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that correct? You drop down to the shelter research and development and there was no item under that heading this year.

Mr. MCKINNEY. That is correct.

ESTIMATE, 1965

Senator MAGNUSON. And this year the estimate is $265,600,000, that is a new item under a new heading. The chairman got a little optimistic and we thought we would drop $41 million someplace.

All right, the Secretary has a short statement and we will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. VANCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before your committee.

My purpose is briefly to underscore the importance of this program as an indispensable element of our national security. Secretary Ailes and Mr. Durkee will discuss the matters before you in more detail.

STUDIES IN CIVIL DEFENSE

Within the Defense Department, an assessment of the importance of civil defense and, in particular, of the fallout shelter program, rests upon detailed studies, the views of senior military officers, and the best judgment of Secretary McNamara and his advisers in this field. All point to civil defense as an essential ingredient of national defense. In both practical and human terms, all indicate the especial importance of a nationwide fallout shelter program.

In my view, a civil defense program with emphasis on fallout shelters is essential because:

It will save many millions of lives in the event of nuclear attack; It will demonstrate our national will to stand fast, recover from nuclear attack, and look to the future with optimistic determination; It will give us more flexibility in making future decisions as to weapons systems and strategy:

It will, as Mr. McNamara has said, "contribute much more, dollar for dollar, to the saving of lives" than further increases in either our strategic retaliatory or continental air and missile defense forces; It will, in accomplishing all of the foregoing, strengthen our deterrent posture.

CIVIL DEFENSE ELEMENT OF DEFENSE

The complementary relationship of the civil defense program to military measures seems apparent to me. It has repeatedly been emphasized by our senior military leaders.

General Wheeler, in testifying before the Senate, pointed out that: The objectives of deterrence and of limiting damage on the United States are served by a combination of offenses and defenses

and identified civil defense as an element of our defenses, a conservator of lives, and so a "significant part of our national security effort." General LeMay has written that civil defense has the same objective as active defense operations; namely minimizing damage to our country and its people. Thus, he stated:

Civil defense is a vital element of our national deterrent posture and is another factor which must be carefully assessed by any potential enemy in calculating his chances of success.

FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

But just as the relationship of civil defense to military defense measures is apparent, so, too, is it clear that a nationwide program for fallout shelters is important in its own right. It will stand on its own feet. No matter what else we do, fallout shelters would save lives and give us a human springboard to national recovery from nuclear attack. No matter what future decisions are made as to defensive systems, these shelters are needed.

With reference to future decisions as to defenses, perhaps one of the most significant questions to be answered is whether or not the NIKE-X ballistic missile defense system merits deployment. It is the view of our experts that such a system is closely related to the development of fallout shelters. Indeed, they question that ballistic missile defenses would serve any effective purpose if not coupled in timely fashion with fallout shelters.

Mr. McNamara, reflecting this widely held view, has said that an active defense

in the absence of adequate fallout shelters *** might not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an “all-out” nuclear attack. Offensive missiles

he pointed out

could easily be targeted at points outside the defended area and thereby achieve by fallout what otherwise would have to be achieved by blast and heat effects. In short, it is essential to move forward with the program we are supporting today.

DEFERMENT OF FALLOUT SHELTER BILL

As you consider the budgetary request before you, I should like to mention two recent events which may have been misconstrued.

The first is the decision by the responsible Senate Armed Services Subcommittee to defer action on H.R. 8200, the administration's fallout shelter bill. This decision has been interpreted by some news sources as an abandonment of the fallout shelter program.

Senator Jackson has made it very clear that this is not the case. The deferral decision was based on several factors not directly related to the substance of the bill, and the committee suggests that further work be undertaken to enhance the national shelter capability within the authority of existing law. It is for this reason, Mr. Chairman, that the Department transmitted several budget revisions to you recently, reprograming some $72 million of the fiscal year 1965 budget request to purposes authorized under the basic Civil Defense Act. This should not be construed as an executive branch reduction in priority for new legislation of the type proposed in H.R. 8200. There has been no change in the administration's position that legislative authority should be enacted promptly to permit incorporation of fallout shelters in existing and new facilities of nonprofit institutions.

TRANSFER OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO ARMY

The other event to which I referred is the recent transfer of the Office of Civil Defense to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. I have been distressed to read statements in the press to the effect that this move constituted a downgrading of civil defense. I want to state categorically that this is not so. Rather, this action constituted recognition of the progress already made and a belief that the program, now essentially operational, should be located in that office already having principal responsibility for coordinating military support of civil authority.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this program is critical to the security of the people and the military defense of the Nation. Good progress has been made, but further progress is essential. I urge your support in this.

(The statement of Mr. Ailes follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN AILES, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Army has long had a particular interest in civil defense. We are responsible, as you know, for the development and, if there were a decision to deploy, for the operation of an active ballistic missile defense system. The Army is also responsible for the coordination of military support of civil defense. I would like to discuss these matters after I outline for you the manner in which I intend to administer my new responsibilities for the entire civil defense program.

The delegation of civil defense responsibilities from the Secretary of Defense is a personal one to me. Under the terms of this delegation, the Army staff has no responsibilities. I have redelegated my authority to Mr. William P. Durkee who has been designated the Director of the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army. He will report directly to me. The civilian nature of the leadership, supervision, and control are in no way changed by this action. The Office of Civil Defense is now a fully operational agency within the Defense Department. This being the case, Mr. McNamara decided to incorporate it within one of the operational military departments. The Army was the logical choice due to our already great interest in this field.

To assure that all matters involving civil defense are given priority attention and support, I have directed my top civilian staff to make available to the civil defense decisionmaking process all the talents available to the Department of the Army. However, civil defense remains a civilian responsibility in the same fashion as our authority over the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal Company is assigned to me as Secretary of the Army, and not to the Army staff.

We will deal with the problems of civil defense in relation to their place in our total defense posture. The same approach must be taken with respect to decisions to deploy any ballistic missile defense system. Secretary of Defense McNamara has defined this problem in his March posture briefing to the Appropriations Committees: "*** the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense might not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an 'all out' nuclear attack. Offensive missiles could easily be targeted at points outside the defended area and thereby achieve by fallout what otherwise would have to be achieved by blast and heat effects."

I need not repeat what Secretary Vance said about the justification for the program standing alone because of the millions of lives that a fallout shelter system would save in a nuclear attack. As I am sure most of you know, General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, strongly supports this program and the military justification for it. I would like to quote a paragraph from his presentation before the Armed Services Committees:

"Speaking both for myself as a professional soldier and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a fallout protection oriented civil defense is clearly a necessary element of the total U.S. national security effort." Later, he said, "To sum up, effective fallout protection of our population, both civilian and military, gives us

flexibility in the courses of action we may pursue. We illustrate our national will to aggressors. We improve our deterrent posture, and we increase our capacity to withstand attack. This is why we say that civil defense is a significant part of our national security effort."

Just as civil defense is an essential element of military defense, so military support is an important element of civil defense. As Under Secretary of the Army, I gave this problem considerable attention. Certain conclusions seem clear to me. The effective support by our military resources of civil defense both in planning and in actual operations in a nuclear disaster greatly increases the country's ability to minimize damage and speed recovery. However, great care must be exercised to insure that civilian civil defense efforts at Federal, State, and local levels are not relaxed. We cannot permit our Armed Forces to become irrevocably committed to the task of civil defense. Our Armed Forces must retain their capability to deal with military threats: The military forces and resources based in this country, even if committed entirely to civil defense operations, could not cope with the requirements since these forces represent less than 3 percent of the Nation's manpower and equipment potential. In my judgment, therefore, the key to effective military support of civil defense is the existence of a suitable organization which can respond readily to the requirements of the civil defense organization at all levels of Government. An inconsistency presently exists between the civil defense organization and that of the military. The civil defense organization extends from regional headquarters to the State civil defense, and thence to county and local civil defense headquarters, while in the Regular Army organization there are no headquarters at the State level. The essential element lacking in carrying out the Army mission in a civil defense emergency is the availability in each State of a military headquarters to plan for and to control military support operations in civil defense emergencies under the supervision of an appropriate Army commander. There now exists in the National Guard organization a headquarters and headquarters detachment in each State which could be utilized as a State-level military headquarters for military support of civil defense within the State.

Essentially, the State AG's would be used as follows:

In the event of a nuclear attack, the State AG and the necessary elements of his headquarters would be called into Federal service. The State AG would

then come under the command of the ZI Army commander in whose area he is located, and would have operational command of the military resources, including Reserve and Active Army units, within his State which were made available by the ZI Army commander for the military support mission.

If State AG's and necessary elements of their headquarters are to be called into Federal service in event of a nuclear attack, these same people should have premobilization responsibilities for the planning and preparation for military support of civil defense within their States. They should carry out this function under the supervision of the CONUS Army commanders. It is not intended, however, that military forces in any State assume the major civil defense responsibility.

This organizational concept has certain obvious advantages. In utilizing State headquarters, it utilizes existing military staffs who do not otherwise have a mobilization assignment. Further, it provides an ideal means of coordinating State and Federal organizations. In 11 States the State AG now has civil defense responsibilities. During the premobilization phase the Governor of each State, working through his Adjutant General, will have an input to the planning which will affect his State. Even after mobilization, a familiar means of coordination will exist between the Governor and the senior military authority with responsibility concerning the State. This plan will thus provide a standard military chain of command, made up of compatible military components, which can function with maximum effectiveness in cooperation with State and Federal authorities.

It is important to preserve the integrity of the military chain of command. However, within the civil defense mission assignment, the military commander must be given enough discretionary power to enable him to support relevant civil authority.

In April 1963, I presented this concept to the Association of State Adjutants General during their conference in San Juan, P.R., and they approved it.

The Chief of Staff of the Army then appointed a planning board at USCONARC consisting of representatives from the CONARC staff, the CONUS armies, the National Guard Bureau, the Association of State Adjutants General, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of Civil Defense, to study methods of implementing this

TRANSFER OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO ARMY

The other event to which I referred is the recent transfer of the Office of Civil Defense to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. I have been distressed to read statements in the press to the effect that this move constituted a downgrading of civil defense. I want to state categorically that this is not so. Rather, this action constituted recognition of the progress already made and a belief that the program, now essentially operational, should be located in that office already having principal responsibility for coordinating military support of civil authority.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this program is critical to the security of the people and the military defense of the Nation. Good progress has been made, but further progress is essential. I urge your support in this.

(The statement of Mr. Ailes follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN AILES, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Army has long had a particular interest in civil defense. We are responsible, as you know, for the development and, if there were a decision to deploy, for the operation of an active ballistic missile defense system. The Army is also responsible for the coordination of military support of civil defense. I would like to discuss these matters after I outline for you the manner in which I intend to administer my new responsibilities for the entire civil defense program.

The delegation of civil defense responsibilities from the Secretary of Defense is a personal one to me. Under the terms of this delegation, the Army staff has no responsibilities. I have redelegated my authority to Mr. William P. Durkee who has been designated the Director of the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army. He will report directly to me. The civilian nature of the leadership, supervision, and control are in no way changed by this action. The Office of Civil Defense is now a fully operational agency within the Defense Department. This being the case, Mr. McNamara decided to incorporate it within one of the operational military departments. The Army was the logical choice due to our already great interest in this field.

To assure that all matters involving civil defense are given priority attention and support, I have directed my top civilian staff to make available to the civil defense decisionmaking process all the talents available to the Department of the Army. However, civil defense remains a civilian responsibility in the same fashion as our authority over the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal Company is assigned to me as Secretary of the Army, and not to the Army staff.

We will deal with the problems of civil defense in relation to their place in our total defense posture. The same approach must be taken with respect to decisions to deploy any ballistic missile defense system. Secretary of Defense McNamara has defined this problem in his March posture briefing to the Appropriations Committees: "*** the effectiveness of an active ballistic missile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defense system. Indeed, in the absence of adequate fallout shelters, an active defense might not significantly increase the proportion of the population surviving an ‘all out' nuclear attack. Offensive missiles could easily be targeted at points outside the defended area and thereby achieve by fallout what otherwise would have to be achieved by blast and heat effects."

I need not repeat what Secretary Vance said about the justification for the program standing alone because of the millions of lives that a fallout shelter system would save in a nuclear attack. As I am sure most of you know, General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, strongly supports this program and the military justification for it. I would like to quote a paragraph from his presentation before the Armed Services Committees:

"Speaking both for myself as a professional soldier and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a fallout protection oriented civil defense is clearly a necessary element of the total U.S. national security effort." Later, he said, "To sum up, effec tive fallout protection of our population, both civilian and military, gives us

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