On the whole, the subject was skilfully treated. No sentiment was expressed to which any southern opponent of the tariff would be likely to take exception; and although some of the friends of the tariff professed to discover in the general tenor of the language of this part of the message indications of a change of position on this question, it is not easy to perceive how any sentence could, by fair construction, be regarded as hostile to the protective policy.

The power of the president to remove public officers except for cause, was discussed at this session. Resolutions on the subject were offered in the senate by Mr. Holmes, of Maine, and by Mr. Barton, of Missouri; and in the house by Mr. Chilton, of Kentucky. The objects embraced in the different resolutions presented, were to ascertain the number of removals made by the president, and the reasons for the same; and the exercise of the power in removing officers when not required for the faithful execution of the laws, and of filling the vacancies, during the recess of the senate, was declared to be against the public interest, the rights of the state, and the spirit of the constitution.

In the senate, the question of the executive power of removal and appointment, was discussed, both in secret sessicn, and in open debate. Of the speeches reported, those of Messrs. Holmes and Barton in favor of the resolutions are the principal, and of those in opposition, that of Mr. Bibb, of Kentucky. Several of the speeches made in secret session do not appear in the “congressional debates."

Mr. Barton referred to the 77th number of the “Federalist,” to sustain the exposition for which he contended. It was there said: “The consent of that body, (the senate,) would be necessary to displace as weil as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the offices of the government, as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of the offices.” The same writer, in reference to the objection that the senate might influence the president, and assume the control of the government, says: “If by influencing the president be meant restraining him, this is precisely what must have been intended. And it has been shown that this restraint would be salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncon trolled agency of that magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the good without the ill.”

Appended to this number of the Federalist, is the following note, in the later editions : “This construction bas since been rejected by the legis lature; and it is now settled in practice that the power of displacing belongs exclusively to the president.” Mr. Barton said: “This note ought to be expunged as calculated to mislead students and weak cabinets. It

is not true, in point of fact, that the legislature has rejected this construction; nor true, in point of law, that the senate can renounce an iota of their restraining power that belongs to their organization, and chiefly distinguishes our checked and restrained executive from one of arbitrary will. The whole idea of the annotator was taken from the laws respecting the assistants of the president, to perform the duties prescribed by him as under the act of 1789, and not applicable to the officers of the public, or of the law, to perform duties prescribed by the laws of the land. The correctness of Hamilton, (the writer of the article,) and the error of the annotator and his disciples of the majority, can be demonstrated, if there be truth in logic and common sense.

The argument stands thus : Without the concurrent power of the senate in matters of appointing, (as you admit in your report of 1826,) the president becomes a monarch."

Mr. Barton admitted the right of the president to remove an officer for official delinquency or disability, and to put a fit person in his place. This was in conformity to his obligation to see the laws faithfully executed. But the doctrine of an unrestricted power of removal was a departure from the exposition and understanding of the constitution by the founders of the government. It enabled the president to use the offices of the republic as bribes or weapons, and rendered public officers dependent upon him for official existence. It put it into his power to wield the whole official force of his country—nay, the purse and the sword of his coun. try-against its liberties. To pervert the power to the purpose of punishing freemen for their opinions or votes, or purchase supporters, or reward office hunters, was a great offense, a gross violation of our constitutional rights, by a president. He adverted to the inconsistency of the majority. They had said that the president was responsible to the people at the

of his term; and they could correct the abuse. Yet the opponents of the resolutions refused to let the people know for what causes the power had been exerted !

Mr. Bibb, in reply, referred to the act of July, 1789, establishing the department of foreign affairs, since called the “department of state,” the principal officer of which was authorized to appoint a chief clerk, “who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the president of the United States," &c. A similar provision, he said, was

, in the law organizing the departments of war and the navy. Those three acts conceded the power of the president to remove the principal officer. Mr. Bibb read a list of removals, by presidents Washington, Adams and Jefferson. From the time of Washington's first removal to the present time, not an instance had occurred in which the senate, as a body, had asserted the right to ask the cause of removal, or to exercise an appel

late or revisory power over the president's decision. The attempt, in 1814, to ask the cause of the removal of Gideon Granger from the office of postmaster-general, was rejected by the senate.

Mr. B. also cited a decision of the supreme court, made in 1803. “When an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern, because the act is at any time revocable. By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his orders. In such cases, their acts are his acts;

and there exists and can exist, no power to control that discretion.”

He also examined this question upon the principles of the constitution. A feeble executive produced a feeble execution of the laws; which was, in effect, a bad execution of the laws. Energy in the executive was essential to a good government. This had been provided by the constitution. In a government looking to our intercourse with foreign nations to preserve peace; direct the energies of the nation in war; spreading over such an extent of territory, an energetic executive was more necessary than in one of the confederated states. At the time of making the constitution, there were but two tenures of office, the one during good behavior, the other during pleasure. When, therefore, the constitution required the president to nominate, appoint, and commission all officers, and to commission the judges during good behavior, it followed clearly that he should commission no other officers during good behavior, but to hold during the pleasure of the president.

Mr. B. presented several other considerations to enforce this interpretation. He said this tenure of office at the will of the president was well adapted, (1.) To preserve due subordination in the officers to the executive head; (2.) To preserve that unity of purpose and action necessary for decision, energy and dispatch; (3.) To defend the executive against the encroachments of the coördinate departments, as well as against anarchy; (4.) To maintain that due weight and influence to the president which was intended by the constitution, in giving him a qualified negative upon the proceedings of congress, and in assigning to him the duty to recommend to congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

The resolution, being that introduced by Mr. Barton, was on motion of Mr. Grundy, laid on the table. Mr. Holmes' resolutions, after a long speech by himself, were, on motion of Mr. Grundy, indefinitely postponed.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FOOT'S RESOLUTIONS ON THE

PUBLIC

LANDS.GREAT DEBATE IN THE

SENATE.

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At this session, (1830,) occurred what has been termed, “the

great debate in the senate." The occasion, rather than the subject of it, was a resolution offered by Mr. Foot, of Connecticut, “That the committee on the public lands be instructed to inquire into the expediency of limiting, for a certain period, the sales of the public lands to such lands only as have heretofore been offered for sale, and are subject to entry at the minimum price. And also whether the office of surveyor-general may not be abolished without detriment to the public interest."

We have said this resolution was the occasion of the debate; because, except in the earliest stage of it, among the unusual number of topics embraced in the discussion, the resolution itself received but a secondary consideration.

The resolution was offered on the 29th of December, 1829. It was taken up the next day for consideration, and, after a short debate, was laid on the table. The discussion was resumed a few days afterward, and continued until the 21st of May. The object of the mover of the resolution was to confine the sales of the public lands to those already yurveyed and brought into market; there being more than 72,000,000 acres which remained unsold at the minimum price of $1 25 per acre. The resolution was opposed on the ground that the object contemplated by it would check emigration to the new states and territories, and limit their settlement. The eastern states were charged with a design to impede the settlement of the western states; one object of which was alleged to be, to keep the people in the east to work in the manufactories. Hostility on the part of the eastern states, to the new states of the west, had been repeatedly manifested. The resolution was vigorously opposed by the western senators, Messrs. Benton, of Missouri, and Kane and Noble of Illinois, especially Mr. Benton, who referred to the early policy of the government; the tendency and design of which had been to retard the settlement and prosperity of the new states.

Mr. Foot repelled the imputation of hostility to the west ; said, if the resolution should be adopted, he should move to add the words, “propriety of making donations to actual settlers."

The senators whose names are most familiarly associated with this debate, are Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, and Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts; the former having twice spoken at length, and been replied to

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by Mr. Webster. The second reply is the speech which has so often been the subject of high encomium, and which has probably contributed more than any other single effort to the fame of that distinguished orator and statesman. Besides these, the other prominent participants in the, debate, were: Messrs. Benton, Grundy, Kane, Livingston, Rowan, Smith, of South Carolina, and Woodbury, all, it is believed, friends of the administration, and all, perhaps, except Mr. Smith, concurring mainly in the views of Mr. Hayne on the subject of the public lands; and Messrs. Barton, Clayton, Foot, Holmes, Johnson, of Louisiana, Sprague, and Noble, opponents of the administration; the last named senator, however, being opposed to the resolution.

Mr. Hayne said, that, in relation to the proper policy of the government concerning the disposal of the public lands, there were two parties, holding opposite opinions. The one supposed the policy heretofore pursued had been just and liberal to the new states; the other, embracing the entire west, thought the government had treated them in the -spirit of a taskmaster-that its policy had been illiberal and selfish. It had sold out, from time to time, certain portions for the highest prices that could be obtained; and until within a few years, on long credits. The result of such a course was to keep a country for a long time under a heavy load of debt. Other nations, in planting colonies, had given free grants of land. He had not yet formed a fixed or settled opinion on the subject. But he suggested that, after the public debt should have been paid, (for which the lands were pledged,) it might be sound policy to relinquish them to the states in which they were, on terms which should compensate the government for the cost of the original purchase, and for other expenses incurred on their account. He thought the states should in due season be invested with the control of all the lands within their respective limits.

Mr. H. distrusted the policy of creating a great national treasury, whether to be derived from the public lands or from any other source, and of distributing the excess among the states. It would be a fund for corruption-fatal to the duration of our institutions, and to the sovereignty and independence of the states. He believed the very life of our system was the independence of the states, and no evil was more to be deprecated, than the consolidation of the government.

Mr. Webster maintained that the policy of the government had been liberal to the new states. He considered the analogy referred to by Mr. Hayne to be unjust; the cases were not similar. The North American colonists either fled from Europe to avoid persecution, or came hither at their own charges, as private adventurers. The western lands and the protection of the settlers against the Indians, had led to the expenditure

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