Opinion of the Court.

by the land department in pursuance of express authority from the acts of Congress. This perjury was not merely a wrong against that tribunal or a violation of its rules or requirements; the tribunal and the contest only furnished the opportunity and the occasion for the crime, which was a crime defined in and denounced by the statute.

"Nor is there anything in the case of United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 688, conflicting with the views herein expressed. In that case the wrong was in the violation of a duty imposed only by a regulation of the Treasury Department. There was an act entitled 'An act defining butter; also imposing a tax upon and regulating the manufacture, sale, importation and exportation of oleomargarine,' which contained several sections forbidding particular acts, and imposing penalties for violation thereof. And in addition there was a general provision in section 18 that if a party shall knowingly, or wilfully, omit, neglect, or refuse to do, or cause to be done, any of the things required by law in the carrying on or conducting of his business, or shall do anything by this act prohibited, he shall pay a penalty,' etc. There was authority given to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make all needful regulations for carrying into effect the act. In pursuance of that authority the Commissioner required the keeping of a book in a certain form, and the making of a monthly return-matters which were in no way referred to in the various sections of the statute prescribing the duties resting upon the manufacturer or dealer in oleomargarine, although subsequently to this statute, and subsequently to the offence complained of, and on October 1, 1890, Congress passed an act, by section 41 of which wholesale dealers in oleomargarine were required to keep such books and render such returns in relation thereto as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should require. It was held by this court that the regulation prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under that general grant of authority, was not sufficient to subject. one violating it to punishment under section 18. It was said by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the court: 'It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for

Opinion of the Court.

declaring any act or omission a criminal offence; and we do not think that the statutory authority in the present case is sufficient. If Congress intended to make it an offence for wholesale dealers in oleomargarine to omit to keep books and render returns as required by regulations to be made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it would have done so distinctly, in connection with an enactment such as that above recited, made in section 41 of the act of October 1, 1890.

666

Regulations prescribed by the President and by the heads of departments, under authority granted by Congress, may be regulations prescribed by law, so as lawfully to support acts done under them and in accordance with them, and may thus have, in a proper sense, the force of law; but it does not follow that a thing required by them is a thing so required by law as to make the neglect to do the thing a criminal offence in a citizen, where a statute does not distinctly make the neglect in question a criminal offence.'

"This, it will be observed, is very different from the case at bar, where no violation is charged of any regulation made by the department. All that can be said is that a place and an occasion and an opportunity were provided by the regulations of the department, at which the defendant committed the crime of perjury in violation of section 5392. We have no doubt that false swearing in a land contest before the local land office in respect to a homestead entry is perjury within the scope of said section."

The act before us is on its face an act for levying taxes, and although it may operate in so doing to prevent deception in the sale of oleomargarine as and for butter, its primary object must be assumed to be the raising of revenue. And, considered as a revenue act, the designation of the stamps, marks and brands is merely in the discharge of an administrative function and falls within the numerous instances of regulations needful to the operation of the machinery of particular laws, authority to make which has always been recognized as within the competency of the legislative power to confer. United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46; Ex parte

Opinion of the Court.

Reed, 100 U. S. 13; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1.

We concur with the Court of Appeals that this provision does not differ in principle from those of the Internal Revenue laws, which direct the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to prepare suitable stamps to be used on packages of cigars, tobacco and spirits; to change such stamps when deemed expedient; and to devise and regulate the means for affixing them. Rev. Stat. §§ 3312, 3395, 3445, 3446, etc.

By section 3446, the Secretary and the Commissioner were empowered to alter or renew or change the form, style and device "of any stamp, mark or label used under any provision of the laws relating to distilled spirits, tobacco, snuff and cigars, when in their judgment necessary for the collection of revenue taxes and the prevention or detection of frauds thereon; and may make and publish such regulations for the use of such mark, stamp or label as they find requisite"; and by the act of March 1, 1879, 20 Stat. 327, 351, c. 125, § 18, the section was amended so as to provide that the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, might “establish and, from time to time, alter or change the form, style, character, material and device of any stamp, mark or label used under any provision of the laws relating to internal revenue." The oleomargarine legislation does not differ in character from this, and the object is the same in both, namely, to secure revenue by internal taxation and to prevent fraud in the collection of such revenue. Protection to purchasers in respect of getting the real and not a spurious article cannot be held to be the primary object in either instance, and the identification of dealer, substance, quantity, etc., by marking and branding must be regarded as means to effectuate the objects of the act in respect of

revenue.

And we are of opinion that leaving the matter of designating the marks, brands and stamps to the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, involved no unconstitutional delegation of power.

Writ denied.

Syllabus.

In re MCCAULLY, Petitioner, 8 original. 10 original. Argued January 25, 1897.

In re LUSBY, Petitioner, Decided March 1, 1897.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: These are petitions for habeas corpus to discharge petitioners from confinement on convictions under the oleomargarine law on the ground of the unconstitutionality of that enactment. So far as that question is concerned, it is conceded that the records are substantially the same as the record in Kollock's case just decided, and the applications must be disposed of in the same way.

Writs denied.

Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson and Mr. Henry E. Davis for petitioners.

Mr. Solicitor General opposing.

MCCORMICK v. MARKET BANK.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

No. 554. Submitted December 7, 1896. Decided March 1, 1897.

In an action against a national bank upon a contract, each party relied on section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, by which a national bank, upon filing its articles of association and organization certificate with the Comptroller of the Currency, becomes a corporation, with power "to make contracts" and other corporate powers, but is prohibited to "transact any business, except such as is incidental and necessarily preliminary to its organization, until it has been authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to commence the business of banking." The defendant relied on the prohibition. The plaintiff relied on the exception to the prohibition, and also contended that, under the general power to make contracts, the contract sued on was valid as between the parties, even if contrary to the prohibition. Held, that a judgment for the defendant in the highest court of the State might be reviewed by this court on writ of error. By section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, a contract of lease, at a large rent, of an office to be occupied "as a banking office, and for no other purpose," for the term of five years, determinable at the end of any year by either party, executed by a national bank as lessee, after having duly filed its articles of association and organization certificate with the Comptroller of the Currency, but not having been authorized by him to com

Statement of the Case.

mence the business of banking, is void, cannot be made good by estoppel, and will not support an action against the bank to recover anything beyond the value of what it has actually received and enjoyed.

THIS was an action brought July 17, 1895, by McCormick against the Market National Bank of Chicago, Illinois, in the superior court of Cook county in the State of Illinois, and was submitted by the parties, waiving a trial by jury, to that court, upon an agreed statement of facts, in substance as follows:

On January 31, 1893, articles of association were signed, and an organization certificate was signed and acknowledged, by nine citizens of Illinois, before a notary public, and both were transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, as required by Title 62 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (the material parts of which are copied in the margin'), for the purpose of making them a national banking association at Chicago by the aforesaid name; and were on

1SEC. 5133. Associations for carrying on the business of banking under this Title may be formed by any number of natural persons, not less in any case than five. They shall enter into articles of association, which shall specify in general terms the object for which the association is formed. These articles shall be signed by the persons uniting to form the association, and a copy of them shall be forwarded to the Comptroller of the Currency, to be filed and preserved in his office.

SEC. 5134. The persons uniting to form such an association shall, under their hands, make an organization certificate, which shall specifically state: First. The name assumed by such association.

Second. The place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on.

Third. The amount of capital stock and the number of shares into which the same is to be divided.

Fourth. The names and places of residence of the shareholders, and the number of shares held by each of them.

Fifth. The fact that the certificate is made to enable such persons to avail themselves of the advantages of this Title.

SEC. 5135. The organization certificate shall be acknowledged before a judge of some court of record, or notary public, and shall be, together with the acknowledgment thereof, authenticated by the seal of such court or notary, transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, who shall record and carefully preserve the same in his office.

SEC. 5136. Upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certificate, the association shall become, as from the date of the execution of its organization certificate, a body corporate, and as such,