Reorganization is all too often a palliative administered to avoid taking the action necessary to address real problems. Frantic action is substituted and used as a cover for lack of accomplishment. The hard problems need to be addressed in substance, not just in form. All too often, the reorganization tack is taken to evidence great movement, but with no clear notion of the direction that should be taken. I think that may well be what is going on here. The Reorganization Plan under consideration by the Congress in my view is not a complete answer to the Commission's organizational difficulties or to improved regulation of nuclear power. Whether it will aggravate matters to the extent which the Commission statement suggests is less obvious. Inasmuch as the Plan may be the source of heightened tension and distrust within the Commission, however, it has at least the potential to aggravate regulatory problems, not help in their resolution. With that backdrop, let me suggest a few things which, in my view, need to be taken. into account as the future of this agency is considered: 1. This is a licensing agency; it is not a non-licensing agency. Its purpose is to issue and administer licenses in the interest of the public health and safety and the environment. The agency's purpose is to ensure that acceptable safety and environmental criteria have been thoroughly drawn and considered and that these criteria have been and continue to be met by licensees. We are not, and I believe should not be, commissioned by the Congress to debate the issue of the wisdom and desirability of nuclear power. As early as June 1976, I first expressed concern on this matter In this regard, one must recognize that all regulatory bodies are Commission conducts its affairs, to which I refer. An unequivocal 2. There also is a tendency in this agency, which I believe is the way to its ultimate destruction, best described as self-flagellation. Self-analysis and self-criticism are healthy and, indeed, are representative of a level of maturity which one should expect of an agency as vital to the national good as our own. But when that criticism becomes an all but paranoid expression of a feeling. of inadequacy or inability to effectively do the public's business in accord with the law, it suggests the ultimate demise of the agency, not progress toward a better and more effective regulatory program. Moreover, a continuing dialogue of criticism unaccompanied by a recognition of true worth--worth of a staff devoted to the public interest and incomparable in its qualification--can eventually lead to nothing but destroyed morale and thus destroyed organization. Reorganization will not deal with questions such as these and yet they are fundamental. 3. It is one thing to be skeptical, but the definition of skepticism--an attitude of disposition towards doubt--suggests more than just a deep and abiding concern with safety. Rather, it suggests a question of whether safety is even achievable, and thus, whether effective regulation is possible; and, therefore, whether nuclear power should be pursued. Skepticism about the wisdom of nuclear power leads to different responses than skepticism as to the efficacy of specific safety standards or criteria. I have heard it said that skepticism is the thing that drives us to more effective regulation. I am suggesting only that that may not be the case. Rather, it would seem to me that the true skeptic is likely to reach a conclusion ultimately favoring his doubts. I am not sure in my own mind that this necessarily means safer nuclear power. It may just mean less nuclear power. Again, in the last analysis, it is perfectly clear that, in the world of risk-taking in which we all live, the most risk-free nuclear power plant is one which has never been built, and next to that, the one which isn't operating. 4. Organization is simply a means of categorizing and assigning responsibilities in recognizable and effective patterns to get the job done; and those responsibilities must be accompanied by appropriate authorities if that job is to be done. The Congress wisely considered this fundamental premise in its passage of the Energy Reorganization Act. It provided this agency with what is, 5. at least in some measure, an unusual structure by establishing It is interesting that the reorganization proposal does nothing directly to deal with the problem which all, including Commissioners, over the years have seen--I speak of the existence of separate staff elements whose truly outstanding efforts lack integration. I have in mind the necessary feedback relationship which must exist between licensing review, inspection and enforcement activity, formulation and conduct of research programs, and drafting of regulations and technical guides. All of these must reflect operating experience on as near a real-time basis as is possible. Though we have taken some steps in this direction, there is much yet to be done to achieve the kind of integration which I believe is essential to effective regulation over time. This is something which the Commission itself can and must address. I do not believe that the reorganization plan makes that more or less likely, either of being undertaken or of being successful. 6. Moreover, for its part, the Commission should attend to developing a procedural framework for its own regulatory actions and decisions. which assures that no single Commissioner can hamstring the orderly conduct of the Commission's business. The Commission has already recognized this need and I am pleased to say has taken some positive steps in this direction to enhance the effectiveness of its collegial activities. It is important that this progress not be lost. In sum, I am not convinced that the proposals before the Congress will necessarily or even predictably make improvements, but they surely will make it different. Different is not always better, and I am not convinced that the proposed reorganization will make it better. In the last analysis, what will make the Commission function or fail to function in an effective way is decided in the appointment process. The managerial dimension of nuclear regulation is more a function of people than organization structure. It is doubtful that any organizational structure for the Commission can harmonize widely differing views about the substance of nuclear regulation. The President and the Congress hold the tools to formulate the answer, not in the power to reorganize but rather in the power to define the nation's policy and to appoint and confirm Commission members who believe that nuclear power is needed, is technically sound, and can be produced safely, and who thus will have the incentive to make it as safe as possible. APPENDIX C TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. LEESON EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TECHNICAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES Before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY of the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS MARCH 25, 1980 (92) Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be able to appear before you today to comment on H.R. 4717, which has been titled "Federal Personnel Ceilings and Contracting Activities." I understand that you are limiting the scope of these hearings to Section 3 of the bill, which, while only six lines in length has aroused at least half of the attention given to H.R. 4717. These six lines reportedly would help end the "wasteful year-end spending". However, an analysis of the reported "problem" and the "solution" indicate that this section would worsen the situation. If there is a problem with year-end spending, it can only result from one of three situations. 1. Contracting officials improperly or illegally let contracts at the end of the contract year for goods and/or services that should not be purchased. I believe that we can agree that unless these goods or services should not be purchased, and the contract is improperly or illegally arranged, there is no harm done. We have the same problem with last minute Christmas shopping, and no one has suggested we be forced to complete 80% by Columbus Day. 2. Agency management improperly or illegally contract for goods and/or services at the end of the contract year that should not be purchased. In both cases 1 and 2, there is intent on the part of contracting officials or management to let improper or illegal contracts. 3. Due to the rush of work, particularly in years in which it is several months into the fiscal year before appropriations are available, procurement is delayed on a high volume of goods and services until the last month or two of the fiscal year. Delays in audits, appraisal of progress in research and development, and good program management can all lead to extensive expenditures late in the |