Mr. RANSOM. That is right.

Mr. GINN. I guess you said they feel so strongly; it is just not something they will discuss even?

-?

Mr. GINN. It is also subjecting them to▬▬▬?

Mr. RANSOM. Yes, sir, it is not a wholly satisfactory solution, and we have looked for a variety of ways which would allow us to do the kind of planning and carry out the kind of

Mr. GINN. I think that is true.

Mr. RANSOM.

—.

ALLIED SUPPORT

Mr. GINN. The members of this committee understand the strategic necessity of our having RDF bases in that part of the world. But there is a growing feeling, I think, in this country, of deep concern that we get less than 10 percent of our oil from that area, whereas some of our friends and allies like Japan, West Germany, France, in particular, get the majority of their oil. What are they doing to help insure stability in this part of the world? Is it entirely up to us to spend millions and billions of dollars to ensure those countries have a free flow of oil to them?

Mr. RANSOM. I think that our economies are interrelated in ways that make it difficult, at least for me, to see how a collapse of the European economy as a result of loss of oil supply from the Middle East would not have an equally catastrophic effect on us, only measured by the relative dependence of different economies on the Middle Eastern source.

Mr. GINN. Wouldn't you also say our trading imbalance with Japan is having a disastrous effect on our economy right now?

Mr. RANSOM. I certainly would, and the tack we have taken in the past on this question is to try to persuade these countries, and we have had some success, to increase the share of their own budgets which go to defense, and strengthen the role they are prepared to play in their own areas in defense, so we can undertake these new efforts in Southwest Asia without leaving any gaps, and with the accommodation that the increased budgets for defense in the other countries would provide.

Mr. GINN. Well, I would simply point out to you that there is a growing feeling of resentment on the part of Americans, particularly with regard to our relationship with Japan and some European countries, that we are spending billions to insure the fact that their economies will remain strong. They need that oil, and we all know we are interrelated. There seems to be a tremendous imbalance as opposed, or as compared, to what we are spending to help them, as opposed to what they are doing to help themselves.

Our taxpayers are hurting, and I don't know if other members of the subcommittee are getting that feeling back home, but I am certainly getting it.

For the first time, my people are saying, we don't think defense should be sacrosanct any more. We should look hard at what we are doing. This is one of the areas that they say that they think

our friends around the world should be doing more than they are doing to help us insure stability in that part of the world.

Mr. RANSOM. I think that is a fair criticism of our allies, and we make it constantly.

Mr. GINN. We make it, but we don't seem to be getting anywhere.

Mr. RANSOM. We have gotten some changes, or increases like from the Japanese, increases in their defense budget, so we have had some success in that regard.

At the same time, I want to underscore that it is not only their interests that are at stake, but our interests are at stake, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

A Soviet occupation of the Gulf area would tilt the balance of power in the world, and it would undermine entirely our role as a leader of the free world, and our standing as a power that can contain the Soviets.

Mr. GINN. I completely agree with you.

The point remains: Our economy in this country is in a very precarious position, and one of the reasons is what some of these nations have done to the world that we are spending so much now to defend. What they have done to the world by tremendously increasing the price of oil, which is the number-one contributing factor to worldwide inflation. We talk about free trade. We don't have free trade with Japan. They are destroying several industries in this country, while we stand by and spend a billion dollars a year to defend them.

I am telling you; there is a strong growing feeling of resentment in this country.

It is something that is going to have to be addressed soon.

Mr. REGULA. Is any other nation doing any construction in the Persian Gulf area?

Mr. RANSOM. Of a military nature?

Mr. REGULA. Right.

Mr. RANSOM. Non-Persian Gulf countries?

Mr. REGULA. Yes.

Mr. RANSOM. I do not know of any, and, if you would like, we can look and see if there is any.

Mr. REGULA. Are there presently any already constructed facilities that non-Persian Gulf nations have in that area?

Mr. RANSOM. The Soviets have certain facilities in that area, some of which they have developed themselves. In Ethiopia and South Yemen, and I might add we have use of some facilities which the Soviets have developed in that area, our use of them, Somalia and Egypt, in particular.

I don't think that is a good example of cooperation.

Mr. REGULA. No.

Mr. RANSOM. No current development.

Mr. REGULA. What do the French use to support their fleet activities in the Persian Gulf?

Mr. RANSOM. The French, for the most part, base there; they depend on the port of Djibouti for their naval forces.

Mr. REGULA. Where is that?

Mr. RANSOM. Between Ethiopia and Somalia.

They also have used ports in some of the islands farther to the south, Reunion, which is a French province.

The British deploy small forces to the area regularly for exercises, and they have a limited but important small capability of projecting military units into the area, but they do not have a program for constructing facilities. They would use host-country facilities.

Our whole effort is based on two things; one is the military construction programs approved by the Congress, which provide the particular facilities, and the other is facilities that already exist in these countries, and in every case of a country where we have requested funds for construction, the contribution of the host government is larger than our own, so far.

Now, that will be true in Oman to the end of the planned program. If we ever deploy forces into Oman the facilities which the government of Oman has built and will make available to us, will exceed in scope and in cost those facilities which we have built for our unique use at that time.

Mr. REGULA. Do the French

Mr. RANSOM. The whole program is a piggy-back affair, and that is one of the principles, also, of it.

Mr. REGULA. How does the French naval mission interface with ours in the Persian Gulf?

Is there some tacit agreement that each group will have a certain portion of the total mission?

Mr. RANSOM. Admiral Watson may be able to answer this question better than I,

Admiral Watson?

Admiral WATSON. Certainly; that is right. As I recollect, there have been military-to-military discussions with the

I don't believe that the discussions got above the military-to-military talks on how we could do it. I don't believe there were any national commitments.

Mr. GINN. All right. I have a few questions on your presentation that you can answer for the record.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-The questions submitted by Mr. Ginn and the answers thereto follows:]

QUESTIONS ON JCS PRESENTATION

Question. In your presentation you indicate that the U.S. must be able to respond to situations in the Persian Gulf short of U.S./ Soviet confrontation, such as internal instability, intra-regional conflicts, and Soviet-supported subversion or invasion by surrogate forces. This appears to be a change in policy from the past when we were primarily preparing to respond to the direct Soviet threat. What has brought about this change in policy?

Answer. This does not represent a change in policy. At the point where a Soviet armed intervention occurs.

Question. What type of intra-regional conflicts or Soviet-supported subversion would the U.S. respond to with deployment of the RDF? Can you give some specific examples?

Answer.

Question. What restrictions on using our present and planned bases do we have during intraregional conflicts?

Answer. The only restriction is -

Question. Your presentation also indicates that

facilities

would not be available to the U.S. until D-Day, the day conflict begins.

Give us an example of potential hostility in the region

Answer.
Question. If

.

were directly threatended, would they allow

us to use their facilities prior to D-Day?

Answer.

Question. Under what potential conflict in this region would --not be directly threatened?

[CLERK'S NOTE: End of questions submitted by Mr. Ginn.]

RAS BANAS AIR BASE, EGYPT-UPGRADE/CONSTRUCT RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FACILITIES, $219,600,000 (AIR FORCE: $125,600 IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, Part 2, PAGE 859, AND $70,400,000 IN FISCAL YEAR 1982 SUPP., PAGE 41; ARMY: $53,000,000 IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, PART 1, PAGE 700, AND $36,000,000 IN FISCAL YEAR 1982 SUPP., PAGE 43; SECDEF CONTINGENCY FUND: $7,000,000 IN LETTER OF MARCH 23, 1982)

Mr. GINN. The committee currently has pending requests totaling $292 million for RDF facility construction at Ras Banas Air Base, Egypt. Last year, Congress did not provide construction funds at Ras Banas because of the preliminary nature of the program.

The House action on the program indicated that "The committee has denied all construction funds for Ras Banas until questions concerning the program, country-to-country agreement, and design have been resolved."

I would like to take each of these issues and see where we are today. Let's begin with the status of a country-to-country agreement.

Mr. RANSOM. We have some slides that we can show you on Ras Banas, and this is a little off the beaten track.

[CLERK'S NOTE: The slides mentioned were not provided to the committee.]

Mr. GINN. Why don't we see them right quick?

Captain EMSLEY. As you know, Ras Banas is located on the Red Sea in Southern Egypt near the border with Sudan.

This slide illustrates the location of the airfield and port facilities.

This is the existing fuel loading pier, which will be upgraded for use as an ammunition pier. Lighters will be used for munitions transfer ship to shore.

This existing cargo pier will be upgraded to support on/roll-off ships and tankers.

roll

Mr. REGULA. How does this happen to be there? Was it built by the Egyptians?

Mr. RANSOM. Built by the Egyptians at a time when they were cooperationg very closely with the Soviets.

Mr. REGULA. What was the mission?

93-949 0-82—18

Mr. RANSOM. It was intended to allow the Egyptians to maintain military presence in the southern end of the Red Sea, and-

Mr. GINN. How deep is the harbor?

General DELBRIDGE. That port varies.

At the end of that pier, it is eight meters.

We would anticipate a requirement of about thirteen meters for full depth.

At the other pier, the ammunition pier, it is only two and a half meters in depth; so there is some dredging required.

Mr. GINN. Go ahead.

Captain EMSLEY. This is the existing runway to be upgraded.
Existing underground bunker to be used by the Army
Exising A/C shelters.

An existing barracks built by the Soviets.

Mr. REGULA. What kind of support facilities are there?
General DELBRIDGE. No support facilities are available, sir.

The initial effort that would go into the construction would provided those necessary items. We would propose in the case of water to use a reverse osmosis, desalinization plant with distribution system and sanitary sewer.

Mr. REGULA. What did the Soviets use?

General DELBRIDGE. In the case of power, sir, they used gener

ators.

In the case of water, I don't know.

Do we have an answer on that?

Mr. MYERCHIN. They have an existing desalinization plant. In addition, fresh water is brought in by barge.

Mr. REGULA. This is a fairly remote location?

Colonel REDICAN. Very remote.

Mr. RANSOM. Air, sea and also land, and land is the most difficult.

Mr. GINN. Do you feel that President Mubarak will take any action to provide a formal country-to-country agreement on the use of Ras Banas?

Mr. RANSOM. I don't think he will change the basis on which we use Ras Banas.

He has, however, reaffirmed for us the offer to use those facilities.

We think that the letter that we have is a valid basis for the use of that facility, given the whole range of other activities we undertake in that region of the world.

Mr. GINN. Has President Mubarak offered the use of other facilities in Egypt?

Mr. RANSOM. Yes, sir, he has, for specific contingency uses.

Mr. GINN. This committee has been concerned that although bases overseas are made available to us for construction, the operational agreements are not always certain. The letter from President Sadat concerning Ras Banas indicates that the U.S. could build temporary facilities for the purpose of assisting any Arab or Muslim country requesting assistance to repel an armed attack.

Explain how you interpret this and what limitations are imposed on the operation of Ras Banas?

Mr. RANSOM.