with his own, he may leave a power of attorney to a friend to collect his debts, and even to sue for them. Traité des Assurances, I, 567. But though a power of attorney to collect debts, given under such circumstances, might be valid, it is generally conceded that a power of attorney cannot be given, during the existence of war, by a citizen of one of the belligerent countries resident therein, to a citizen or resident of the other; for that would be holding intercourse with the enemy, which is forbidden. Perhaps it may be assumed that an agent ante bellum, who continues to act as such during the war, in receipt of money or property on behalf of his principal, where it is the manifest interest of the latter that he should do so, as in the collection of rents and other debts, the assent of the principal will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown; but that, where it is against his interest, or would impose upon him some new obligation or burden, his assent will not be presumed, but must be proved, either by his subsequent ratification, or in some other manner."

In United States v. Grossmayer (1869), 9 Wall. 72, 19 L. ed. 627, Davis, J., says: "We are not disposed to deny the doctrine that a resident in the territory of one of the belligerents may have, in time of war, an agent residing in the territory of the other, to whom his debtor could pay his debt in money, or deliver to him property in discharge of it."

The leading American case is Williams v. Paine (1898), 169 U. S. 55, 42 L. ed. 658, affirming s. c. (1895), 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 116. In 1859, Lieutenant Ransom of the United States Army, then stationed in Pennsylvania, and his wife executed a power of attorney to the latter's brother to convey their interest in certain lands in the District of Columbia. After the Civil War broke out, Ransom, who was a native of North Carolina, resigned his commission and entered the Confederate service. His wife accompanied him to the south. Her brother remained with the United States Army in which he was an officer. During the war, the lands were sold and a deed for them was given by the attorney in fact under the power of attorney. The purchase money was duly paid and the share of Mrs. Ransom was paid over to her while she was within the lines of the Southern army with her husband. Some years afterwards, a bill was filed to have the deed executed by Mrs. Ransom's brother under the power of attorney, declared void. In support of this petition, it was argued among other things that the power of attorney was revoked by the war. The court, per Peckham, J., said: "We are of opinion that the war did not revoke the power of attorney executed by Mrs. Ransom and her husband. It is not every agency that is necessarily revoked by the breaking out of a war between two countries, in which the principal and agent respectively live. Certain kinds of agencies are undoubtedly revoked by the breaking out

of hostilities. Agents of an insurance company, it is said, would come within that rule. (Insurance Company v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 429.) Under the circumstances of this case, we think the attorney in fact had the right to make the conveyance he did. It was not an agency of the class such as is mentioned in Insurance Company v. Davis, supra, and was not necessarily revoked and avoided by the war. Where it is obviously and plainly against the interest of the principal that the agency should continue, or where its continuance would impose some new obligation or burden, the assent of the principal to the continuance of the agency after the war broke out will not be presumed, but must be proved either by his subsequent ratification or in some other manner. And, on the other hand, where it is the manifest interest of the principal that the agency constituted before the war should continue, the assent of the principal will be presumed. Or, if the agent continues to act as such, and his so acting is subsequently ratified by the principal, then those acts are just as valid and binding upon the principal as if no war had intervened. (Insurance Company v. Davis, supra.) It is entirely plain, as we think, that the mere fact of the breaking out of a war does not necessarily and as a matter of law revoke every agency. Whether it is revoked or not depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case and the nature and character of the agency. . . . Here we have a power of attorney properly executed for the purpose of selling, among other lots, this real estate in question, and a state of circumstances which fairly shows that it was for the benefit and interest of the principal that such real estate should be sold at the time the sale in fact occurred; we have also the principal's receipt of her share of the purchase-money in 1865, with full knowledge of all the facts, and her acquiescence in and approval of the action of her attorney up to the time of her death in February, 1881. Upon these facts, we think it clear that the instrument executed by the attorney in fact was as valid and effectual as if no war had intervened. The ratification of the act of the attorney was full and complete. It recognized and assented to the continued existence of the agency. The purchase-money for the land was received by the principal, and to permit her heirs after her death to repudiate the transaction on the ground that the power of attorney had been revoked would be at war with every principle of equity and fair dealing."

In Botts v. Crenshaw (1868), Chase, 224, F. C. No. 1690, it was held that where an attorney had been entrusted with the collection of a claim, the agency thus created was not revoked by war. See also as to agency generally: Anderson v. Bank (1869), Chase, 535, F. C. No. 354; Stoddart v. United States (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 340; Douglas v. United States (1878),

14 Ct. Cl. 1; Ward v. Smith (1868), 7 Wall. 447, 19 L. ed. 207; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Statham (1876), 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. ed. 789; Williams v. Paine (1895), 7 App. Cas. (D. C.) 116; Bartow County v. Newell (1880), 64 Ga. 699, but see Howell v. Gordon (1869), 40 Ga. 302; Stiles v. Easley (1869), 51 Ill. 275; Fisher v. Krutz (1872), 9 Kan. 501; Buford v. Speed (1875), 11 Bush (Ky.) 338; Monsseaux v. Urquhart (1867), 19 La. Ann. 482; Kershaw v. Kelsey (1868), 100 Mass. 561, 97 Am. Dec. 124; Murrell v. Jones (1866), 40 Miss. 565; Statham v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1871), 45 Miss. 581, 7 Am. Rep. 737. Cp. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Statham (1876), 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. ed. 789; Buchanan v. Curry (1821), 19 John. (N. Y.) 137, 10 Am. Dec. 200; Robinson v. International Life Insurance Co. (1870), 42 N. Y. 54, 1 Am. Rep. 400; Sands v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1872), 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am. Rep. 535, affirming s. c., 59 Barb. 556; Hubbard v. Matthews (1873), 54 N. Y. 43; Pope v. Chafee (1868), 14 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 69; Darling v. Lewis (1872), 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 125; Maloney v. Stephens (1872), 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 738; but see Conley v. Burson (1870), 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 145; Rodgers v. Bass (1877), 46 Tex. 505; but see McCormick v. Arnspiger (1873), 38 Tex. 569; Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Warwick (1870), 20 Gratt. (Va.) 614, 3 Am. Rep. 218; Hale v. Wall (1872), 22 Gratt. (Va.) 424; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hemdren (1873), 24 Gratt. (Va.) 536; Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Atwood (1873), 24 Gratt. (Va.) 497; Small v. Lumpkin (1877), 28 Gratt. (Va.) 832.

Where the agency is not revoked a payment to the agent binds the principal, and sales made by the agent are valid. So also a notice of dishonor served upon the agent charges his endorser principal.

The agent is bound to take all steps necessary for the protection of the property and other interests of his principal, e. g., keep property insured, prevent waste, employ services of counsel. Buford v. Speed (1875), 11 Bush (Ky.) 338. The agent remains accountable for any failure to exercise due care, as in ordinary cases, and is entitled to compensation for his services.

The agent remains accountable to his principal for money or other property administered or received by him. Stiles v. Easley (1869), 51 Ill. 275; Shelby v. Offutt (1875), 51 Miss. 128; Caldwell v. Harding, 1 Lowell, 326, F. C. No. 2302; McVeigh v. Bank (1875), 26 Gratt. (Va.) 188. And this duty to account arises even though the agency is terminated by the war; the accounting is postponed until the end of the war. In order to save the moneys collected, the agent may invest it in property in the country where the agency is being carried on, Stoddart v. United States (1870), 6 Ct. Cl. 340, which must be accounted for as required by the law

of the country in which the agent acts. Thus, payment to the Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act and any other acts required by law are valid. The decision in cases like Botts v. Crenshaw (1868), Chase, 224, F. C. No. 1690, where investments were made in securities in accordance with the law of the place where the agency was being carried on, and the agent was nevertheless held accountable, are explainable on the ground that the investment authorized was one in securities in aid of the Rebellion, and therefore, the laws and other governmental acts authorizing such investment were unconstitutional.

The powers of alien enemy directors of a corporation are terminated upon the outbreak of war or upon the prohibition of intercourse. The same applies to proxies made by alien enemy shareholders. See supra, p. 177.

Partnership.

The doctrine that partnerships of which alien enemies are members, are dissolved by war is usually supported on the twofold ground that further performance of the contract is unlawful, and that a continuance of the partnership, where the members are prohibited from communicating with each other, is inequitable. Under some circumstances, a dissolution might also be supported under the doctrine of the "Coronation Cases.” Where the partnership agreement provides for the continuance of the partnership business, even after the outbreak of a war, separating the partners by belligerent lines, the dissolution can, in the absence of express statutes (such as the California statute presently to be noted), be supported only on the ground of illegality of performance, unless we accept the rather doubtful ground of public policy, suggested in Planters' Bank v. St. John (1869), 1 Woods, 585, F. C. No. 11,208, which appears to be contrary to the English doctrine.

The doctrine is limited to partnerships. It does not extend to the relation existing between co-owners or co-tenants. Therefore, the co-owners of a vessel do not cease to be interested in the further profits of the vessel, and may recover their shares of freight earned by the vessel during the war. Caldwell v. Harding (1869), 1 Lowell, 326, F. C. No. 2302. The same rule, it seems, should apply to mining partnerships such as exist under the laws of some of the western States, and in which the relation of the partners is substantially a relation of co-tenants. Cp. California Civil Code, section 2516; Skillman v. Lachman (1863), 23 Cal. 198, 83 Am. Dec. 96.

The rule must be limited in its application to partnerships operating within the United States or governed by the laws of the United States.

It does not extend to cases where a person resident in the United States is a co-partner with alien enemies for the carrying on of business in a country other than the United States. In this connection it is to be noted that under the laws of certain countries (e. g., Germany, Austria) a partnership is not dissolved by reason of the co-partners becoming separated by the line of war. An American partner of a German firm does not cease to be a member of such firm by reason of the declaration of war. It is to be noted that the English cases have thus far dealt only with the case of partnerships carrying on business in England. The reported American cases arose out of the War of 1812 or the Civil War, and while they have applied the same rule both as to partnerships doing business in the forum and to partnerships doing business in the enemy country, the enemy country in each of the cases was one that had a cognate system of law, and may be assumed to have recognized a similar doctrine.

It is also questionable whether the doctrine of dissolution by war, obtaining in the Anglo-American law, is in force in the parts of the United States where the commercial law is based on the law of Spain (Philippines, Porto Rico) or of Colombia (Canal Zone).

Prior to the present war, there was no English decision regarding the effect of war on a partnership where one or more partners are alien enemies. Evans v. Richardson (1817), 3 Mer. 469, only decided that an agreement between an American citizen and a British subject then in America for the exportation of goods from America on joint account in time of war "provided a peace should not be likely to take place at the time of shipping the goods" was illegal. Trotter (Supp.) 53. Lindley, Partnership (8th ed.), 87, 88, 111, 648, states that in his opinion war dissolves a partnership. So also Hall, International Law (6th ed.), 384, is of opinion that a partnership is dissolved "since it is impossible for partners to take up their joint business on the conclusion of war at precisely the point where it was at its commencement."

In Rex v. Kupfer [1915] 2 K. B. 321, the Court of Criminal Appeal assumed that a partnership was dissolved. The English Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, contains no specific provision on this point, and section 2 (2) apparently assumes that war does not dissolve a partnership. On the other hand section 3 provides for the appointment of a receiver on the petition of the Board of Trade. Trotter (Supp.) 54.

In Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Limited v. Aktiengesellschaft für Cartonnagen-Industrie [1916] 1 K. B. 763, a partnership existing between a British subject and a German subject residing in Germany, the business being carried on in England, was held to be dissolved by and at the date of the outbreak of the war between the two countries. Under the terms of the