"to make such special orders as may be proper "-contrary to the general usage is undoubted (Dunnegan's case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 97; Di Cesnola's case, Id., 146). Thus, the question is presented: is any sufficient reason shown to justify the "special order" which is asked for? It is maintained in support of the right to such order, that the power-of-attorney given to, and contract made with, Manning were "a substantial assignment of nine per cent. of the claim," and that the draft should be delivered to him as a means of securing payment of his proportion thereof, either by a voluntary payment by the administratrix, or by force of judicial proceedings to be had against her in relation to the draft. The distributees of Suchet Mauran, second, deceased, had no authority to assign any portion of the claim. It was assets of decedent's estate, the legal title to which vested in his legal representative. They could only make a contract imposing on them a liability to pay for services to be rendered. Nor is it material to inquire, whether an assignment was either made, or ratified, by any legal representative of the decedent. Such assignment is now disputed. It was said by AttorneyGeneral Butler, December 7, 1835 (3 Op. Att.-Gen., 29, 30), in a similar case, that: "The executor, being the 'legal representative' of the owner, is prima facie the person entitled to receive the money from the government; and though, in all such cases, where assignments have been made in apparently due form, and no objection is made to the right of the assignee, it would be proper to make payment to the assignee; yet, whenever the validity of the assignment is impeached, and conflicting claims exist, it is undoubtedly the safest course to pay to the person legally entitled, and to leave all parties having equitable claims to their appropriate remedies in the courts of justice." See 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introduction, XLII. It may possibly be true, that section 3477 of the Revised Statutes does not apply to the claim in this case, since it is payable out of a fund which the Government holds in some sense as a trustee; and, hence, that an assignment is not prohibited by said section; it may also be possible, that, since the act of June 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 98), assignments in such cases as this may be enforced in the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, before judgment, or may be valid in equity even after payment (Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 614); but it does not follow that the First Comptroller will recognize, or deal with, the equitable claimant. On the contrary, and without reference to section 3477 of the Revised Statutes, this Department will not, as a general rule, take cognizance of any merely equitable claim arising under an assignment, es. pecially when, as in this case, it is disputed, and the extent thereof is controverted. The reasons for this have already been stated in Judg. ment-Assignment case (5 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 106). The Treasury Department generally deals only with parties having the legal title to claims (Keyser's case, 4 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 263). It may be said, also, that the power of attorney and contract relied on to create an as signment do not so operate (Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 447; Bachman v. Lawson, 109 U. S., 660). If the attorney had been permitted to perform all the conditions of the contract, and it was obligatory on the legal representative of the decedent, the former could have maintained an action for the agreed compensation. If he performed the contract in part, and tendered performance of all, he may have an action for breach of the contract, in which his damages may be something less than the agreed compensation; because full performance by him may have been attended with expense and loss of time, of which he was relieved by only part performance (Star-route Attorney's case, 4 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 543, note; Printers' case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 505, 524). A contract to pay an attorney-at-law a per centum or a specific sum of money out of the proceeds of a claim for his services in securing payment thereof is valid. In any event, so far as Manning's contract is concerned, his remedy is not on the judgment, or fund arising therefrom, but his claim is simply that of a general creditor of the estate of the decedent. It is maintained, however, that, on general principles of law, Manning has a lien on the judgment, and its proceeds, which should be protected by the First Comptroller. If, under a valid contract with the legal representative of the decedent, Manning rendered services-distinct from merely personal or political "influence," sometimes called lobby services-in procuring legislation under which the present claim was provided for, he is, as a general creditor of the estate, entitled to compensation. Whether for such services, as distinct from those of an attorney in judicial proceedings, a lien, which courts recognize, exists on the fund in this case, it is not necessary to decide.* *In the case of Dodge et al. v. Schell (12 Federal Reporter, 515, 517, 518) it appeared, that, after a final judgment had been rendered for the plaintiffs, they moved the court to vacate the appearance of the attorney of record. That was a case in which the plaintiffs had previously agreed with one Douglass, that the latter, who was not an attorney-at-law, should prosecute said suit by such attorney as he might employ at his own expense, and should be paid for his services a sum equal to one-half of the recovery. Wallace, Judge, said that: "The plaintiffs have the right to collect the judgment themselves, and for that purpose to appoint such attorney as they desire. If Douglass had been an attorney, the agreement and services would have created a lien. * "It would not be proper to determine now, or by any proceeding which cannot be reviewed, the amount of the lien to which the executrix is entitled. But for present purposes it should be held that she is not to be turned over to a suit at law, to receive that measure of compensation at the end of litigation, to which she is entitled now before surrendering her lien. It may be the plaintiffs have equities and legal rights with which the court has not been impressed, and from which they should not be definitely precluded by the present decision. It may ultimately appear that the executrix should not receive the whole compensation contemplated by the agreement; but the burden should rest upon the plaintiffs, who are seeking to dispossess her of a lien, to show that she is not entitled to the sum which they promised to pay when their claim should be established. "It is, therefore, ordered, that the plaintiffs' motion be granted upon the payment to the executrix of Douglass of one-half of the amount of the judgment, without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to recover at law if they can show themselves entitled to the whole sum, or such part thereof as may be just." But assuming that courts would hold that such lien does, and can, exist in this case, there is no ground upon which the First Comptroller can make the "special order" asked for. The principles of common law accepted by courts are only applied by the executive government, so far as such principles are applicable to its condition and circumstances (3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introduction, XXII). This is a necessary The subject of the lien of attorneys is discussed with a citation of many authorities in Overton on the Law of Liens (Chapter VI, §§ 52–73). There is appended to the able opinion of Wallace, Circuit Judge, in the case of Dodge et al. v. Schell (12 Federal Reporter, 518), the following: "ATTORNEY'S LIEN ON JUDGMENT. See, generally, [In Re Paschal, 10 Wall., 483; Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How., 415; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 441;] Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn., 444; Carter r. Davis, 8 Fla., 183; Young . Dearborn, 27 Ñ. H., 324; Currier v. Boston, &c., R. Co., 37 N. H., 223; Pinder v. Morris, 3 Caines, 165; Ten Broeck v. De Witt, 10 Wend., 617; Martin e. Hawks, 15 Johns., 405; Power v. Kent, 1 Cow., 172; Walker v. Sargent, 14 Vt., 247; Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aiken, 162; and compare Craigin v. Travis, 1 How., Pr., 157; Noxon v. Gregory, 5 Id., 339; Frissell r. Haile, 18 Mo., 18. Contra, Hill v. Brinkley, 10 Ind., 102. It does not arise till judgment. Potter v. Mayo, 3 Me., 34; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass., 309; Sweet v. Bartlett, 4 Sandf., 661; Foot v. Tewksbury, Vt., 97. See Casey v. March, 30 Tex., 180. Nor nor does it cover all compensation which may be due by special agreement (Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal., 331; Mansfield v. Dorland, 2 Id., 507; Wright v. Cobleigh, 21 N. H., 339; Wells v. Hatch, 43 Id., 246; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw., Ch., 108; compare Dennett v. Cutts, 11 N. H., 163; Fowler v. Morrill, 8 Tex., 153), and is limited to specific fees or disbursements taxed as costs, and included in the judgment. Humphrey v. Browning, 46 Ill., 477; Rooney v. Second Av. R. Co., 18 N. Y., 368; Warfield v. Campbell, 38 Ala., 527; Forsythe r. Beveridge, 52 Ill., 268. An attorney cannot obtain a lien on a decree rendered in a probate court on a guardian's final settlement. McCaa v. Grant, 43 Ala., 262. The lien is waived by procuring satisfaction of the judgment, and perfecting the client's title to land attached in the action. Cowen v. Boone, 48 Iowa, 350. An attorney cannot obtain a lien under the Oregon Code, unless he has a special agreement as to the amount. In re Scroggin, 5 Sawyer, 549. Lien on substitution of attorney. See Carver v. U. S., 7 Ct. Cl., 449; Supr's v. Broadhead, 44 How., Pr., 411; Id., 426; Leszynsky v. Merritt, 9 Fed. Rep., 688.-[Ed." In Bussian v. Milwaukee, L. S. and W. Railway Company, decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, December 12, 1882 (3 Ohio [Columbus] Law Journal, 346), the following is a part of the syllabus of the case: "After the plaintiff had commenced her action against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries, and hat employed counsel to protect her rights, the agent of the company obtained a release from her in the absence of her counsel, and when she had no proper adviser. The execution of the release was urged upon her by her attending physician, acting on behalf of the company, when she desired a postponement until she could consult her counsel. She was uninformed as to the amount of charges her attorneys would be entitled to demand for their services, and the defendant's agent represented that the company would probably defeat her in the action, and, if it did not, her counsel would probably absorb whatever damages she might recover after an uncertain and prolonged litigation. Held, that the jury were justified in finding that the release was a fraud pou the plaintiff." A compromise, by which the plaintiff in a judgment releases his claim, cannot affect the lien of the attorney of record. (Patrick r. Leach, 3 McCrary C. C., 555.) In Stanton v. Embrey, Administrator (93 U. S., 556), it is said: "Professional services were rendered by an attorney, in the first case cited, in prosecuting a claim against the Republic of Mexico, under a contract that the attorney was to receive five per cent. of the amount recovered. Valuable services were rendered by the attorney during the lifetime of the claimant; but he died before the claim was allowed. Subsequently, the efforts of the attorney were successful; and he demanded the fulfilment of the contract, which was refused by the administrator of the decedent. Payment being refused, the attorney brought suit; and this court held that the decease of the owner of the claim did not dissolve the contract, that the claim remained a lien upon the money when recovered, and that a court of equity would exercise jurisdiction to enforce the lien, if it appeared that equity could give him a more adequate remedy than he could obtain in a court of law. Courts of law also adopt the same rule of decision, as sufficiently appears from the result of the organization, powers, and purposes of the Executive Departments. There is not, and cannot be, in this case any lien which this Department can recognize or protect. And this is so, without any reference to section 3477 of the Revised Statutes. A lien is an equitable right, and is generally to be enforced in equity-rarely ever at law. As between private parties, courts have authority to enforce second case cited, where the same rule of decision was applied and enforced without hesitation or qualification. Contracts for lobbying stand upon a very different footing, as was clearly shown by the Chief Justice in commenting upon a prior decision, in which the opinion was given by Justice Swayne. (Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 450.) "Nothing need be added to what is exhibited in the case last mentioned to point out the distinction between professional services of a legitimate character, and a contract for an employment to improperly influence public agents in the performance of their public duties. (Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall., 53.) " It may be inferred, from the authorities relating to the lien of an attorney, and to a compromise effected by a judgment-debtor, or his attorney, with a plaintiff not fully adrised as to his legal rights, in the absence of his attorney, when said judgment-debtor, or his attorney, effecting the compromise is aware of the plaintiff's want of knowledge that such a compromise is fraudulent, and will be set aside by proper proceedings in court, whenever it secures to the debtor an undue advantage of the plaintiff, or is designed to, and does, on its face deprive the plaintiff's attorney of the means of enforcing a lien recognized at law or in equity. (Wharton, Agency, 627, 628, 629, and cases cited.) An attorney participating in such fraud is unfit to practice law. It does not require a careful study of Sharswood's Legal Ethics to reach this conclusion (Ex parte, Robinson, 19 Wall., 505; Ex parte, Secombe, 9 How., 9; Ex parte, Garland, 4 Wall., 333; Ex parte, Bradley, 7 Id., 364; Randall v. Bigham, 7 Id., 523; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Id., 335; Ex parte, Burr, 9 Wheat., 529). An attorney-at-law is, in legal contemplation, required, not only to act with the highest degree of fidelity towards his client, which may be consistent with integrity, but also, in the performance of his duties, to be alike honorable and honest, to exercise good faith to the court and to all parties affected by his conduct, and not to be guilty of any fraudulent concealment, or of making any false allegation. And these principles apply to the conduct of an attorney-at-law in services having no connection with judicial proceedings. There are some services, which an attorney may not lawfully render. Thus, an agreement for compensation to secure a contract with the Government to furnish its supplies, or an agreement for a consideration to procure legislation, is against public policy, and will not be enforced by the courts (Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall., 45, 54). So, a contract to procure the passage of a law by personal or political influence is void (Marshal v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 16 How., 314; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 441). On the same principle, a contract for reward to procure the pardon by the President, or Governor of a State, of a person convicted of crime, or to render services by exerting personal or political influence in endeavoring to procure such pardon is contra bonos mores and void. An attorney-at-law who makes such contract may, to say the least, be denominated a disreputable practitioner. Assuming that such attorney may properly present a strictly legal argument, or evidence as to any material fact in support of an application for pardon, yet, if he does even this without disclosing to the executive pardoning power the fact that he is acting as attorney retained for a consideration, and without having sufficient reason to suppose that his position as such is understood by such executive authority, he is guilty of a suppressio veri, his conduct is fraudulent, and he is unfit to perform the honorable and trustworthy duties of an attorney-at-law. A citizen may properly, in the interests of justice, ask for the pardon of a criminal, and, when he does so, the influence of his unbiased judgment may have great weight. But when for a pecuniary consideration he makes the same appeal, it may carry much less weight. 6 LAWR-2 liens on funds, of which they can obtain possession, or control, by process against parties. Courts may pass upon the equitable rights of parties, even after payment by the Treasury Department (Comegys et al. v. Vasse, 1 Pet., 193; Frevall v. Bache, 14 Id., 97; 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introd., XXXVIII). But courts cannot make any officer of the Treasury Department a party to a proceeding in court, and direct him to pay money under its order (Keyser's case, 4 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 261; Draft case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 11). How far courts may, by proceeding in personam, control parties having the custody of a Treasury draft, it is unnecessary now to consider (Id.; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 441). That question can only arise, after such draft has passed into the custody of some person having authority to indorse, collect, or control it. Whatever may be the powers of courts, executive officers can make no inquiry as to a lien in such case as this. They cannot by any process enforce a lien. They can issue no writ for this purpose. They cannot enforce the taking of evidence for such purpose. When officers have no authority to enforce a particular remedy, there can be no right requiring it, which they can recognize. The law does not deal in impracticabilities, nor create absurdities. No right to a "special order" exists by force of any lien, since there is none. The duty of the Treasury Department is, to pay the claimant who has the legal right to the judgment, and to give her, or her legal attorney, whose authority is admitted or clearly proved, the custody of the draft issued to make payment. The claimant has a right to select her own attorney. The Treasury Department cannot select one for her. It does not have the means, which courts have, of taking evidence, and of deciding controverted questions, as to the authority of an attorney. Regulations may, as they do, for the transaction of the business of the Department, prescribe that the attorney of record in court shall generally be the attorney to receive a draft in such case as this. The authority of such attorney has the sanction of a court. Beyond this-this Department cannot inquire into the existence of liens involving judicial questions, nor entertain proceedings in the nature of a creditor's bill, nor give a remedy to general creditors. The exercise of any such jurisdiction would involve the executive government in inextricable difficultyfrequently in loss-and would usurp the functions of the judiciary (Keyser's case, 4 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 263, 332; 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introduction, XXXVIII). The attorneys of record have not waived, and do not waive, their right to receive possession of the draft. They had a right under section 18 of the act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 249), as it says and provides, to apply to the court which rendered judgment, to "allow, out of the amount thereby awarded, such reasonable counsel and attorney's fees *, which allowance * as the court shall determine is just shall be entered as part of the judgment * * ; and a warrant shall issue from the Treasury in favor of the person to whom such allowance |