be directed toward maintaining peace.

Mr. IzAC. Without going to war?

Mr. WRIGHT. Without going to war.

The CHAIRMAN. Use the good offices of this Government?

Mr. WRIGHT. Use the good offices of this Government to discourage war to the utmost. I do not think we want to be Don Quixotes and fight against windmills.

Mr. TINKHAM. You describe it perfectly.

Mr. SHANLEY. What did Mr. Stimson fail to do in Manchuria that he should have done?

Mr. WRIGHT. He acted too slowly. We at first took a position against sending a commission to Manchuria to investigate the degree in which Japan was carrying out the resolution she had agreed to for withdrawing her troops. I think if the commission had been sent 6 months earlier than it was the history of that incident might have been different. The point I am making is this, if you are going to do anything to prevent war you will have to start before the war

starts.

Mr. SHANLEY. Professor, I am always puzzled by the possibility of another partition of Poland. Suppose Russia should undertake to take Transylvania, Rumania, and Bessarabia, how would we be interested as Americans? What can we do?

Mr. WRIGHT. There is nothing more than nonrecognition, which we applied in the cases of Ethiopia and Manchuria.

Mr. SHANLEY. Would you do anything?

Mr. WRIGHT. That might be something.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing might be something.

Mr. WRIGHT. Not to go to war in defense of it, but to pursue such policies as we can to discourage war.

Mr. SHANLEY. In three instances that we know of the growing pains of nations are such that nothing will stop them.

Mr. FORD. Suppose the policy you propose would lead us into conflict?

Mr. WRIGHT. I should not propose anything that would necessarily lead us into a conflict. I would propose a policy which would discourage aggression and at the same time assist us to avoid war.

Mr. FORD. We are all heartily in favor of discouraging war. The question is what would you do?

Mr. WRIGHT. Let me set forth this policy I have proposed. If a war is threatened, we should consult with the other states of the world under the Pact of Paris. That is the policy urged by Secretary Stimson and President Hoover and urged by Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt. At one time it was considered that under the Pact of Paris, we should consult when there was a threat of the violation of the pact. This is the first thing I propose, a consultation to be aimed at bringing about an adjustment without war. The CHAIRMAN. Professor, suppose we get down more particularly to the bill pending. Will you give us your ideas?

Mr. WRIGHT. The second point would bring us in to that. I should propose that when this consultation began, we with the other states of the world should impose embargies on arms, munitions, and implements of war applicable to both factions.

The CHAIRMAN. The present law?

Mr. WRIGHT. Apply the present law at an earlier stage. I think the value of that can be illustrated in the Ethiopian case. The countries of Europe were consulting for 9 months before hostilities began; and during that period Mussolini was importing arms and oil and everything else he needed for a war. As soon as he got them all in he started his war. That, it seems to me, illustrates that if an embargo of this kind is to be of any value it should be imposed at

this early stage.

Mr. KLOEB. May I interrupt there? Isn't that theory rather vague as to when the law should become applicable? What we need now under present conditions is to embargo shipments of most everything to every country on the globe?

Mr. WRIGHT. I would make it more definite.

Mr. KLOEB. Another point is we would be busy all the time applying embargoes to every war threat.

Mr. WRIGHT. Not when there was no consultation going on, but when a consultation had been formally called under the pact of Paris, that would be the point to apply the embargoes.