Illusionism: as a theory of consciousness
Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an illusion. This book is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies devoted to this topic. It takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of the theory such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented and different viewpoints are discussed and defended. The colleciton is tied together with a response to the commentaries from the editor.
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acquaintance anomalous appear argues argument attention schema theory awareness brain causal Chalmers change blindness claim cognitive colour conscious experience Consciousness Explained Consciousness Studies Daniel Dennett Dennett deny direct phenomenal epistemic epistemology existence experiential properties explain fact Frankish functional Gazzaniga Graziano Humphrey illusion of phenomenality illusion problem illusionism illusionist illusionist theories illusory instantiated intentional objects internal model intrinsic properties introspective representations issue Keith Frankish magic manifest situation mental metaphysical misrepresent mode of presentation naďve theory neural Nicholas Humphrey one’s Oxford University Press panpsychism panpsychist Penrose triangle perception Pereboom phenomenal belief phenomenal consciousness phenomenal feelings phenomenal properties phenomenal realism phenomenology philosophers philosophy of mind physicalist position processes properties of experience psychokinesis psychology qualia quasi-phenomenal radical reality refer represent right hemisphere Russellian monism s-consciousness seems sensations sense sensory split-brain patients target article Tartaglia theoretical theory of consciousness things Vasubandhu veridical visual zombies