of the belligerents (e. g., France, Italy) are directed against acts of nationals wherever resident.

The circumstances of a case may furthermore be such that they give rise to a contractual obligation under the laws of a country other than the United States, although involving a violation of the Act. While American courts might refuse, even after the war, to take jurisdiction of a suit based on a transaction entered into abroad, and contrary to the public policy of the United States, as announced in the Act, [cp. Ware v. Jones (1878), 61 Ala. 288] a foreign court will not give legislation of this character any extraterritorial force. Cp. Huntington v. Attrill [1893] A. C. 150; Huntington v. Attrill (1892), 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. ed. 1123. A contract made outside the United States involving a violation of the Act may be enforceable in a foreign court, if other circumstances confer jurisdiction. Cp. Henkel & Co. v. Brice, Whyte & Sons, Ltd., Court of Appeal, The Hague, November 24, 1916, Weekblad, No. 10060, more fully discussed infra, p. 173. A view similar to that of the Netherlands court is contained in a dictum in an early American case: "Although during a war between the nations of creditor and debitor, the former cannot compel the latter, by a judiciary sentence in his own country to pay the money, such a sentence may be obtained during the war in another country if the debitor be found there." Per Wythe, C., in Page v. Pendleton (1793), Wythe's Va. Rep. 211. Where assumption of jurisdiction is discretionary, the American courts, while the United States was neutral, have ordinarily refused to assume jurisdiction where the countries of which the opposing belligerents were subjects have prohibited payments to alien enemies. Watts, Watts & Co., Ltd. v. Unione Austriaca di Navigazione (1915), 224 Fed. 188, affirmed (1915), 229 Fed. 136. Rhederei Actien-Gesellschaft Oceana v. Clutha Shipping Co., Ltd. (1915), 226 Fed. 339; The Kaiser Wilhelm II (1916), 230 Fed. 717. Contra: Compagnie Universelle v. Service Corporation (N. J., 1915), 95 Atl. 187, holding that the courts of a neutral state will take jurisdiction of a suit for. the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land situated in the neutral country although the litigants are respectively the subjects of and resident within the territory of opposing belligerents. See Huberich and King, Jurisdiction of Courts of Neutrals in Actions between Subjects of States at War, in 59 Sol. Jour. 702.

Time of going into effect of Act.

Under the general rule, the Act became effective from the first moment of the day on which it was approved, October 6, 1917. Where, however, the application of this rule will work a hardship or injustice, as, e. g., to destroy the validity of contracts entered into with persons who become enemies

under the Act, but are not such at common law, the exact time of approval will be taken into account. United States v. Stoddard (1899), 91 Fed. 1005. The Act received the signature of the President on October 6, 1917.

Definitions: "Enemy."

Sec. 2. That the word "enemy," as used herein, shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of such trading and of this Act

(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any country other than the United States and doing business within such territory.

"Word 'enemy' as used herein shall be deemed to mean for the purposes of such trading and of this Act."

The word "enemy" as used in the Act has a special meaning. Great confusion arises because of a failure to distinguish between the meaning of the term "enemy" when used in reference to the political status of such person, e. g., in the United States Revised Statutes, section 4067, relating to apprehension, restraint, internment or removal of designated persons, "natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the hostile nation or government," and which applies only in cases of declared war or actual or threatened invasion, and the use of the term in connection with the civil status of a person.

In using the term "enemy" in connection with civil rights and disabilities, a distinction must be made between the use of the term in the sense of a definition such as given in the Act or as used in various State statutes relating to acquisition or conveyance of land, limitation, etc., and the term "alien enemy" as used at common law. At common law, in turn, the words "alien enemy" are used in different senses.

"Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals."

Not any "person" as defined in this section, infra. It does not include corporations. As to corporations, see infra.

"Of any nationality."

Enemy character under the Act and at common law is primarily determined by residence or place of business, and not by nationality.

The personal allegiance of the person is immaterial. A citizen of the United States resident in an enemy country is an enemy.

"The question is, whether a man, who resides under the allegiance and protection of a hostile State for all commercial purposes, is not to be considered for all civil purposes as much an alien enemy as if he were born there. If we were to hold that he was not, we must contradict all the modern authorities upon this subject. That an Englishman, from whom France derives all the benefit which can be derived from a natural-born subject of France, should be entitled to more right than a native Frenchman would be a monstrous proposition. While the Englishman resides in the hostile country he is a subject of that country, and it has been held that he is entitled to all the privileges of a neutral country while resident in a neutral country (Marryatt v. Wilson, 1 Bos. & P. 430)." McConnell v. Hector (1802), 3 Bos. & P. 113, per Lord Alvanley, C. J.

So also, per Lord Reading, C. J., in Porter v. Freudenberg [1915] 1 K. B. 857: "Trading with a British subject or the subject of a neutral state carrying on business in the hostile territory is as much assistance to the alien enemy as if it were with a subject of enemy nationality carrying on business in the enemy state, and, therefore, for the purpose of the enforcement of civil rights, they are equally treated as alien enemies. It is clear law that the test for this purpose is not nationality but the place of carrying on the business: Wells v. Williams, (1 Ld. Raym. 282); McConnell v. Hector, per Lord Alvanley C. J. (3 Bos. & P. 113); Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines [1902] A. C. at p. 505, per Lord Lindley. When considering the enforcement of civil rights a person may be treated as the subject of an enemy state, notwithstanding that he is in fact a subject of the British Crown or of a neutral state. Conversely a person may be treated as a subject of the Crown notwithstanding that he is in fact the subject of an enemy state. . . . Such a person is equally treated as an alien enemy provided he is voluntarily resident there, having elected to live under the protection of the enemy state. For the purpose of determining civil rights a British subject or the subject of a neutral state, who is voluntarily resident or who is carrying on business in hostile territory, is to be regarded and treated as an alien enemy and is in the same position as a subject of hostile nationality resident in hostile territory. Professor Dicey, in his treatise on Parties to an Action, at p. 3, states the law accurately in the following proposition: 'Under the term "alien enemy" are included not only the subjects of any state at war with us, but also any

British subjects or the subjects of any neutral state voluntarily residing in a hostile country."" See also Scotland v. South African Territories, Ltd. (1917), 33 T. L. R. 255.

Under the Canadian Orders of May 2, 1916, section 1 (1) it is expressly provided that the term "enemy" does not "include a subject of His Majesty or of any state or sovereign allied to His Majesty who is detained in enemy territory against his will, nor shall such last-mentioned person be treated as being in enemy territory."

"Under the recognized rules governing the conduct of a war between two nations, Cuba, being a part of Spain, was enemy's country, and all persons, whatever their nationality, who resided there were, pending such war, to be deemed enemies of the United States and of all its people. The plaintiff, although an American corporation, doing business in Cuba, was, during the war with Spain, to be deemed an enemy to the United States with respect of its property found and then used in that country, and such property could be regarded as enemy's property, liable to be seized and confiscated by the United States in the progress of the war then being prosecuted; indeed, subject under the laws of war, to be destroyed whenever, in the conduct of military operations, its destruction was necessary for the safety of our troops or to weaken the power of the enemy. In Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305, the court, speaking of the powers possessed by a nation at war, said: . . . 'It is immaterial to it whether the owner be an alien or a friend, or even a citizen or subject of the power that attempts to appropriate the property. In either case the property may be liable to confiscation under the rules of war. It is certainly enough to warrant the exercise of this belligerent right that the owner be a resident of the enemy's country, no matter what his nationality.' Per Harlan, J., in Juragua Iron Co. v. United States (1908), 212 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 522. American corporations doing business in enemy territory are not enemies under the Act. See infra, p. 63.

American citizens are not bound to return from foreign countries (including enemy countries) on a declaration of war, unless so ordered by their government. The Joseph (1813), 1 Gall. 545, F. C. No. 7533. But the civil disabilities of enemy always attach. No order requiring citizens to return has been issued by the United States up to January 15, 1918.

The subjects of allied and neutral countries resident within the enemy country are enemies. The Venice (1864), 2 Wall. 258, 17 L. ed. 866; Young. United States (1877), 97 U. S. 39, 24 L. ed. 992; Gallego v. United States (1908), 43 Ct. Cl. 444.

Personal political opinions are immaterial. "It is not the private char

acter or conduct of an individual, which gives him the hostile or neutral character. It is the character of the nation, to which he belongs, and where he resides. He may be retired from all business, devoted to mere spiritual affairs, or engaged in works of charity, religion and humanity, and yet his domicile will prevail over the innocence and purity of his life. Nay more, he may disapprove of the war, and endeavor by all lawful means to assuage or extinguish it, and yet, while he continues in the country, he is known but as an enemy." Per Story, J., in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (1814), 2 Gall. 105, F. C. No. 13,156. See also Brown v. Hiatts (1872), 15 Wall. 177, 21 L. ed. 128. "This court cannot inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory." Mrs. Alexander's Cotton (1864), 2 Wall. 404, 17 L. ed. 915 (per Chase, C. J.); Miller v. United States (1870), 11 Wall. 268, 20 L. ed. 135; The Benito Estenger (1899), 176 U. S. 568, 44 L. ed. 592; Juragua Iron Co. v. United States (1908), 212 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 522.

"Resident within.”

It seems that the word "resident" is not used in the sense of "domiciled." It is intended to cover any physical presence of some length, and to exclude cases of mere technical domicile. In the hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Secretary of State Lansing, in reply to the question as to whether in the definition of enemy, a distinction was intended to be made between "domiciled" and "resident," stated that he believed no distinction was intended to be made, though perhaps the word "resident" was a little broader than "domiciled." Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce-on H. R. 4704, 9.

It may be doubted whether a person may be treated as an enemy for civil and commercial purposes generally by reason of his domicile in an enemy country, unless he personally resides in that country. Page, War and Alien Enemies (2d ed.), 5. "It has been always held, that this incapacity (of alien enemies to sue) only applies to persons actually present in their own country at the time of the war. . . . The general allegation that the plaintiff is a resident of the State of Florida (enemy territory), and has been for several years is, probably, sufficient to bring him within the rule." Per Clerke, J., in Sanderson v. Morgan (1868), 39 N. Y. 231. A person may by operation of law have a domicile at a particular place where he has never been, but it could not be said that he resides there. Dorsey v. Brigham (1898), 177 Ill. 250. Hence, a married woman residing in England, but whose husband is a subject of and is domiciled and resident in an