R, a doctor of medicine, filed an application for old-age insurance benefits on June 24, 1960. His application was denied for lack of an insured status. Notice of this determination was mailed to R on January 18, 1961. On June 14, 1961, R requested reconsideration of this determination, but he was informed in a letter dated May 17, 1962, that upon reconsideration the denial of his application was affirmed. At the same time he was notified that if he wanted a hearing before a hearing examiner of the Social Security Administration, he must file a request for a hearing not later than 6 months from the date of the letter. R did not file a request for a hearing until March 21, 1963, more than 10 months after the mailing date of the notice of reconsidered determination. With his request for a hearing, R submitted a statement in which he advanced his reasons for failure to file a request for a hearing within the 6month time limitation: He stated that he injured a vertebra on June 10, 1962; that he postponed treatment of the injury because on the following June 18 he was to be speaker and honored guest of a national fraternity and recipient of its award. On June 21, 1962, R entered the hospital and was not discharged until July 18, 1962. Thereafter he was confined to his home, practically bedridden, until about December 18, 1962, when he was permitted to be up around the house with a back brace. He was again hospitalized from January 28 to February 4, 1963, this time for a cataract operation; following this operation, he was unable to read until March 14, 1963, when he received glasses. R concluded, "These disabilities, interruptions, and distractions were the reason for the delay in filing my request for a hearing***” 66# * * Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act provides in pertinent part that a request for a hearing must be filed within such period after [a reconsidered determination] as may be prescribed in regulations of the Secretary, except that the period so prescribed may not be less than 6 months after notice of such [reconsidered determination] is mailed to the individual making such request." Section 404.918 of Social Security Administration Regulations No.. 4 (20 CFR 404.918) states in pertinent part that the request for a hearing must be filed within 6 months after the date of mailing notice of the reconsidered determination except where the time is extended as provided in sections 404.612 and 404.954. Section 404.954 (a) of Regulations No. 4 (20 CFR 404.954 (a) provides, as pertinent here, that: may petition for an ex- * The petition shall be in Any party to a reconsidered determination The question presented in this case is whether R has shown "good cause" for extending the time period in which he might request a hearing. The record in this case shows that R is a doctor of medicine, well edu cated, and able to read and interpret notices. Therefore, it must be presumed that he understood his obligations as explained in the notice of the reconsidered determination mailed to him on May 17, 1962. There was nothing to prevent R from filing a request for a hearing during the period of more than 30 days from the date he received the notice to the date he entered the hospital on June 18, 1962. While R has suffered serious impairments, the existence of a physical impairment is not in itself "good cause" for extension of the time period. Even during his hospitalization and while bedridden at home, R undoubtedly had access to a telephone or to persons who could act as his agents in carrying out his obligations, such as paying bills, answering correspondence, etc. It is not unreasonable to expect as much from him in his dealings with the Social Security Administration. Accordingly, it is held that R has not shown "good cause" for extending the time for filing a request for a hearing, and therefore his request for a hearing filed on March 21, 1963, is dismissed. SECTIONS 205 (g), 216(i), 223.-JUDICIAL REVIEW-JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TO REVIEW REMAND ORDER OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 20 CFR 404.951 SSR 68-57c BOHMS v. GARDNER, 381 F. 2d 283 (8th Cir., 1967), Cert. Denied 390 U.S. 964 U.S. March 4, (1968) The claimant initiated civil action for review of the Secretary's final decision denying his application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits. The United States District Court vacated the Secretary's decision and remanded the case to the Secretary for a rehearing and the taking of additional evidence. The claimant immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals contesting the remand and the district court's failure to order the payment of benefits. Held, (1) the remand by the district court was proper under section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act; (2) since the district court neither granted nor denied relief, it made no final decision on the complaint; and (3) the remand order was not, therefore, a "final decision" of the lower court; accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review the remand order of the district court. Before VAN OOSTERHOFT, BLACKMAN and LAY, Circuit Judges. Alfred F. Bohms, pursuant to § 205 (g) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), instituted this action for review of the Secretary's final decision disallowing Bohms' claim for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits under the definitions in § 216(i)(1)(A) and § 223(c) (2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (A) and 423(c) (2). The claimant's application, filed in August 1963, was initially denied administratively and was denied again on reconsideration. He asked for a hearing. One was held but the examiner's decision was also adverse. Then the Appeals Council denied Bohms' request for review. At that point the claimant retained an attorney and this suit was brought. The defendant-Secretary filed with his answer, as required by § 205 (g), a certified copy of the transcript of the administrative record. Both sides moved for summary jurisdiction. (sic) Judge Nichol denied these motions and entered judgment reversing the decision of the Secretary and remanding the case to the Secretary "for the purpose of rehearing" and for the taking of such additional evidence as the respective parties deemed appropriate. The court's unreported supporting memorandum reveals that he entertained reservations about the correctness of the standard of disability employed by the hearing examiner; about the claimant's confusion, in a proceeding where he was not represented by counsel, as to his burden of proof and his right to cross examine; and about the absence in the record of possibly pertinent documentary evidence. Bohms appeals from those parts of the district court's judgment which remand the matter to the Secretary and which fail "to adjudicate that the Secretary be ordered to forthwith pay to the plaintiff disability insurance benefits as prayed for." His motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis was denied by the district court on the grounds that the appeal was not taken in good faith, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and that the “judgment. . . is not an appealable order." Judge Nichol also expressly refused to issue the certificate which is required for an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court waived the printing of the record and authorized the filing of typewritten briefs. We are immediately and obviously confronted with an issue as to our appellate jurisdiction. The Secretary urges that Bohms' appeal should be dismissed because the judgment appealed from is not a final decision of the district court. Our jurisdiction of appeals from federal district courts is based on the statutory concept of finality: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although the Supreme Court has been liberal and pragmatic, and necessarily so, in its approach to this statute and has given it a "practical rather than a technical construction," see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962), finality (subject to exceptions, not applicable here, such as those provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.) is the firmly established requirement. Section 1291 has its origin in § 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 84. The Supreme Court has observed that by it "Congress has lone expressed a policy against piecemeal appeals." Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-79 (1955). See Switzerland Cheese, Ass'n v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966); Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124–27 (1962); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-27 (1940); McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891); United States 66 *Section 205 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), reads in part: ... The court shall, on motion of the Secretary made before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and may, at any time, on good cause shown, order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or its decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the exent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision. 99 v. Bailey, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 267, 272 (1835); 6 Moore's Federal Practice (Second Edition, 1966), par. 54.11 and .12[1]. The Supreme Court, in Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945), has given us a definition: A "final decision" generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. This court, of course, has accepted and utilized that definition. Smith v. Sherman, 349 F. 2d 547, 551-52 (8 Cir. 1965). See Directory Services, Inc. v. United States, 353 F. 2d 299 (8 Cir. 1965). From this it inevitably follows, we feel, that the present appeal must be dismissed. Although the Secretary made a final administrative decision for purposes of court review under 205 (g), Cody v. Ribicoff, 289 F. 2d 394, 395 (8 Cir. 1961); Murphy v. Gardner, . . . F. 2d. . . (8 Cir. 1967), no such decision was made at the district court level. And it is district court action which measures our appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. The district court merely vacated the Secretary's decision and remanded the case for reconsideration and, possibly, the reception of additional evidence. It neither granted nor denied the relief the claimant seeks. The adverse agency decision so vacated may of course be reinstated in due course but it may go the other way. Until the Secretary acts on the remand we have no insight as to what his eventual decision will be. Thus, in the words of Catlin v. United States, supra, the litigation had not reached its end on the merits and there is more for the court to do than execute the judgment, or, as Judge Ridge said, in Smith v. Sherman, supra, p. 551 of 349 F. 2d, the district court's action by no means was "the last word of the law." Neither we nor counsel have found a case precisely in point. Because remand is statutorily authorized by § 205 (g) and is common, see, for example, Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F. 2d 413, 414 (8 Cir. 1965), and Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F. 2d 498, 500 (8 Cir. 1963), the very absence of precise authority may be indicative of general acceptance of the proposition that a district court's remand is not a final decision. Two recent cases in the Third Circuit, however, are scarcely distinguishable. In each of these the Secretary, before filing his answer, and as permitted by 205 (g), moved to remand for the taking of additional testimony. His motion was granted. The appeal therefrom was dismissed on the ground that the remand order was not final within the meaning of § 1291. Marshall v. Celebrezze, 351 F. 2d 467 (3 Cir. 1965); Mayersky v. Celebrezze, 353 F. 2d 89 (3 Cir. 1965). Although the district court in the present case effected the remand on its own motion, after the Secretary's answer had been filed and after study of the merits, we see no distinction whatsoever, so far as legal precept is concerned, between the Third Circuit cases and this one. Those cases are precedent here and, furthermore, we agree with them. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp. v. Vallot, 334 F. 2d 358, 360 (5 Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 974, affords further support. The appeal is not saved by any theory that the district court was without power to remand or that it had legally insufficient reasons for sending the case back. The very language of § 205 provides the answer to the ques tion of basic power, for remand is specifically authorized, either on motion of the Secretary before answer or "at any time, on good cause shown." And we cannot say that the district court's remand was without good cause (a) when the court possessed a reasonable desire for existing documentary evidence and reports omitted from the record, Flemming v. Rhoades, 276 F. 2d 788 (5 Cir. 1960); Angell v. Flemming, 291 F. 2d 72, 75 (4 Cir. 1961); Sage v. Celebrezze, 246 F. Supp. 285, 288 (W.D. Va. 1965); Wray v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390, 394-96 (W.D. Ark. 1958); (b) when it felt unsure about the adequacy and fairness of the administrative hearing because of the claimant's unfamiliarity with procedure, see Arms v. Gardner, 353 F. 2d 197, 199 (6 Cir. 1965); (c) when, after the Secretary's decision became final on November 4, 1964, the statutory definitions of disability contained in § 216(i) (1) (A) and in § 223 (c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (A) and § 423 (c) (2), were amended, made less stringent, and made applicable to this case (Pub. L. 89-97, § 303(f) (1), 79 Stat. 368); Nichols v. Gardner, 361 F. 2d 963, 967 (8 Cir. 1966); Byrd v. Gardner, 358 F. 2d 291 (5 Cir. 1966); Sergeant v. Gardner, 361 F. 2d 334 (6 Cir. 1966); and (d) when it felt that an improper standard may have been applied by the hearing examiner, Moncrief v. Gardner, 357 F. 2d 651, 652 (5 Cir. 1966). * The appeal is dismissed. SECTIONS 205 (a), 216(i) and 223.-FINALITY OF DECISION-NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY-RES JUDICATA 20 CFR 404.937(a), 404.956-404.958 SSR 68-12a Where the claimant alleged in his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed in September 1961 that he became unable to work in November 1957, and his application was denied initially by the Social Security Administration on January 4, 1962, and the claimant requested no review thereof but filed a new application in March 1966, again alleging he became unable to work in November 1957, and he was found by reason of new and material evidence to be under a disability from November 1957 within the meaning of the Act as in effect before enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, held, (1) the rules of administrative finality set forth in sections 404.956-404.958 of Social Security Administration Regulations No. 4 preclude the reopening of the initial determination of January 4, 1962, because more than 4 years had elapsed before new and material evidence was submitted with the application of March 1966; however, (2) a determination of entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits based on the March 1966 application is not precluded by section 404.937, subsection (a) (res judicata) of Social Security Administration Regulations No. 4, because such determination is not based on the same facts pertinent to the same issue as the unfavorable determination of January 1962. Accordingly, the claimant is entitled on his application of March 1966 to a period of disability beginning in November 1957, and to disability insurance benefits beginning March 1965, the twelfth month before the month in which he filed such application. This case is before the Appeals Council on its own motion for review of the hearing examiner's decision dated February 1, 1967. The hearing examiner held that the claimant is entitled to a period of disability and to disability insurance benefits under the applicable provisions of the Social Security Act, as amended. Specifically, he found that the claimant became |