(c) Such other individuals, or body or class of individ uals, as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation which is an ally of a nation with which the United States is at war, other than citizens of the United States, wherever resident or wherever doing business, as the President, if he shall find the safety of the United States or the successful prosecution of the war shall so require, may, by proclamation, include within the term "ally of enemy."

"Ally of enemy."

The subject or citizen of a state that is an ally of an enemy is not, in the absence of statute, an alien enemy or subject to any disabilities attaching to the latter class of persons. Nor is the question affected by the severance of diplomatic relations. See supra, p. 42. Within the meaning of the term "ally of enemy nation" are included at the present date (January 15, 1918) Bulgaria and Turkey.

By the Act transactions with the subjects of ally of enemy states are placed, for the purposes of the Act, in the same position as those with the subjects of a state with which the United States is at war. Technically, therefore, the Act forbids all transactions or communications with the diplomatic and consular representatives of Bulgaria within the United States. But the circumstance that diplomatic relations have not been severed with Bulgaria may be regarded as an implied license to trade and communicate with agents of this Government within, but not without, the United States, in regard to all ordinary matters.

The word "person," as used herein, shall be deemed to mean an individual, partnership, association, company, or other unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation or body politic.

"United States."

The words "United States," as used herein, shall be deemed to mean all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States or occupied by the military or naval forces thereof.

"Land."

This includes an American private vessel on the high seas, [Wilson v. McNamee (1880), 102 U. S. 572, 23 L. ed. 234] and an American public vessel even within the territorial waters of a foreign state. Cp. The Exchange (1813), 7 Cr. 116, 3 L. ed. 287; (1855), 7 Op. Atty.-Gen. 122; (1856), 8 Op. Atty.-Gen. 73. That offences against this Act may be committed on the high seas, e. g., by the sending of a wireless message from an American vessel, is expressly recognized by the Act. See section 18.

“Water.”

As to what waters are within the jurisdiction of the United States, is determined by the general principles of international law, subject to any modifications made by the political departments of the government. It does not comprise the high seas, properly so called, nor does jurisdiction extend to acts done on foreign public vessels within the territorial limits of the United States. The Exchange (1813), 7 Cr. 116, 3 L. ed. 287; (1855), 7 Op. Atty.-Gen. 122; (1856), 8 Op. Atty.-Gen. 73.

"Continental or insular."

The use of these words sets at rest any question that might otherwise have arisen under the restriction placed upon the meaning of the term "United States" under the doctrine of the so-called "Insular Cases," Downes v. Bidwell (1900), 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088; De Lima v. Bidwell (1900), 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, and subsequent cases, regarding the position of the Philippines, Porto Rico and the Canal Zone. Cp. section 18.

"In any way within the jurisdiction of the United States."

The Act is operative in all places subject to the political sovereignty of the United States, regardless of the manner in which such political sovereignty was acquired, whether by conquest, cession, annexation, or occupation. It is not operative even as to citizens of the United States in countries where these citizens enjoy extraterritorial privileges (e. g., China, Siam) because these places are not subject to the political sovereignty of the United States. Cp. Mather v. Cunningham (1909), 105 Me. 326; Huberich, Domicile in Countries granting Exterritorial Privileges, 24 Law Quarterly Review, 444, 31 Ibid. 447. The English acts and proclamations relating to trading with the enemy were extended to British subjects in these countries. And cp. In re Tootal's Trusts (1883),

23 Ch. 532; The Lutzow (1915), 1 Trehern P. C. 528. The English courts adhere to the doctrine laid down in In re Tootal's Trusts, Casdagli v Casdagli (1917), The Times, November 10, 1917.

The courts will take judicial notice of the boundaries claimed by the political departments of the government. Jones v. United States (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 34 L. ed. 691.

"Occupied by the military or naval forces."

See notes, supra, p. 57. The Act applies to all territory in the military or naval occupation of the United States. This is in accordance with the rules laid down during the Civil War. In United States v. Lapéne (1873), 17 Wall. 601, 21 L. ed. 693, the facts were as follows: In February, 1862, while the whole State of Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans, was under the civil and military control of the Confederacy, a firm in New Orleans sent their agent into certain interior parishes of the State to collect money due to the firm and to make purchases of cotton. After the agent had arrived in the interior parishes, but before he had bought any cotton, the city of New Orleans was captured by the forces of the United States and remained from that time under the control of that Government. The interior parishes, however, still remained in the control of the Confederacy. Subsequently to this, the agent made purchases of cotton from persons in the interior parishes. There was no evidence of any communication having passed between the firm and the agent. The cotton purchased was subsequently captured by the military forces of the United States. Hunt, J., says: "All commercial contracts with the subjects or in the territory of the enemy, whether made directly by one in person, or indirectly through an agent, who is neutral, are illegal and void. This principle is now too well settled to justify discussion. No property passes and no rights are acquired under such contracts. In March, 1862, the whole of the State of Louisiana was in the military possession of the Confederate forces. Intercourse between the inhabitants of the different portions thereof was legal, and contracts made between them were legal. On the 27th of April, in the same year, the city of New Orleans was captured by the military forces of the United States, and thereafter remained under their control. From that time commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of that city and the inhabitants of other portions of the State of Louisiana which remained under the Confederate rule became illegal. Ordinarily the line of non-intercourse is the boundary line between the territories of contending nations. The recent war in the United States was a civil war, in which portions of the same nation were engaged in hostile strife with each other. The State

of Louisiana, although one of the United States, was under the control of the Confederate government and their armies, and was an enemy's country. While the city of New Orleans was under such control it was a portion of an enemy's country. When that city was captured by the forces of the United States, the line of non-intercourse was changed, and traffic before legal became illegal. This line was that of military occupation or control by the forces of the different governments, and not that of State lines." Accord: Montgomery v. United States (1875), 15 Wall. 395, 21 L. ed. 97; Desmare v. United States (1876), 93 U. S. 605, 23 L. ed. 959.

Enemy territory in the occupation of the military or naval forces of the United States comes under the jurisdiction of the United States subject to the limitations imposed by the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land. See supra, p. 44.

"Beginning of the war."

The words "the beginning of the war," as used herein, shall be deemed to mean midnight ending the day on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of a state of war.

"Beginning of the war."

By Joint Resolution passed by Congress on April 6, 1917, a state of war was declared to exist between the United States and the German Empire, and by a similar resolution, passed on December 7, 1917, a state of war with Austria-Hungary was declared. The Joint Resolutions contain no provision relating to the hour of that day when such state of war began to exist. The civil effects of a declaration of war attach as of the moment of declaration. The Joint Resolution, declaring a state of war with the German Empire was signed by the President on April 6, 1917, at 1:18 P. M., Washington time. The declaration against AustriaHungary was signed on December 7, 1917, at 5:03 P. M., Washington time. See also supra, p. 50.

For the purposes of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the beginning of the war is the end of the day on which war was declared, but this does not apply to transactions not affected by the Act.

By the term "war" is meant not the mere employment of force but the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be prosecuted by force. Thus, if two nations declare war against each other, war exists though no force whatever may as yet have been employed.

On the other hand, force may be employed by one nation against the other, as in the case of reprisals, and yet no state of war may arise. 7 Moore, International Law Digest, section 1100.

The mere fact that there has been no counter-declaration of any kind, does not affect the situation. A declaration of war may be unilateral. It is not "a mere challenge to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other. It proves the existence of actual hostilities on one side at least, and puts the other party also into a state of war." The Eliza Ann (1813), 1 Dod. 234, 2 Roscoe P. C. 162. "We have heard considerable argument to the effect that war is not unilateral-which, no doubt, is true-that you must have at least two nations engaged in hostilities. . . . All this to my mind is beside the mark. Immediately the Royal prerogative is exercised and war is declared against another nation every subject of His Majesty is bound to regard every subject of that nation as an enemy." Per Lord Wrenbury, in British and Foreign Mar. Ins. Co. v. Sanday & Co. [1916] 1 A. C. 650.

The law recognizes a state of peace and a state of war but knows of no intermediate state. Trotter (Supp.) 4. This is clearly brought out in the decision in the House of Lords in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines [1902] A. C. 484. In this case a British subject who underwrote a policy of insurance by which a Transvaal company was insured, among other risks, against arrests, restraints, and detainments, of all kings, princes and peoples, was held liable to make good the loss of the property through its seizure by the Transvaal government some days before the actual outbreak of the Boer War. The imminence of war was held not to affect the validity of the contract. Lord Halsbury said: "It would be, to my mind, to introduce a new principle into our law to hold that the probability of a war should have the same operation as war itself. It is war and war alone that makes trading illegal."

Lord Macnaghten in the same case said: "The law recognises a state of peace and a state of war, but it knows nothing of an intermediate state which is neither the one thing nor the other-neither peace nor war." So also Lord Robertson: "It cannot be affirmed that at the moment in question there was a state of war between this country and the Transvaal. That the Transvaal was a future enemy, an intending enemy, that she was arming, and that this seizure was an act of arming-all this I assume and I believe; and if the principle of the cases about actual war really involved cases of impending war, I should not be deterred by the absence of any former decision from applying it. But for the purposes of the present question there are, as it seems to me, but two categories-war and not war; and the difference between the two things is essential. The