Commission. In the past, this responsibility has not been clearly fixed and, consequently, has been neglected.

The Chairman is directed to delegate day-to-day administrative management of the agency to the Executive Director for Operations. The original plan intended that the Chairman would make such a delegation so that he could be relieved from excessive managerial detail, but the plan did not mandate such a delegation.

Under the mandatory delegation in the amended plan, it remains clear that the Chairman retains final decisionmaking responsibility, subject to Commission approval where indicated, for the functions that he delegates. It is also clear that the EDO performs these functions subject to the supervision and direction of the Chairman to whom he reports. The Chairman is also directed to consult the EDO when initiating the selection of a person to fill an office director position under supervision by the EDO.

In sum, the changes which affect the EDO give that position additional status as the Chairman's designated subordinate responsible for managing the day-to-day activities of the agency.

The amended reorganization plan before you continues to assign to the full Commission those functions which benefit from collegial deliberation by the members. These are policy formulation, rulemaking, and adjudication-the substantive heart of nuclear safety regulation. In sum, the Commission has the task of setting the policy and seeing to its proper implementation in Commission rules and decisions. In Commission decisions on the above matters, each member will continue to have responsibility and authority equal to that of the other four members. Decisions will be by majority vote. The plan authorizes the Commission to delegate part of these functions to the Chairman or any other member. This corrects the limitation of the current law which prevents efficient conduct of business through delegation of defined authority to a member where this may be useful in the view of the majority.

I want to emphasize that the Commission majority remains the ultimate authority for setting nuclear safety policy. The plan leaves its regulatory powers intact in providing policy direction to the staff through the Chairman and to affected interests outside of the NRC.

The studies have shown that the Commission has lagged in providing such direction, for example in resolving generic issues of nuclear safety. They have also participated in few reactor licensing cases over the years. This plan is designed, in large part, to free the members from the administrative details that have distracted them from deliberating and resolving policy issues, the task for which the Commission was created.

The plan places in the Chairman all functions not vested in the Commission. These include the responsibility of serving as principal executive officer and official spokesman of the agency. The principal executive officer role includes determination of the use and expenditure of funds and presentation to the Commission of the annual budget and any major reorganization.

The Chairman is also vested with supervision of the staff including the EDO, and for assuring that it is responsive to the needs of the Commission. The EDO reports directly to the Chairman for all

matters. The Chairman will take the lead in planning for policy development and presentations to the Commission.

Finally, and very importantly, the Chairman will initiate all key appointment and removal actions.

Let me spend a moment discussing the reporting relationships as proposed by the plan. The line organization of NRC reports to the Executive Director for Operations who, in turn, reports to the Chairman. This is a fundamental change in the present practice and is necessary to provide the unified management that is sorely needed. The single most debilitating flaw in NRC's management is the current structure whereby the heads of operating offices report to five individual Commissioners at least in an arm's-length formal manner. Such an arrangement contributes to irresponsible management with no one really in charge or accountable.

Instructions to the line officers would come from the Executive Director for Operations acting under the supervision of the Chairman. The EDO, as well as the Chairman, is charged with following the policies set by the Commission. Office heads have had no one from top management with clear authority to set priorities or resolve conflicting instructions. Office heads have often had to clear proposed actions with all five Commissioners who, of course, frequently disagree.

Coordination among officers in meeting program objectives requires a strong executive director as their immediate supervisor. Negotiating with Commission members to obtain management policy direction requires a strong Chairman who is closely linked to the EDO acting as his day-to-day agent.

The reorganization will finally make it clear to key officials to whom they report and who reports to them. There will be a clear line from top management to successive levels of organization. There is far less danger of matters falling between the cracks when someone is responsible for seeing that this does not happen. Accountability for actions or inaction will be fixed, a critical consideration in the area of nuclear safety.

A concern has been expressed that a single line of command may result in muzzling the staff. I believe that the section-by-section analysis submitted in connection with the original plan resolves this concern by demonstrating that the Commission has full access to all information it requires and that the Chairman cannot block the flow of information. The amended plan makes this even more explicit. As an additional safeguard, the plan specifically authorizes any officer or employee to communicate directly with the Commission or to any member when they believe a critical problem of health, safety, or national security is not being addressed.

This provision in law is in addition to the Commission "open door" policy that permits any staff member to contact a Commissioner on any matter when he believes such action is warranted.

Finally, let me say a word about the plan's provision for agency response to emergencies. The accident at Three Mile Island revealed serious shortcomings in the capabilities of the NRC as well as other agencies and branches of Government to deal effectively with an emergency situation. This is particularly attributable to legislative

provisions that prevent the Commission from delegating emergency management to one of its members, although delegations can be made to staff.

When a serious emergency arises, a politically accountable official should be designated to act as needed. Under the present system, several Commission members may try to deal with fast-breaking events requiring urgent decisions not susceptible to group deliberations.

Consequently, the plan makes the Chairman responsible for dealing with incidents at a facility or concerning materials licensed or regulated by the Commission. Such management functions include declaring an emergency, issuing orders, and advising the civil authorities and the public. The Chairman may delegate his emergency authority to any of the other Commissioners to provide for contingencies such as dual emergencies or the Chairman's temporary absence from the agency.

Of course, the delegations may continue to be made to staff. The Chairman is best suited to respond to an emergency because he best knows the organization capabilities of key staff.

Finally, the Chairman's authority in responding to an emergency is subject to prior Commission policy guidance and subsequent oversight. Advance planning for dealing with emergencies is developed within the Commission policy guidelines.

Upon termination of the emergency, the Chairman or other member delegated response authority shall render a report to the Commission on actions taken. If the Commission is not assured that the response was properly handled, it can initiate its own investigation.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the greatest resource available to the NRC is its expert staff. This resource is being poorly served and poorly utilized under the unfocused management that has characterized the NRC. It needs to be supported by top management while subject to managerial discipline through clear lines of authority. It needs coherent policy direction which can only be provided by the Commission doing its job.

Through establishing the proper roles of the Commission, the Chairman, the Executive Director for Operations, and the staff, and having each concentrate on what each does best, nuclear safety will be advanced.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared testimony. We would be glad to take your questions.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you very much.

What in this plan will insure more effective operations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission?

Mr. WELLFORD. First, that we have established a more disciplined management system to see that the day-to-day administration of the agency is carried forward in an accountable and responsible manner. The Chairman is made chief executive officer in fact as well as name. Second, we have clarified the respective roles of the key elements of the Commission. The Commissioners are charged to devote themselves to policymaking, to adjudication, to rulemaking, which is what Congress originally intended that they do. The Chairman is responsible for supervising the staff. The EDO is given a clear line authority as the Chairman's delegate to help oversee day-to-day administration.

Finally, the reporting relationships are made clear. The emphasis on teamwork, on having the chief line officers of the agency report through the EDO to the Chairman and then to the Commission, is important. The fragmentation of present management has been described by all the studies of the NRC, and this system helps to clarify those relationships and provide a more efficient, direct management structure.

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Mr. BROOKS. What authority will the Executive Director for Oper- afe ations have over the various offices within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: the Office of Nuclear Safeguards, and the Office of pro Nuclear Regulatory Research, et cetera?

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Mr. WELLFORD. First, he has authority that derives from reporting go relationships. These offices now are directed by law to report to the EDO and not directly to individual Commissioners.

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Second, he has the additional status as the mandated delegate of the y Chairman in the day-to-day administration of the agency.

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Third, we have given him the authority to select certain key staff com officers without further action by the Commission.

These are all changes in the law, or in the current practice of the NRC, and I think they are going to give the EDO a much clearer role. ist Mr. BROOKS. Will the Executive Director for Operations have re-get sponsibility for hiring any of his line officers? How will this responsibility be shared, if at all, with the Chairman?

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Mr. WELLFORD. He does have a very clear authority in selecting si the staff officers. With respect to the program officers, the plan pro-ma poses that the Chairman, in initiating selection of these officials, consult the EDO. And then, of course, the Commission has final approval. the Mr. BROOKS. In other words, the Chairman and the Commission will ge have to approve any of these appointments?

Mr. WELLFORD. That is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. He might well initiate some.
Mr. WELLFORD. That is correct.

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I suspect that in the day-to-day affairs the Chairman will turn to in the EDO to help with the recruitment, coming up with names for vacancies, and so forth.

do Mr. BROOKS. How does the plan improve the ability of the Nuclear m Regulatory Commission to better meet its mission of insuring safety th in the commercial nuclear power industry?

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Mr. WELLFORD. The plan does this in a number of ways. The first ta and most important way is that we are preventing important safety issues from falling between the cracks by making clear who is re- a sponsible for particular areas of policy and management.

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Second, we are clarifying reporting relationships so that internal a accountability is understood.

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Third, and probably most importantly in response to this question, e the emergency management responsibility of the agency is no longer going to be turned over to a committee to run; it is going to be the fi responsibility of the Chairman.

Mr. BROOKS. All right. I want to thank you very much. I appreciate your bringing Mr. Dinsmore and Ms. Connor down. I appreciate your cooperation.

Mr. WELLFORD. Thank you.

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Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Horton?

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Mr. HORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Harrison, it is good to have you back before the committee again. I have just a few quick questions I would like to ask you.

Why was the recommendation for a single administrator turned down by the President?

Mr. WELLFORD. The basic reason was the conclusion that nuclear safety is an area of such extraordinary controversiality in this country that a Commission framework which provides for diversity of opinion, provides for a number of safeguards against precipitous and unwise action, was necessary to reassure the public that nuclear safety was going to be managed with the proper care and deliberation.

That has been a conclusion reached by the Congress when the NRC was set up and we found that, all things considered, it was better to the try to improve executive management within a collegial system than go through the trauma of trying to convert an independent regulatory commission into a single executive agency.

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Mr. HORTON. One of the criticisms of the plan is that the Chairman the will become too strong and he will have increased control over administration, staff, and flow of information. Is this a backdoor attempt to get a single administrator?

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Mr. WELLFORD. No; we are trying to have the best of both worlds. We are trying to preserve a proper collegial role for the Commissioners as a whole. They will continue to be the authority for rulemaking and adjudication and setting ultimate nuclear safety policy. But you must remember, the NRC has a number of other functions that are not quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative. It does operate in emergencies; it has a number of line functions that are much more analogous to those of an executive branch agency. Therefore we feel that in addition to having to a collegial decisionmaking process for policy, we need to have a stronger management system that is accountable to see that safety policy is carried out, that good staff are selected, and that reporting relationships are crisp and efficient.

Mr. HORTON. The NRC has had a long tradition of so-called open door policies where staffers can go to any Commissioner on important matters, particularly with regard to nuclear safety. Do you think that this new proposal is going to inhibit that in any way? Perhaps because the Chairman has more control over the staff, will the staff feel reluctant to go to some other Commissioner, do you think?

Mr. WELLFORD. Mr. Horton, I really do not think that this plan does anything to inhibit the open door policy. We specifically state that we expect that policy to continue. And. indeed by making the Chairman and the EDO specifically responsible for keeping the Commission members fully and currently informed, I think we may even have enhanced it.

Mr. HORTON. Will there be any staff increases or reductions resulting from the plan? The Chairman might very well want to have additional staffers. Has any thought been given to that?

Mr. WELLFORD. We do not anticipate that there will be any significant staffing changes as a result of this plan. There may be a very modest change, perhaps, in the immediate office of the Chairman. But that is not an area that we see as a major problem. It is not the number