No. 76-1036. GRAVITT, EXECUTRIX, ET AL. v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO. ET AL., 430 U. S. 723;
No. 76-1282. FULTON v. HECHT ET AL., 430 U. S. 984; No. 76-1379. DAVIS v. UNITED STATES, ante, p. 917; No. 76-6019. JUAREZ-RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES, 430 U. S. 985;
No. 76-6067. DOVE v. NEW YORK ET AL., ante, p. 901. Petitions for rehearing denied.
UNITED STATES TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK, TRUSTEE V. NEW JERSEY ET AL., ante, p. 1. Petition for rehearing denied. MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
ABSTENTION. See Federal-State Relations, 1, 4, 6.
ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY PLEA. See Habeas Corpus.
ADMISSION OF MINORS TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS. See Class
Actions; Mootness.
ADVERTISEMENT OF CONTRACEPTIVES. See Constitutional Law,
VIII, 7; Standing to Sue.
AGENCY-SHOP AGREEMENTS. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 1, 2.
AIRLINE STEWARDESSES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1.
ANTITRUST ACTS.
1. Pass-on theory-Use offensively by indirect purchaser-Treble-dam-
ages action under Clayton Act.-If a pass-on theory may not be used
defensively by an antitrust violator (defendant) against a direct pur-
chaser (plaintiff) that theory may not be used offensively by an indirect
purchaser (plaintiff) against an alleged violator (defendant). Therefore,
unless Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481,
is to be overruled or limited, it bars pass-on theory of respondents (State
of Illinois and local governmental entities) in their treble-damages action
under 84 of Clayton Act alleging that petitioners, concrete block manu-
facturers (which sell to masonry contractors, which in turn sell to general
contractors, from which respondents purchase block in form of masonry
structures), had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1
of Sherman Act. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, p. 720.
2. 84 of Clayton Act-Illegally overcharged direct purchaser as injured
party-Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S.
481, which held that generally illegally overcharged direct purchaser suing
for treble damages under §4 of Clayton Act, and not others in chain
of manufacture or distribution, is party "injured in his business or prop-
erty" within meaning of § 4, was correctly decided and its construction of
§ 4 is adhered to. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, p. 720.
APPEALS. See also Jurisdiction.
1. Challenge to sufficiency of indictment-Court of Appeals' jurisdic-
tion.-Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 to
pass on merits of petitioners' challenge to indictment as failing to charge
an offense, since District Court's rejection of such challenge does not
977
come within "collateral order" exception to final-judgment rule announced
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. That rejec-
tion is not "collateral" in any sense of that term, but rather goes to very
heart of issues to be resolved at upcoming trial. Moreover, issue resolved
adversely to petitioners is such that it may be reviewed effectively, and, if
necessary, corrected if and when a final judgment results. Abney v.
United States, p. 651.
2. Denial of motion to dismiss indictment-"Final decision."-District
Court's pretrial order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss indictment.
on double jeopardy grounds was a "final decision" within meaning of 28
U. S. C. § 1291, and thus was immediately appealable. Abney v. United
States, p. 651.
APPEAL TO PRURIENT INTEREST. See Federal-State Relations, 5.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction.
ARMED FORCES. See also Federal Tort Claims Act; Military Selec-
tive Service Act.
Extension of enlistments-Entitlement to re-enlistment bonuses.—
Respondent enlisted members of United States Navy and others similarly
situated, who agreed to extend their enlistments at a time when a statute
provided for a Variable Re-enlistment Bonus (VRB), in addition to
Regular Re-enlistment Bonus (RRB), for members of Armed Forces whose
ratings were classified as a "critical military skill," are entitled to VRB's
determined according to award level in effect at time they agreed to extend
their enlistments, notwithstanding Navy eliminated their ratings from
"critical military skill" list before they began serving their extended enlist-
ments, and statutes authorizing RRB and VRB were repealed and a new
Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB) substituted before one of respond-
ents began to serve his extended enlistment. United States v. Larionoff,
p. 864.
ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 1, 2.
ATTACHMENT. See Federal-State Relations, 4.
ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENSE. See Constitutional Law, VII, 1.
AUTOMOBILES. See Constitutional Law, III, 10.
BISTATE COVENANTS. See Constitutional Law, II.
BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEMS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
1, 3-7.
BONDS. See Constitutional Law, II.
BORDER SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, IX; Criminal Law.
BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3-7.
CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, VI; VIII, 4.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV.
CARRIERS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2–7.
CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See Constitutional Law, I.
CAUSATION INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY IN MURDER PROSECU-
TION. See Constitutional Law, III, 9.
CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS. See Civil Rights Act of
1964, 2.
CHESAPEAKE BAY. See Federal-State Relations, 2.
CHILL OF FREE SPEECH EXERCISE. See Constitutional Law,
VIII, 5.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
1. Employment discrimination-Airline-Female flight attendant-Se-
niority rights. Where respondent female air flight attendant failed to file
a timely claim against petitioner airline for violation of Title VII of Act
when her employment was terminated in 1968 pursuant to a later invali-
dated policy because she got married, petitioner does not commit a present,
continuing violation of Title VII by refusing to credit respondent, after
rehiring her in 1972, with pre-1972 seniority, absent any allegation that
petitioner's seniority system, which is neutral in its operation, discrimi-
nates against former female employees or victims of past discrimination.
Moreover, § 703 (h) of Title VII, which provides that it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice to apply different terms of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority system if any disparity is not result of
intentional discrimination, bars respondent's claim, absent any attack on
bona fides of petitioner's seniority system or of any charge that system is
intentionally designed to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, p. 553.
2. Employment discrimination-Motor carrier-Line drivers-Improper
certification of class action. In respondent Mexican-Americans' action.
against petitioner unions and petitioner motor carrier claiming employ-
ment discrimination in violation of Title VII of Act with respect to line-
driver positions, Court of Appeals plainly erred in certifying a class action
and in imposing classwide liability on petitioners, where trial court pro-
ceedings made clear that respondents were not members of class of dis-
criminatees that they purported to represent. East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, p. 395.
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