orbiter, solid rocket boosters, the external tank, the launch and landing facilities at the Kennedy Space Center, and the flight planning and control facilities at the Johnson Space Center.

The Air Force, as the Department of Defense's (DOD) executive agent for the shuttle, is responsible for: (1) developing an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) for use by both NASA and DOD to deploy payloads from the shuttle into higher orbits; (2) developing and operating shuttle launch and landing facilities at VAFB, and DOD peculiar facilities at Vandenberg, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, and Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers; and (3) developing and operating a Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) to be located near Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The Air Force retained the design agent responsibility for the launch complex at VAFB. The Corps of Engineers was designated the design agent for the remaining facilities. The Corps of Engineers was designated the construction agent for the entire project as required by law.

The original Space Shuttle Program envisioned that the NASA design and development of the orbiter, solid rocket boosters, external tank, and the launch facilities would be stable by late 1978, and that the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) would achieve its initial operations capability (IOC) by March 1979. The Program Management Directive, dated January 23, 1975, intended that construction of the Vandenberg facilities would be predicated on stable/documented KSC design and that both the KSC ground system and the Space Shuttle would have reached maturity. Needless to say, this did not happen. NASA's initial operating capability (IOC) milestone has slipped 42 months from March 1979 to September 1982.

The Air Force, driven by its dictated schedule of December 1982, did not slip its development of the Vandenberg facilities. This decision forced the Air Force to design and develop the VAFB facillities to less mature requirements than originally intended. The results have been incomplete specifications, drawings, and documentation for construction which are continually updated by NASA. To illustrate, NASA change actions ranged between 800 to 1,600 a month during 1980 and 1981. The Air Force estimated that approximately 200 of these change actions each month had a direct impact on the design and development of the Vandenberg facilities.

In May 1980 when design costs were 250 percent over the original Air Force estimate and construction contracts had been awarded, a basic question was asked by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Housing: "Was design started too early?" The response of the Director of Civil Engineering for the Space Division included the following rhetorical

statement:

"The answer to the question depends upon
one's point of view. If one is to measure
performance based solely upon the execution
of a design program which minimizes lost
design, then obviously the answer to the
question is: 'yes, we started too early.
As a matter of fact, if we required fully
defined stable criteria (a prerequisite for
minimum lost design), we would still be
awaiting a design 'start.' If on the other
hand, one is to measure performance upon
the ability to produce the required facil-
ities commensurate with the schedule dic-
tated (IOC date) in the Program Management
Directive, then the answer is: 'No, we
started too late!' Certainly we were pre-
mature with regard to having fully defined
criteria but there was no choice insofar as
schedules were concerned."

93-641 0-82--43

Each time the Air Force has been faced with insurmountable design and development problems, the "dictated IOC schedule of December 1982 has been slipped." The IOC date is currently set at October 1985. However, due to the unstable design and development of the KSC launch facilities and the orbiter hardware and the Air Force's persistence to meet its constantly slipping IOC date the cost to design and construct the initially identified facilities at Vandenberg has escalated significantly. In addition, many new program requirements have been identified at both Vandenberg and at various NASA locations. The increased cost attributable to design problems will be discussed in Section VII of this report.

The initial Military Construction Program (MCP) requirement estimates for the DOD shuttle program have grown from $252 million to a current working estimate of approximately $617 million. The construction cost of the original identified facilities have escalated from $252 million to a current working estimate of $435 million, a 73 percent increase. In addition, the Air Force has identified new program requirements estimated at $122 million at Vandenberg and at $60 millon at other locations including Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, and NASA locations including Goddard, Kennedy, and Johnson Space Centers. These new program requirements for Vandenberg and NASA locations will be discussed in Section III. A. Cost Growth to the Initial

Vandenberg Requirements

The following table shows the cost growth for each facility element identified before the Committee on March 9, 1978.

Since the Launch Complex, Orbiter Maintenance and Checkout facility, Hypergolic Maintenance and Checkout facility, and STS facility modifications represent approximately 88 percent of the cost growth, these inital requirement facilities are addressed in detail. A summary of the remaining facilities shows that the majority of the 12 percent cost growth is attributable to escalation adjustments of moving the construction to future fiscal years.

1. Launch Complex

The launch complex requirements include construction and modification to an existing launch pad area and launch control center for shuttle operations at Vandenberg. This includes the modification to the existing launch pad to relocate launch position, provide two new exhaust ducts and modify the existing exhaust duct and mobile service tower and supporting facilities. Also included is the construction of an access tower, payload preparation room, movable payload changeout room, gas storage area, and a launch mount. Other modifications involve the existing launch control center to include interior reconfigurations and construction

of two additions for heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system expansion.

According to Space Division officials the original launch complex estimate of $104.7 million was nothing more than a best "guesstimate" based on inadequate design at the time these MCP funds were requested in March 1978. The Air Force did not achieve a design status of approximately 35 percent as expected by the Congress, prior to their submission for authorization and appropriation of these funds. Construction contracts had been awarded without fully defined, stable design critiera. The lau complex was divided into four packages and each package was advertised and awarded separately in an attempt to meet the imposed IOC date. The following table illustrates the launch complex cost history from August 1977 through the December 1981 current working estimates.