respondent's, in which the conviction was not yet final when Edwards was decided. The petition in No. 83–1747 accordingly presents a question left open in Solem v. Stumes.

The Court's decision in Stumes, however, sheds considerable light on the correctness of the Sixth Circuit's decision in respondent's case. First, the Court concluded, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's view, that the analysis adopted in United States v. Johnson, supra, is not applicable to the decision whether Edwards is retroactive. 465 U. S., at 643, n. 3. Thus, the Court of Appeals followed an erroneous approach in considering the retroactivity of Edwards. Second, the rationale of the Court in Solem v. Stumes casts into substantial doubt the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Edwards presents a ground for ordering a new trial in respondent's case. The Court reasoned that Edwards "has only a tangential relation to truthfinding at trial," 465 U. S., at 643-644; that police cannot "be faulted if they did not anticipate [the] per se approach" of Edwards, 465 U. S., at 647; and that "retroactive application of Edwards would have a disruptive effect on the administration of justice," id., at 650. Although new arguments, of course, might be made to blunt the force of this reasoning in cases presenting different facts from those presented in Stumes, the reasoning of Stumes strongly suggests that Edwards should not retroactively render inadmissible a statement, such as those at issue in respondent's case, obtained by police years before Edwards was decided.

Because the petition in No. 83-1747 presents an open question and because Solem v. Stumes makes highly doubtful the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals, I think it likely that four Justices will vote to grant the petition. As for disposition of the case on the merits, I think it likely that the Court will either (1) give plenary consideration to the question left open in Solem v. Stumes and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals or (2) vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Solem v. Stumes. I further conclude that the "stay

equities" balance in petitioner's favor: granting the stay for the time necessary to consider the petition should not cause a significant incremental burden to respondent, who has been incarcerated for several years, but doing so will relieve the State of Ohio of the burden of releasing respondent or retrying him.

I therefore grant the application for a stay of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Rose v. Engle, supra, pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 83-1747.

It is so ordered.

INDEX

ACCESS OF PUBLIC TO FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION "CONSULTATIVE PROCESS" MEETINGS. See Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act.

ADMISSION TO STATE BAR. See Antitrust Acts, 1.

"ADMONITION” TO JURY ON ACCUSED'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY.
See Criminal Law, 1.

ADVERTISING SIGNS FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES. See Con-
stitutional Law, IV.

AIR CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR LOST CARGO. See Warsaw
Convention.

ALIENS. See Constitutional Law, VII, 2.

ANESTHESIOLOGISTS' CONTRACT WITH HOSPITAL. See Anti-
trust Acts, 2.

ANTITRUST ACTS.

1. Admission to Arizona Bar-Liability of bar examiners-State-action
doctrine. In a Sherman Act action brought by an unsuccessful applicant
for admission to Arizona Bar against State Bar, members of a committee
appointed by Arizona Supreme Court to administer bar examinations, and
others-alleging that defendants had conspired to restrain trade by setting
grade scale on bar examination so as to artificially reduce number of com-
peting attorneys in State-challenged conduct was in reality that of Ari-
zona Supreme Court and was thus exempt from liability under state-action
doctrine. Hoover v. Ronwin, p. 558.

2. Hospital's contract with anesthesiologists-Tying arrangement.-A
contract between a hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists requiring that
all anesthesiological services for hospital's patients be performed by firm
did not violate § 1 of Sherman Act as constituting a per se illegal "tying
arrangement" or as unreasonably restraining competition. Jefferson
Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, p. 2.

ARBITRATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1; Collective-
Bargaining Agreements.

ARIZONA. See Antitrust Acts, 1.

1305

ARREST OF ACCUSED AT HOME. See Constitutional Law, VII, 3.

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VI.

AT-LARGE ELECTIONS. See Voting Rights Act of 1965.

ATTORNEY'S FEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2.

AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, VII, 1.

BACKPAY ORDERS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
See National Labor Relations Board.

BAIL. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2.

BAR EXAMINERS' IMMUNITY FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY.
See Antitrust Acts, 1.

BOUNDARIES.

Louisiana and Mississippi-Oil and gas well under Mississippi
River. It was not necessary to determine exact location of boundary
between Louisiana and Mississippi in a certain reach of Mississippi River
since Special Master properly concluded that (1) only issue to be resolved
centered on location of bottom hole of an oil and gas well drilled direc-
tionally under river from a surface location on riparian land in Mississippi,
and (2) bottom hole's location was within Louisiana at all pertinent times,
regardless of boundary's exact location. Louisiana v. Mississippi, p. 96.
BREATH-ANALYSIS TEST. See Constitutional Law, VII, 3.

CALIFORNIA. See Water Rights.

CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law,
VI, 2.

"CHECK KITING." See Constitutional Law, VI, 1.

CHEMICAL TESTS FOR DRUGS. See Constitutional Law, VII, 5.
CHILD CUSTODY AS AFFECTED BY INTERRACIAL MAR-
RIAGES. See Constitutional Law, III.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871.

1. Employee's action-Prior arbitration of grievance.-In an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, a federal court should not afford res judicata or
collateral-estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration proceeding brought
under a collective-bargaining agreement, and hence petitioner's § 1983
action-alleging that he was discharged from respondent city's police force
for exercising First Amendment rights-was not barred by an arbitration
award against him under grievance procedures of collective-bargaining
agreement. McDonald v. West Branch, p. 284.

1

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871-Continued.

2. Immunity of judicial officer-Injunctive relief—Attorney's fees.-Ju-
dicial immunity does not bar (1) prospective injunctive relief in an action
brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against a judicial officer or (2) an award
of attorney's fees against such officer under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976-such as in instant § 1983 action challenging constitu-
tionality of petitioner County Magistrate's practice of imposing bail on
persons (such as respondents) arrested for nonjailable state offenses and of
incarcerating those persons if they cannot meet bail. Pulliam v. Allen,
p. 522.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.

1. Discrimination suit against employer-Limitations period-Com-
plaint. Where (1) after filing a discrimination charge with Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, respondent received a right-to-sue letter
informing her that she could file suit against employer within 90 days from
receipt of letter, as provided by Title VII of Act, (2) she mailed right-to-
sue letter, with a request for appointment of counsel, to District Court
within 90-day period, (3) when she received a questionnaire relating to her
request for appointment of counsel, she was reminded that a complaint
must be filed within 90-day period, and (4) District Court ultimately held
that she had forfeited her right to sue by failing to file a timely, proper
complaint, Court of Appeals erred in reversing apparently on alternative
grounds that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing adequacy of com-
plaints did not apply to, or had a different meaning in, Title VII litigation,
or that 90-day period was "tolled" by filing of right-to-sue letter. Baldwin
County Welcome Center v. Brown, p. 147.

2. Notice of employment discrimination charge-EEOC subpoena.—
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's subpoena duces tecum,
directing an employer to turn over certain records, was enforceable since
EEOC had complied with all strictures of Title VII of Act and an imple-
menting regulation pertaining to form and content of a charge of systemic
discrimination and to timing and adequacy of notice afforded employer.
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., p. 54.

CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976. See
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1; Con-
stitutional Law, V.

COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. See also Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 1; Railway Labor Act.

Multiemployer trust funds-Arbitration.-Respondent trustees of mul-
tiemployer employee-benefit trust funds-created under trust agreements
that were incorporated by reference into collective-bargaining agreements