but what policy-making positions should be political and should correctly gage the attitude of the dominant party in control of the Government. If it were not so there would be no point in having the form of government whereby the popular opinion might be reflected at election time in a change of control.

When the policy is determined beyond the important technical planning and supervision, and administration of methods for carrying out those policies rests in the hands of operating officials who should be strictly professionalized, where the question of loyalty to any person, to any official, to any party would not enter in-they are loyal to their work, to their particular profession, and to the success of that method we will have then a real Federal personnel system which will be reflected in the increased efficiency of government and the increased quality of service rendered to the taxpayer.

There should be, it seems to us, a very clear distinction drawn between policy-making and operating. Now in that connection we feel that the provision contained in section 203, paragraph (2), should be eliminated.

Some discussion was had between the chairman of the committee and Mr. Kaplan as to authority vesting in the President to exempt from the competitive classified service certain employees or officials who occupy a confidential relationship to the head of an executive department or independent establishment. We have no quarrel with the exemption of legitimate cases, such as personal secretaries to important officials. However, when it is proposed, as on page 12, section 203, paragraph (2), to take out, as they are to a very large extent at the present time, from the competitive classified service the heads of bureaus and divisions, services of similar agencies directly responsible to the head of an executive department, independent establishment, or independent agency, make them presidential appointees subject to the confirmation by the Senate, that is very destructive not only to the extension of a career system, but it will take several hundred key positions now under the competitive classified service out of the competitive classified service, and to that extent break down the merit system and discourage future advancement to those who win their way by merit and not by personal or political preferment.

There is another provision which seems to us unfair, and that is, where the President has the authority granted to him to extend the competitive classified service to agencies not at present under that classified service.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean section 208 (a)?

Mr. STEWARD. Section 206 (1) on page 14, providing for the acquirement of classified civil-service status by encumbents of positions through noncompetitive examination. On line 16 there is the provision that prior to taking such a noncompetitive examination the recommendation of the head of the agency concerned must be had. We think that is unnecessary and unreasonable, when it is borne in mind that at the present time the positions intended to be covered by that section are without the terms of the competitive classified service. They are subject to instant and summary dismissal or demotion, or transfer, or whatever else the head of that particular agency determines.

Now, prior to the effectiveness of such legislation as is here proposed it must be assumed that the head of such an agency will have purged his organization of those whom he does not feel should longer continue, and then to require that an additional recommendation from the head of the agency must be had before such an employee can even qualify, or attempt to qualify for continuance in office, seems to us unnecessary and unreasonable.

We wish to say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, what seem to us, under title II, the three most important points, the extension of the merit system, the extension of the classification and the setting up of a civil-service administration, we are in hearty accord on those.

There are certain things, some of which I have attempted to enumerate, which can be changed that will immeasurably strengthen S. 2700, and to permit them to continue would do damage out of all proportion to their apparent importance at this time. That, in the main, we are very strongly in favor of legislation on those three important points being enacted at the carliest possible date.

Let me emphasize as one who has been, in a way, connected with Federal personnel matters for more than 40 years, that the greatest evils today in regard to our Federal personnel system are those of omission and not of commission, and the imposing as a definite, unqualified duty upon some responsible official or agency of the doing of all of these things that are recognized at the present time as necessary to build and maintain a proper personnel system, is put right in there. It becomes someone's job to do these things, and it will not longer be possible for officials to give lip service, or to pass the buck and say, "We think it ought to be done but it is not our job to do it." We want something done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Steward. The next witness I will call will be Mrs. Harris T. Baldwin.

STATEMENT OF MRS. HARRIS T. BALDWIN, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Baldwin, you represent the National League of Women Voters?

Mrs. BALDWIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You desire to address the committee with regard to what feature?

Mrs. BALDWIN. With regard to the personnel feature, Mr. Chair

man.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mrs. Baldwin.

Mrs. BALDWIN. The National League of Women Voters supports the civil-service recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. To the extent that the bill under discussion carries out those recommendations, it has the support of the League. We are not in a position to speak on other phases of the report or the bill.

After years of participating as citizens in the democratic processes of government, members of the League of Women Voters have reached the conclusion that the effective control of government by the will of the people the fundamental principle of democracy-is thwarted by the patronage system. It destroys party responsibility by substitut

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ing the bribery by jobs for adherence to principles, and is one of the contributing factors to lack of public confidence in government.

The growth of patronage in the Federal Government is demonstrated by the figures showing the number of Federal employees exempt from the merit system, which have been filed with your committee by other witnesses. I wish especially to speak of the growing inclination of the Congress to extend patronage through the device of senatorial confirmation. No one questions the necessity for exempting policy-determining positions from the merit system, but those positions are very few in number. Only such positions should be subject to senatorial confirmation. We cannot go along with the opinion that was once expressed to us by one of your body to this effect: "My own view is that Senate confirmation is an important check on executive appointments. Agreeing with your views about the extension of civil service and its principles, I feel that the public interest is best safeguarded by adequate checks and balances between the different departments. A system of checks and balances can be carried too far. It might be carried to a point where it is impossible for government to function at all. The inability of a democratic government to meet the needs of the people promptly and effectively would inevitably lead to its destruction.

We consider the extension of control by the Congress of appointments to the important administrative positions an invasion of the rights and responsibilities of the executive branch of the Government. We believe that responsibility for government must be fixed clearly so that citizens may best exercise their functions of holding officials responsible for their acts. When the responsibility is so diffused among the various branches of government that no one agency or person can be held accountable, then the citizen is helpless. When the Senate shares in the naming of persons for the important administrative posts of government, it is performing a function which it is unprepared to fulfill effectively by the very nature of its organization. The Senate cannot, as a body or even as individuals, have the degree of knowledge of the kind of duties to be performed in the particular job that the head of the department concerned must have. Inevitably considerations other than merit will enter into the selection of Government workers when senatorial confirmation is necessary. This is equally true when it is superimposed on an examination system. The individual applicant will be dependent upon the favor of Senators. In many instances the best qualified will not attempt to enter the Government service because of this necessity. Senatorial confirmation also causes delay and confusion destructive to the efficient functioning of government.

Senatorial confirmation should not be extended but curtailed, by limiting it to the positions which are purely policy-determining. The Senate has such important policy decisions to make in regard to the complicated social and economic problems of the day that it should not be harassed by the nagging necessity to act as an employment agency for its constituents.

We believe that the growth of the Federal service necessitates a reorganization of personnel administration. Our experience in the field of government has convinced us that a board is not an efficient administrative device. Unless the administration of personnel is sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the service, the merit system comes into

disrepute. We have heard that it is imperative to exempt personnel in new agencies from the Civil Service Act because of the cumbersome, slow procedure. We have heard of the sterility of the service-clerks in dead-end jobs-the difficulties of discharge-favoritism in promotions the long delays in selecting personnel. Probably only a portion of this criticism is justified and can be traced to the inherent administrative weaknesses of a board or commission, which prevents quick and decisive action. We therefore approve the provision of S. 2700 to the extent that it establishes a single executive as Civil Service Administrator, rather than the present form of a board of three members. We believe that the changes in methods of recruitment and in other factors involved in the development of career service will be facilitated under the direction of an experienced public personnel director. We do not approve of the method of selection of this administrator as provided in the bill, nor do we approve of the elimination of this proposed advisory board of seven members to act as watchdog of the merit system. We believe that it is sounder administrative practice to protect the integrity of the position of Civil Service Administrator by the method of selection, rather than by the method of discharge. The Civil Service Administrator must be above reproach and eminently well qualified for his position. The best method of securing such a person is to provide for a thorough review of his qualifications by a special examining board. Members of such a board would have to be persons themselves experienced in the field of personnel administration. This examining board would certify a group of applicants for the position of Administrator.

The bill does not extend the merit system to any appreciable degree. On the contrary it extends the patronage system, by increasing the number of Presidential appointees subject to confirmation by the Senate. To satisfy the large number of citizens who are increasingly interested in elimination of the patronage system, these sections of the bill must be changed to provide unequivocally for extension of the merit system to all but policy-determining positions.

That there is a steady increase in public interest in the abolition of patronage appointments cannot be denied. Other witnesses have cited the platforms of the major political parties, the Gallup Poll of Public Opinion, and to some extent the action of State legislatures, the fact that five States have enacted State-wide merit systems this year-the first such laws to be passed in 16 years-is one indication of the growth of public interest in this field. In addition to these 5 States, the legislatures of 15 other States seriously considered merit legislation. Three of the nine States having merit system laws prior to 1937 enacted new legislation effecting improvements of major significance. A large number of cities installed merit systems for the first time. This rapid and widespread increase in formal merit systems could only come about through aroused and directed public opinion, which will not be satisfied until the patronage system is abolished. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Rice here?

STATEMENT OF M. W. RICE, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rice, you appear on behalf of the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

Mr. RICE. That is right, as legislative representative for the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Our organization is concerned, primarily, in two features of this bill. First, under title I, we fear that there would be vested in the President the authority to transfer the present Veterans' Administration to some executive department and to abolish it as an independent agency. We can find nothing under title I which would serve as a protection or assurance that the Veterans' Administration would be kept as an independent establishment, or an independent agency, Whichever it should be classified as, and that it might, therefore, be covered into some executive department and become a part of it. That, we think, would be undesirable. We believe that the Veterans' Administration should continue as an independent agency, and we consider this of paramount importance to the future welfare and the administration, the service, and benefit to veterans who are suffering with disabilities caused by their military service during war periods. Let me say that on page 7, under the classification of "definitions" the term "independent establishment" does not appear to include the Veterans' Administration; that, therefore, it would appear that the Veterans' Administration is classified as an agency. That being the case, it would appear that section 2, subsection 1 (1) on page 3 would authorize the transfer of such agency to some other agency, or to some executive department. Subsection (b) of section 2 would not seem to have any protection to the Veterans' Administration against the possibility of such transfer, because it says nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to authorize the President to abolish any executive department or indepdnent establishment. The Veterans' Administration is certainly not an executive department, and according to the definition of an independent establishment on page 7 it does not appear to be classified as an independent establishment, therefore there is no protection afforded to it against its transfer into some executive department or independent establishment.

That could be corrected by adding to subsection (2) of section 5 the inclusion of the Veterans' Administration as being one of the independent establishments.

At the same time it would appear that the provisions of subsection (c) of section 2, authorizing the President

to transfer to an executive department any of the routine administrative and executive functions of any independent establishment which are common to other agencies of the Government such as the preparation of estimates of appropriations; the appointment of personnel and maintenance of personnel records; the procurement of material, supplies, and equipment; the accounting for public funds; the rental of quarters and related matters—

would be very dangerous authority if it were made applicable to the Veterans' Administration. It would seem to be entirely inconsistent with the proper control of the Veterans' Administration to provide that some other agency could prepare its estimates of appropriations, or to take care of its rentals, or to take care of the appointment of personnel, the maintenance of personnel records, or to provide for the procurement of material, of supplies or equipment, and we most emphatically would request that subsection (c) of section 2 should not be applicable as to the Veterans' Administration, if, in fact, it ought to be applicable as to other agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rice, you have pointed out that that section applies to independent establishments. Mr. RICE. That is right.